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Abstract
THE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY OF HOSPITALS 
AND THE EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE:
A Critical Evaluation of the Stochastic Frontier and  the Data Envelopment 
Analysis Models to Efficiency M easurem ent 
by 
Dimitrios Tsaprounis 
Adviser Professor Michael Grossman
The investigation and measurement of administrative efficiency is an issue of great concern 
for health care policy decision makers and has important implications for the efficiency of 
the overall health care sector itself as well as for the cost containment efforts and the 
restructuring of the health care system.
The administrative cost efficiency of the United States health care system has received 
much attention during the last years, and has been under continuous criticism since it 
became widely known that the country’s administrative costs are higher than those of any 
other country in the world.
As criticism on administrative inefficiency of the U.S. health care system has intensified, 
the need for detailed empirical studies has become imperative. To answer the question of 
administrative efficiency, this study undertakes an empirical investigation of the largest 
component of the health care sector, the hospital sector. The variety of proposed health 
care reform proposals that involve the reduction of administrative costs of hospitals
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consider the application of Electronic Data Interchange as the potential mechanism 
towards streamlined administration, cost efficiency and cost containment.
Efficiency is the main concern of all economic sectors and a variety of models have been 
developed to examine every aspect o f it. In this dissertation, the two leading approaches 
to efficiency measurement (Stochastic Frontier and Data Envelopment Analysis) are used 
and compared. To increase the reliability and comparability of estimates, a variety of 
models are estimated.
In addition, an integrated model that incorporates the characteristics of the Stochastic 
Frontier with Data Envelopment Analysis techniques is developed. The model provides a 
new approach for incorporating “Technologically Consistent” information into DEA in the 
form of weight restrictions.
In this integrated framework the extent of administrative efficiency of hospitals is 
evaluated. In a second stage analysis, the determinants of inefficient performance are 
assessed with special attention to the effect of Electronic Data Interchange.
The results support the common belief that hospital administration is inefficient. Hospital 
administration appears to be the most significant determinant of hospital inefficiency. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that Electronic Data Interchange could be used as a 
mechanism of reducing administrative inefficiency.
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I1
Introduction
The administrative cost efficiency o f the United States health care system has received 
much attention during the last years, and has been under continuous criticism since it 
became widely known that the country’s administrative costs are higher than those of any 
other country in the world. The United States allocates a large proportion of its health 
care expenditures to administration. The share of the administrative outlays was estimated 
to be approximately 25 percent o f  total health care expenditures or $232,300 million in 
1993 (Hellander et. al., 1994). Even if the validity of international comparisons (in terms 
of costs, access and quality of health care provided) is questionable, the U.S. 
administrative health care system seems to be the most expensive in the world. The 
United States, as reported by Poullier (1992), spends approximately $150 per capita for 
health care administration, while Germany and the Netherlands spend only 58 and 45 
percent of the U.S. level, respectively.
As Evans (1990) pointed out: “No system can run itself; there must be some outlays for 
administration, management, and reimbursement.” But is the cost o f administering the 
current health care system justified by its benefits? Even if it is not possible to determine 
the optimal administrative share, the rising health care expenditures of the U.S. as a 
proportion of GDP and the deepening crisis in the health care system have intensified the 
debate over strategies to control any component of total costs.
Over the past 30 years, health care costs in the United States have grown at a higher rate 
than overall economic growth. Total health care spending as a percentage of GDP has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
increased from 5.6 percent in 1965 to 13.9 percent in 1994 and is projected to be 15.9 
percent in the year 2000 and 18 percent by the year 2005 (Burner S. and D. Waldo, 1995). 
The most important factors contributing to the explosion of health care spending in the 
United States include: the general economy-wide price inflation (47%), excess medical 
inflation (22%), demographic factors such as the aging o f the population and population 
growth (10%), advances in health care technology, intensity/utilization of services, and the 
cost of administration (Levit K. et al., 1991). There is evidence from the hospital sector 
that administrative expenditures grew faster (at a 90 percent rate of growth) than any 
other component of hospital costs between 1983-90 (Shulkin et al., 1993).
The investigation and measurement of administrative efficiency is an issue of great concern 
for health care policy decision makers and has important implications for the efficiency of 
the overall health care sector itself as well as for the cost containment efforts and the 
restructuring of the health care system.
Administrative costs are “expenses related to the management or supervision of the 
provision of health care coverage and services” as defined by the Office of Technology 
Assessment (U.S. OTA 1993). However, there is no widely accepted definition of what 
constitutes administrative cost for each sector of the health care system. Considerable 
debate exists about what administrative components to include in cost estimates, how 
costs should be measured, what quality of data should be used, and whether various 
efficiency proposals offer real savings. Existing studies rely on available data that is of 
limited quality and derive their estimates on the basis of broad assumptions. Often, in 
order to arrive at estimates, information is extrapolated from the state to the national level 
and from one time period to the next. However, comparison of reported estimates is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
difficult and in addition the validity of the existing estimates is questionable (U.S. OTA, 
1993). The difficulty of comparisons stems from the fact that differences in estimates can 
be attributed to lack of uniform definition as well as to differences in prices, administrative 
functions and efficiency. Furthermore, empirical investigation of the factors that influence 
administrative efficiency has not been undertaken so far.
One of the most important attempts to define administrative costs and provide the 
framework for accurate measurement was made by Kenneth Thorpe in the 1992 workshop 
sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Thorpe, 1992). Thorpe defined 
administrative costs of each health care sector as composed of four functions (transaction 
related, benefits management, selling and marketing, and regulatory/compliance) and he 
treated them as “inputs” in the production of health care services. He considered six 
sectors of the health care system (health insurance, hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, 
firms, and consumers), but his initial list is not comprehensive and can be expanded. 
Existing estimates of administrative costs for three sectors (hospitals, health insurance, 
and physicians) range between $73.6 billion in 1983 and $220.3 billion in 1993. Lewin- 
VHI (1993) provided a “synthesis” estimate of $126.1 billion for the three sectors 
combining a variety o f empirical estimates into a summary form expressed in 1991 dollars. 
Health care policy analysts and researchers have long attributed the rising burden of 
administrative cost to the structure of the health care system. There is a variety of 
proposed health care reform strategies that involve the reduction of administrative costs of 
the health care system. Studies that evaluate the effects of the alternative proposals offer 
estimates of the magnitude of the administrative cost as well as possible savings from 
restructuring the system. Among the most important health care reform proposals are the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Single Payer, the Individual Vouchers or Tax Credits, the Pay-or-Play and the Managed 
Competition. At one end, the advocates of a single payer system favor an overall 
structural change in the way the health system is financed. The single payer, “Canadian 
Type,” system could achieve cost containment and significant reduction in administrative 
costs through a government sponsored tax-financed system. At the other end, proposals 
offer reforms of the current system that promise cost control and elimination of 
administrative inefficiency. The estimates of administrative cost savings of the competing 
approaches to health care system reform range from $2.8 to $113 billions for a single year 
(U.S. OTA, 1993). However, the cost saving estimates o f all proposals involving 
administrative cost reductions are based to a large extent on the application of Electronic 
Data Interchange (EDI) technology. Analysts consider Electronic Data Interchange as the 
potential mechanism towards streamlined administration, cost efficiency, and cost 
containment.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is an integrated computerized-communication system 
of information transferring directly between two electronic entities (computers). The 
application of an electronic communication network in health care, based on common 
formats and standards, could significantly reduce administrative costs associated with the 
diverse nature of the U.S. health care system, where there are many independent providers 
of health services dealing with many independent consumers whose bills are paid by a 
multitude of independent payers.
In response to mounting criticism o f the administrative inefficiency of the U.S. health care 
system, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Louis 
Sullivan, in November 1991, formed three “workgroups” to examine the problem and
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propose solutions: The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, the Taskforce on 
Patient Information, and the Workgroup on Administrative Costs and Benefits (Marder, 
1993).
The Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI) was established to investigate 
how to reduce the administrative costs of the health care system through widespread 
adoption of electronic communications technology (WEDI, 1992). WEDI has been 
working with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to link the health care 
system using common standards. Standardization of data elements and electronic 
transmission rules will facilitate exchange of information and communication among the 
many separate entities in the health care system (Sedor, 1989). The development of a 
national electronic communication network in health care could create significant 
administrative savings. Currently the health care system uses more than 400 formats for 
electronic transactions. Implementation of ANSI standard formats would condense the 
hundred of formats to less than six and eliminate paperwork while establishing a uniform 
format for efficient data transmission (Bergman, 1993).
Electronic Data Interchange extends the organizational boundaries of the firm’s 
information system and enables interconnectedness and the rapid exchange of information 
with the information systems of its trading partners. The Electronic Data Interchange 
technology has been applied in many industries worldwide for years and its strategic 
importance as a tool of promoting efficiency and delivering competitive advantages has 
been documented (Krcmar, H. et al., 1993).
In 1992, WEDI estimated possible annual administrative savings through automation of 
claims submission, claims inquiry, enrollment, eligibility and payment remittance
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6transactions to range between $4 and $10 billion (WEDL, 1992). In 1993, WEDI engaged 
the services of the Tiber Group, Inc. to carry out research designed to provide more 
accurate and detailed estimates of administrative cost savings due to the application of 
Electronic Data Interchange. The new estimates expanded to include six more 
transactions. The combined estimates of potential savings ranged from $12.9 to $26 
billion (WEDI, 1993).
Electronic Data Interchange implementation involves not only savings but also costs.
WEDI estimated the one-time implementation cost for providers to range between $3 .8 
and $11.2 billion in 1993 (WEDI, 1993). In 1992, another study (HCFA) reported that 
Electronic Data Interchange could save providers $152.5 billion over 8 years at an 
investment cost of $38.6 billion and net savings of $113.9 billion (Lewin-VHI, 1993).
The health care industry that recently accounts for 14 percent of GDP devotes a large 
portion of its expenditures to health care information systems. One study reports that 
approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP is spent on health information systems (Sheffler, 
1986).
The impact of information technology on other industries, implemented for many years to 
improve performance, has been surrounded by controversy as the reported studies are 
contradictory or inconclusive (Mukhopadhyay et al, 1995). While businesses invest 
heavily in information technology, the expected rate of return has not been realized. The 
debate in the literature is concentrated around the so called “Robert Solow’s Paradox” .
‘You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics,’ which has 
puzzled decision makers (Oliver and Sichel, 1994).
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7The low contribution of information technology may be attributed to several factors: 
Mismanagement of information technology and misallocation of its resources (X- 
inefficiency, allocative inefficiency); Difficulty o f accurately measuring the information 
technology’s stock as an input as well as the output produced in this process; The rapid 
depreciation o f computer information systems capital stock; The fact that computers 
actually were not everywhere, as their estimated share accounted for only 2% of the 
private capital stock; The direct comparison of costs and benefits is misleading as the pay­
offs to information technology investment are not immediate [Oliver and Sichel, 1994; 
Brynjolfsson, 1991],
As criticism of administrative inefficiency of the U.S. health care system has intensified, 
the need for detailed empirical studies has become imperative. Efficiency is a main 
concern of all economic sectors and a variety of models have been developed to examine 
every aspect of it.
To answer the question of efficiency this study undertakes an empirical investigation of the 
largest component of the health care sector, the hospital sector. The hospital sector 
accounts for approximately 40 percent of the total health care expenditures.
To assess hospital efficiency and hospital administrative efficiency, the two leading 
methodologies of measuring the efficiency of a set of productive units are employed: The 
parametric Stochastic Frontier and the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis. The 
following section explains the unique advantages and limitations of the two approaches. 
Inefficiency imposes a substantial burden on producers and it pays to investigate its main 
determinants and propose solutions. In order to assess the degree of efficient performance 
and its main influences a two-stage methodology is applied. The first stage models the
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performance of the decision-making unit (hospital, administrative hospital sector), and the 
second stage investigates the factors that influence this performance. Special attention 
will be paid to the impact of information technology, and in particular the effect of 
Electronic Data Interchange application on hospital administration.
In addition, this study attempts a direct comparison of the main tools of efficiency 
measurement. Estimates of inefficiency are very sensitive to method (approach) used and 
within a given approach to model specification or assumptions made. The inefficiency 
index obtained from the same sample with the two alternative approaches may be very 
different (Button et al., 1992). The differences may be due to the different assumptions 
employed by the two techniques. Estimates of the stochastic frontier depend on the 
specification of the functional form of the model and the assumption about the distribution 
of the one-sided error term, while estimates of DEA, which have no statistical properties, 
are subject to flexibility of the value-free model assigned multipliers and to data 
inaccuracies.
A comparative analysis will be undertaken and the similarities or differences will be 
investigated. The stochastic frontier model will be compared to alternative DEA 
formulations and extensions. Since the technology under consideration is a multiple- 
output and multiple-input technology, only a parametric cost function can be estimated. A 
cost function accommodates multiple-outputs and muitiple-inputs and yields technical and 
allocative efficiency. The DEA technique that also accommodates multiple-outputs and 
multiple-inputs models a production function and yields only technical efficiency.
The differences in estimates between the two approaches reported so far may be due to 
the different modeling behavior of the two models as well.
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9Recent developments of DEA methodology (as the Cone Ratio/Assurance Region and the 
cost-minimizing DEA) extended its boundaries towards an overall cost-minimizing goal. 
The first technique, the Cone Ratio/Assurance Region, in the absence o f input prices, 
incorporates information through a set o f multiplier restrictions and enriches the estimated 
technical efficiency with elements o f allocative efficiency [Thompson et al., 1990; Chames 
et al., 1990], In addition, this technique limits the flexibility of multipliers that can lead to 
erroneous results. Studies have found that often the DEA-assigned weights (multipliers) 
do not reflect the actual importance of the factors of production [Thompson et al., 1990; 
Dyson and Thanassoulis, 1988; Wong and Beasley, 1990]. The estimated frontier and the 
resulted measure of efficiency may be unrealistic if the assigned weights are unreasonable. 
The extended DEA model, the “Cone-Ratio/ Assurance Region,” introduces constraints 
on multipliers that reflect “experts’ opinions” about the actual importance o f respective 
inputs or outputs [Chames et al., 1990; Thompson et a., 1990],
This paper proposes a new approach for incorporating price information into estimation 
and at the same time restricting the DEA weight flexibility. This method provides a link 
between the two approaches (stochastic and DEA) and attempts to bring the estimated 
inefficiencies closer. Specifically, the mathematical programming - DEA model is used in 
conjunction with the econometric - stochastic frontier model. The stochastic approach 
model is estimated and the estimated production characteristics are used to constrain the 
weights of the DEA model. The set of regression based constraints form the 
Technologically Consistent-Assurance Region (TC-AR) that guides the DEA multipliers 
to objective estimating grounds in terms o f both weight flexibility and overall cost 
efficiency.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
The second technique incorporates into estimation, in addition to output and input 
vectors, a vector of input prices and yields overall cost efficiency, allocative and technical 
(Fare et al., 1994). The cost-minimizing DEA is the mathematical programming analog to 
the stochastic cost frontier model.
In addition to the weight-restricted DEA, the cost minimizing-DEA model will be 
estimated. As the cost-minimizing DEA model accounts for both technical and allocative 
inefficiency, its estimated inefficiency is expected to be closer to inefficiency obtained from 
the stochastic frontier model. Finally, comparison and combination of the desirable 
features of the two approaches will improve the accuracy and reliability of the results.
1.1 The Plan o f the Thesis
The overall purpose o f this paper is:
(1) to examine the extent of administrative hospital inefficiency, an issue o f great concern 
among health care reformers and policy makers;
(2) to identify potential sources o f administrative inefficiency focusing mainly on the effect 
of electronic data interchange technology;
(3) to critically evaluate the alternative approaches to efficiency measurement (stochastic 
frontier and DEA) and to propose and develop links that might bring estimated 
inefficiencies closer and might increase their accuracy for policy analysis.
For the first time, to my knowledge, the efficiency o f the health care related administration 
is econometrically evaluated, as well as the impact of EDI technology on efficiency in the 
health care sector in general. Estimates of efficiency are obtained parametrically and non-
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parametrically. In addition, the TC-AR model provides a new methodology of specifying 
boundary conditions in a DEA/Cone-Ratio framework that links the two leading efficiency 
models (stochastic and DEA) and increases the reliability o f estimation.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step a frontier model (stochastic and DEA) 
is estimated, and a firm specific index of inefficiency is constructed. The second step 
evaluates the determinants of inefficiency focusing on administrative technology (EDI). 
Special attention will be paid to econometric specification of an inefficiency regression 
model.
The second section of this study, that follows this introduction, describes the methodology 
of the two approaches to efficiency measurement; the stochastic frontier approach and the 
mathematical programming approach (DEA). The third section illustrates the specification 
and estimation of the hospital cost frontier function and related econometric issues. The 
specification and estimation of the administrative hospital cost frontier function is 
contained in the fourth section. The fifth section investigates the efficiency of the above 
functions using alternative DEA models, included the weight restricted and the cost- 
minimizing DEA. The sixth section discusses the modeling of inefficiency and the 
contribution of EDI to administrative inefficiency. An evaluation of findings, concluding 
observations, and policy implications are included in the seventh section.
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2
Measuring Efficiency: The Stochastic Frontier and the Data 
Envelopment Analysis Approaches
2.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades a number of econometric and mathematical programming 
techniques have been developed for the estimation o f frontiers (production and cost) and 
the measurement of economic efficiency (allocative and/or technical efficiency). The 
economic concept of frontier defines the optimum behavior. In economics the optimizing 
behavior of the firm is taken as given and economic models examine the performance of 
the firm assuming efficiency. However, firms may fail to optimize their performance, 
particularly in the short run and produce below the maximum possible production frontier 
or above the minimum possible cost frontier. Deviations from the frontier (production or 
cost) which provides the benchmark indicate inefficient performance.
A production function relates the maximum output obtainable from a given set o f inputs 
and a given level o f technology. Since the production function defines the maximum 
performance (optimal), deviations from the frontier are interior points, take only negative 
values and are considered as less efficient combination of inputs.
A cost function specifies the minimum possible total cost of operation given the levels of 
outputs, input prices and the level of technological knowledge. Since the cost frontier 
defines the minimum cost of operation, deviations from the cost frontier are positive and 
indicate inefficiency. Inefficiency reflects the firm’s inability to meet its objectives.
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The objective o f measuring efficiency is the identification o f best performers as well as the 
identification of worst performers. Then, the determinants of their performance can be 
analyzed. The information derived from the analysis could be helpful to the industry as 
well as to the government for policy analysis.
2.2 Efficiency Measurement Methods
Farrell (1957) provided the basic framework o f measuring inefficiency. He introduced the 
formulation and estimation of frontiers as a generalization of the Pareto efficiency concept. 
Farrell termed inefficiency the deviations of actual performance from an optimal frontier 
and used Linear Programming techniques to estimate it. Farrell’s work motivated the 
development of a number of theoretical techniques and empirical applications.
Followers extended the mathematical programming approach but also they developed an 
alternative econometric approach. Ail the developments in frontier estimation can be 
generally classified according to the estimation technique used as mathematical 
programming (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) and econometric techniques or 
according to the statistical properties of estimators as deterministic (non-parametric) and 
stochastic (parametric) approaches. Forsund et al. (1980), Bauer (1990), and Seiford, and 
Thrall (1990) provide an excellent classification and review of the studies and techniques 
of frontier estimation.
In general, inefficiency can be classified as technical inefficiency or allocative inefficiency. 
Technical inefficiency is defined as performance above the minimum possible cost or 
below the maximum possible output obtainable from a given set of inputs. Technical
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inefficient performance is the result of excessive use o f inputs. Allocative inefficiency, 
which reflects the optimal choice o f inputs, is defined as performance deviated from the 
least cost expansion path (Forsund et al., 1980). In the literature the notion technical 
inefficiency is used interchangeably with the term X-inefficiency. However, there are 
some differences between the two definitions. The term X-inefficiency introduced by 
Leibenstein (1966) to define the existence of non-allocative and not strictly technical 
inefficiency. Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency is not subject to neoclassical optimization 
framework and includes additional organizational aspects of human behavior not 
controllable by the decision maker as motivation, effort, and work ethic [Leibenstein,
1977; Leibenstein and Maical, 1992],
A production function frontier that theoretically includes only input levels as its arguments 
yields only technical inefficiency estimates. The cost function that includes input prices as 
well as output levels provides overall inefficiency (technical and allocative).
While the traditional estimation method o f ordinary least squares (OLS) measures the 
average economic behavior allowing deviations from the average to sum to zero, the 
stochastic frontier specifies the “optimum” and not the “average” behavior, so deviations 
from the optimum are one-sided and non-zero. The observed actual production can not 
exceed the maximum possible (optimal) production defined by the production frontier and 
the actual cost of operation can not fall below the minimum possible cost that determines 
the cost frontier (Lovell, C.A.K., 1995). The estimated frontier can provide quantitative 
information on firm specific performance and is superior to the traditional optimizing 
model (OLS) since the later becomes a testable hypothesis (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979).
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The stochastic frontier, proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977), specifies a composite error regression model that integrates a 
two-sided random component and a one-sided component representing inefficiency. 
Specifically this model distinguishes between random shocks and firm specific effects.
This model is based on the assumption that the frontier is stochastic rather than fixed.
Each firm shares the same functional form but each firm is subject to a unique frontier, 
which is stochastic and can vary randomly as the firm’s productive or cost possibilities.
The stochastic econometric approach provides total residual inefficiency for each 
productive unit, but it can not break this measure down by input/output components and 
identify their efficient level of operation.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric technique, which was developed 
by Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) following Farrell’s objectives. The deterministic 
approach to inefficiency measurement, constructs a piecewise linear surface, “the empirical 
frontier,” and converts the basic elements of production (inputs and outputs) into an 
efficiency index which reflects the firm’s relative performance. DEA evaluates each 
productive unit and provides specific detailed information about its performance, which 
the alternative parametric approach can not provide. Specifically, not only is the total 
inefficiency measured but also the deviations of all inputs (excess consumption) and 
outputs (slacks) from benchmark efficient levels. Having information on the efficiency 
level of each productive unit as well as efficiency by input/output component, the 
decision-makers can apply the appropriate policy to improve the performance o f inefficient 
productive units.
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The estimation of deterministic frontiers by mathematical programming does not rely on a 
specific functional form, so, it is not subject to functional misspesification. Also, no 
restrictive assumptions are imposed or implied other than the convexity o f the data set. In 
addition, the Data Envelopment Analysis can accommodate multiple input/multiple output 
production functions with flexibility. Even environmental factors not strictly defined 
inputs and outputs can be included in the estimation process (Seiford and Thrall, 1990). 
However, the obtained DEA estimates have no statistical properties. So, tests o f 
significance, statistical inferences and goodness of fit measures can not be carried out. 
Another disadvantage of the deterministic frontier is the significant influence exercised on 
estimates by sampling outliers, data errors and variable selection. Summing up all the 
uncontrollable influences with inefficiency can seriously bias the estimates upward or 
downward as statistical noise appears as inefficiency.
The stochastic frontier is not sensitive to inaccurate observations and allows the separation 
of random effects or statistical noise from the firm-specific (controllable) effects.
However, this technique is subject to a selected (explicit) functional form and possible 
misspecification. Also, the validity o f certain assumptions regarding the statistical 
properties of the composite term is questionable.
The omission of critical variables and the number of variables (inputs and outputs) 
included affects the estimates of both approaches (Seiford and Thrall, 1990). The 
stochastic approach is subject to limitations of independent observations (degrees of 
freedom) left for estimation, as the frequently used flexible functional form specification 
requires multi-interaction terms and a large numbers of estimated coefficients. DEA 
estimates, also, depend on the relation between the dimensions of the s + m matrix
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(s-outputs and m-inputs) and the number of observations (Decision-Making Units). So, as 
the number of variables increases the number of efficient found DMUs increases (Seiford 
and Thrall, 1990). The efficiency rating of a given DMU will not decrease with an 
additional variable and it will not increase if a variable is omitted (Epstein and Henderson,
1989).
The stochastic cost frontier, which includes arguments of both outputs and input prices, 
allows the estimation of both technical and allocative inefficiencies or total inefficiency. 
The mathematical programming technique, which relates inputs and outputs, measures 
technical efficiency. Alternative DEA models have been developed in addition to the basic 
model. A cost-minimizing DEA model that incorporates input prices yields overall cost 
efficiency (technical and allocative). An extended DEA formulation, the Assurance 
Region/Cone Ratio, which incorporates external information in the form of weight 
restrictions into estimation, may provide estimates of efficiency closer to the overall level.
2.3. Review of the Literature
The excessive growth of expenditures of the health care sector has initiated substantial 
research to identify the causes and propose solutions. The health care sector is dominated 
by not-for-profit “firms” and organizations with unique characteristics that are not subject 
to market optimization criteria o f other sectors of the economy. The approaches of profit- 
maximization and utility-maximization as well as a mixed approach have been investigated 
extensively in the literature of hospital behavior. However, both are subject to criticism.
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The profit-maximizing behavior has been criticized as inappropriate for the health sector 
and the utility-maximizing model as unnecessarily complex (Estaugh, 1992).
An alternative approach, proposed by Cowing, Holtman and Powers, (1983), involves the 
optimization o f a cost minimizing behavior, a general assumption consistent with the 
character and mission of the health care sector (hospitals, physicians, e.t.c.).
However, theoretical and empirical economic models exist suggesting that the hypothesis 
of cost minimizing behavior may not occur in the hospital sector and in the health care 
sector in general (Sloan and Steinwald, 1980).
Newhouse (1970) questioned the economic behavior of nonprofit organizations to 
produce at the minimum cost level. Cost inefficiency results either from a preference to 
(more expensive) quality or existence o f barriers to entry in the nonprofit hospital market. 
Newhouse argues that philanthropy and third party reimbursement promotes inefficiency 
(gives some latitude for inefficiency) and prevents entry for profit makers. All these 
conditions can weaken the least cost behavior.
Lee (1971) developed the utility maximizing theory of hospital behavior to explain the 
departure from cost minimization and optimal behavior. The deviations from the minimum 
cost operation are attributed to a utility maximizing hospital (as opposed to profit or sales 
maximizing) which is motivated to increase the stock of inputs without any adequate 
increase in outputs, stimulating waste and inefficiency.
The hospital firms are subject to uncertain demand for their services that may distort their 
optimizing behavior. Hospitals in order to fulfill their special mission prefer to maintain an 
excess capacity and may fail to reach the efficient “frontier” level o f operation. The 
uncertain environment in which hospitals operate distorts the structure of their cost
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function. Gaynor and Anderson (1995), and Friedman and Pauly (1981) estimated a cost 
function that included uncertain demand as an argument to examine how the uncertainty of 
demand affects the hospital cost structure and efficiency. They found that uncertain 
demand is a significant factor of hospital cost behavior.
Empirical studies focused on regulated industries found evidence of distortions of optimal 
input ratios and significant allocative inefficiency in government regulated firms (Fare et 
al., 1985). Regulation of the hospital sector drew attention and the possible effects on 
cost structure and inefficiency were extensively studied (Sloan and Steinwald, 1980). 
Market conditions in the health care industry as restrictions, interventions and heavy 
regulations, the reimbursement system (third-party payments), and the dominance of the 
non-for-profit organizations can distort the optimal combination of choices (inputs, 
outputs, and technology) and consequently the marginal behavior of the firm. However, 
under these conditions the traditional optimizing model is not appropriate and produces 
biased coefficients.
Empirical hospital cost studies that relaxed the assumptions of cost minimizing behavior 
reported significant departures from the optimal behavior. Goldman and Grossman (1983) 
examined the allocative inefficiency o f Community Health Centers and found evidence of 
inefficient mix of inputs. A firm specific index of inefficiency was constructed which was 
modeled to identify the possible sources o f inefficiency as well as the cost savings 
associated with efficient performance.
Eakin and Kniesner (1988) questioned the cost minimizing behavior of hospitals and 
developed an economic model to estimate the extent of hospital (allocative) inefficiency in 
the United States. They estimated an average inefficiency between 4 and 5 percent ($2.2
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billion in 1976) using a data set of 331 U.S. hospitals for the period 1975-76. Eakin 
(1991) investigated the determinants o f hospitals’ allocative inefficiency of this study. 
Zuckerman et al, (1994) applied the stochastic cost frontier to a sample o f U.S. hospitals 
and found significant inefficiency. Hospital inefficiency was as high as 18.8 percent. 
Controlling for output and patient characteristics as well as output quality the overall 
(technical and allocative) inefficiency was reduced to 13.4 percent.
Data Envelopment Analysis has been applied to a variety of health care settings: Sherman 
(1984), Grosskorf and Valdmanis (1987), and Byrnes and Valdmanis (1989; 1995) 
modeled the efficiency of the hospital sector, Chilingerian (1995) evaluated the efficiency 
of physicians in hospitals; Banker and Morey (1986b) and Capettini et al., (1985) 
examined the efficiency of pharmacies; Nunamaker (1983), Rosko et al., (1995) and 
Kooreman (1994) investigated the efficiency of the nursing home sector as well as its 
determinants.
Banker, Conrad and Strauss (1986) compared the stochastic and DEA approaches using a 
sample of North Carolina hospitals. The two models exhibited similarities and differences 
in terms of estimated marginal rates o f output transformation and returns to scale.
A comparative analysis of DEA and translog regression was conducted by Banker, 
Chames, Cooper and Maindirata, (1988). They found that the DEA estimates 
approximated better a “true production function” (obtained by simulation) than the 
translog model that allows for inefficiency. Wagstaff, (1989), estimated hospital efficiency 
and compared deterministic and stochastic techniques and concluded that the stochastic 
model performs better. So, the literature provides inconclusive or contradictory 
comparative evaluations of the two approaches.
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However, the Stochastic Frontier and the Data Envelopment Analysis could be considered 
“complementary” techniques to efficiency evaluation. Both share unique advantages and 
limitations or weaknesses (Sherman, 1984). Consequently, the application and 
coordination of the two techniques can improve the quality o f estimates and can advance 
the understanding of inefficient behavior and its determinants. This study intends the 
application and coordination of the two methods.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.4 The Stochastic Frontier Model
The stochastic econometric cost frontier model may be written as: 
C=f(Y,W;X)e^u or InCt=lnC(Y,W;X) -  v, -  u, (2 .4 ) -1
where C  is total cost, Fis a vector of outputs, fV is a vector o f input prices, and X  
represents other output characteristics and cost determinants.
The composite one-sided disturbance term (£) = v,- + «£-) is defined as the sum of the 
errors v,- and «,•. The v, component of £i follows a symmetric distribution and reflects the 
random effects of exogenous socks and measurement errors. In the stochastic frontier 
environment, by assumption, vt- is normally distributed with mean 0 and constant variance 
(v, ~/V (0, a 2 )). The distribution of vt is:
m = -exp
r
V
(2 .4)-2
The «,• component o f Si is one-sided and captures the firm-specific deviations from the 
stochastic frontier. The assumption of how the second component of the composite error 
is distributed is critically important. In the literature four distributional assumptions are 
employed for the inefficiency term a,-: the half-normal distribution with mean zero 
(«, ~N\(0, a 2 ) |) , the truncated normal with nonzero mean (m, ~ N \ ( ^  <j 2 )|) , the 
exponential, and the gamma distribution.
One of the most widely used distributions is the half normal (u, ~ \N(0,au2)\), (Cowing, 
Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1983).
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The half-normal distribution o f i s :
V2/r<<r.)
exp
\_
2
r \  u
u, > 0
(2.4)-3
=  0 u, < 0
The joint density function of the composite error f, = v,- + «t- under this assumption, 
following Stevenson, (1980), is:
2
r \  
E eX  "
f ( e / a  , X )  = — <f> — 1 _  cp — ——
cr <er )  ^ a  >
- o o < £ < ± a o  (2 .4)-4
where cr = arv2 + cru" ; X = aj<yv ; <f> is the standard normal density function and <t> is the 
standard cumulative distribution function.
The parameter X = g«'<jv indicates the degree of asymmetry of the composite error s  or 
the level of inefficiency. The greater the distance of actual firm performance from the 
frontier, the larger the parameter X, and the larger the degree of inefficiency. Performance 
on the frontier (optimal performance) implies that X equals zero and e, = v-t and the 
stochastic frontier model reduces to OLS.
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The log-likelihood function of the model (under a half-normal distribution o f«,), 
following Bauer (1990), is:
2 n 2 
In Z,(lnC / P  , X , a  ) = —In------ « l n < r -
2 K
r \  
I n  2 n 
Z f  + Z ln
i i
i _ d | .
(2.4)-5
sX
a  J J
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood with OLS estimates as started values. 
Inefficiency is calculated from the residuals of the model. The residual of the model is the 
composite term e, (e  = lnC -fi‘x). Average inefficiency (mean of u) equals average e 
(residuals of the model) since the mean of v by assumption is zero: E(M)=E(s)=(2/7t)1/2a u. 
The predicted value is calculated as /3‘x  - £/«/.
The firm specific inefficiency (or observation specific inefficiency) can be obtained as the 
expected value of the inefficiency term u conditional on the composite error s  as 
proposed by Jodrow et al. (1982):
E( u  I s )  =
2 A *
sk
sX
1 -  0> sX (2.4)-6
However, as Greene, (1993), pointed out the expected value of the inefficiency term is an 
unbiased estimator of u but it is inconsistent. The variance of the estimator does not 
approach zero as the sample size increases indefinitely. The index of inefficient obtained 
above from the single equation cost function incorporates both Farrell’s technical 
inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. However, the separation of the two components
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and the share of allocative in a stochastic environment has not been definitely answered.
A variety of approaches have been proposed but they are based on specification 
restrictions and assumptions that are subject to criticism. The decomposition of total 
inefficiency into its components might generate conceptual benefits but involves restrictive 
assumptions and methods that depart from the objectives of this study. The stochastic 
frontier model is criticized for its distributional assumption of the error term. This 
assumption is considered very restrictive particularly when a cross sectional model is used. 
For a cost function the residuals are positively skewed when inefficiency is present.
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2.5 The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Model
Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) operationalized the conceptual framework of Farrell 
(1957) introducing a mathematical programming model to efficiency measurement. The 
linear programming approach after that was generalized and was extended in a series of 
papers [Seiford and Thrall, 1990; Ali and Seiford, 1993].
Let’s consider a set of n multiple input, multiple output productive units or Decision- 
Making-Units (DMU). Each DMUt in the process of producing the vector of outputs Yk 
consumes the vector of inputs X k.
The efficiency problem involves the maximization of the ratio of the sum of the weighted 
outputs to the sum of the weighted inputs for each DMU subject to the constraint that the 
efficiency of each unit is lower or equal to I.
£ r  y  rQ
m a x  3 ° =   subject to:
£  •'.X.O
and
where y* = the rth output o f DMU k for
x* = the ith input o f DMU k 
Hr = weight (coefficient) o f rth output 
v, = weight (coefficient) o f ith input
Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) used the fractional programming theory of Chames 
and Cooper (1962) to transform the above nonlinear system to a linear programming 
problem, where the numerator of the ratio is maximized and the denominator is set equal
s
r = l ................ < Im
£  v ,x,k
i=i 
f i r ,  V i ^ O
( 2 .5 H
k =  l,...,n 
r = l,...,s 
i = l,...,m
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to I (model 2.5-2). The mathematical programming formulation has a dual representation. 
It can be stated as an envelopment problem (also called Primal), or a multiplier problem 
(also called Dual). One o f  the two equivalent formulations needs to be solved and then 
the duality of linear programming yields solutions for the second.
The multiplier form:
max^v S0 =  M-Yk,
Subject to: vXk = I,
IlY  - vX < 0,
H >0, v > 0,
The envelopment form: 
minej. 0,
Subject to: YX > Yk, (2 .5)-2
e x k -xA. > 0 ,
X>0,
The parameter 0 is a scalar that satisfies the condition 0 < 1 meaning that the DMU is 
efficient if 0 = I and inefficient if 0 is lower than 1.
The following formulation (2.5)-3 and (2.5)-4, (the additive model, developed by Chames, 
Cooper, Golany, Seiford and Stutz (1985)), provides an illustrative introduction to DEA 
analysis.
The Yk, Xk are the vectors of s outputs and m inputs for DMUk, and Y, and X are the 
s x n and m x i  matrices o f outputs and inputs, respectively. The optimal solution of the 
multiplier problem yields the n sets of multipliers or coefficients (|X, v), while pk, and vk 
indicate the vectors o f their lower bounds.
The parameter Xk (n-vector) identifies the efficient peer group for each DMU and defines 
a projected point on the envelopment surface, (Yt ,Xt ), for each actual point (Yfc, Xk).
The projected point can be expressed as(Yk.X t ) = (Yk + sk, Xk - efc). For efficient DMU 
the projected point equal to the actual point (since sk= 0, and ek= 0). The peer group or
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the convex combination of dominating DMUs of each inefficient DMU constructs the 
frontier.
The optimal solution of the envelopment problem (for each DMUk) yields the output 
slacks sk (output s-vector), and the excess inputs ek (input m-vector).
The CRS model (CCR): The Constant Returns to Scale Model 
The multiplier form: The envelopment form:
max^v (xYk - vXt min^.c - (p.ks +vke>
subject to: pY - vX < 0, subject to: YX - s =Yk (2.5)-3
p > p \  v > v k - XX - e = -Xt,
\ > 0 ,  s >0,  e >0
The VRS model (BCC): Variable Returns to Scale Model
The multiplier form: The envelopment form:
max^v.o pYk - vXk + <a minj^c - (M-ks +vke>
subject to pY - vX + 0 1 < 0, subject to YX - s =Yk
p > p k, v > v k - X X - e  = -Xk, (2.5H
IX = 1
X>0,  s >0,  e >0
The model is solved n times for each DMU. The optimal solution reflects the efficiency of 
the DMUk being evaluated. The empirical production frontier (envelopment surface) is 
determined and the relative efficiency of each unit is estimated. An efficient DMU is 
located on the envelopment surface (pkY - vkX = 0), while an inefficient one falls below 
the envelopment surface.
The relative efficiency is equivalent to Pareto efficiency. A DMU is defined as Pareto 
efficient if there is no other DMU or a linear combination of DMUs that can improve one
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of its input/output levels without at the same time deteriorating at least one of its 
remaining input output levels.
The above formulation (model 2.5-3) termed CCR after Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes 
(1978). The CCR model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS) forcing the hyperplane 
(envelopment surface) to pass through the origin. The efficiency score derived under CRS 
measures overall technical efficiency. Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984) provided a 
variable returns to scale formulation (VRS), termed BCC model. The additional
rt
constraint introduced in the envelopment form, 1A = I, (equivalent to A, = l ), is
i=i
related to the additional variable <d in the multiplier form. Both A. and (D allow for Variable 
Returns to Scale (VRS).
In the multiplier form of the VRS formulation, maximization of the objective function 
yields the virtual multiplier vectors (also called coefficients or prices) for each DMU: the 
Hk (output s-vector), and vk (input m-vector), and in addition, the variable o k The DMU 
k, in this case, is efficient if it lies on the empirical frontier defined by the HkY - vkX + CDk = 
0 condition. In CRS the supporting hyperplane of the envelopment surface passes through 
the origin.
In the VRS formulation the sign of the variable (o for an efficient observation may indicate 
the type of returns to scale; decreasing for co < 0, increasing for co > 0, or constant returns 
for co = 0 (Banker, Chames and Cooper, 1984). But the type of returns to scale of 
inefficient DMUs can not be determined with this method (Olesen, 1995). The estimation 
of returns to scale generalized and extended from a single measure {co) to an interval 
estimate by Banker and Thrall (1992).
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For DMUs that are technically efficient DMUs under the VRS formulation, the range of co 
values defined by a lower and an upper bound identifies the type of returns to scale. A 
positive range indicates increasing returns to scale and a negative range decreasing returns 
to scale. However if the range includes zero the returns to scale are constant [Banker and 
Thrall, (1992); Banker, Bardhan and Cooper, (1996)].
The VRS formulation yields “pure” technical efficiency. In many empirical studies the 
overall technical efficiency obtained under the CRS formulation is decomposed into its 
two components, scale and pure technical efficiency.
Employing the same data, equality o f the efficiency score obtained under CRS with the 
one obtained under VRS indicates the absence of scale inefficiency. The difference 
between the two scores implies that the DMU is scale inefficient.
Fare et al., (1994) developed a method to infer returns to scale for both efficient and 
inefficient DMUs. The ratio of CRS to VRS determines the scale efficient DMUs. For 
inefficient DMUs, a different linear formulation is solved, the non-increasing returns to 
scale (NIRS). The ratio of the CRS to NIRS indicates increasing (equals to 1) or 
decreasing (less than I) returns to scale. The Fare et al., (1994) approach is used in this 
study and it is illustrated in appendix 2.1.
The coefficients /jr, v<, also, may provide estimates of production technology 
characteristics such as marginal productivities. In addition, their ratios may express 
marginal rates of transformation of outputs (,u/fij) and marginal rates o f input substitution 
(vy Vh) (Banker and Maindirata, 1986).
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There is a variety of DEA models in the literature that provide extensions of the basic 
CCR and BCC models. The variety of data envelopment models for efficiency 
measurement can be classified:
(1) according to the form of envelopment surface; constant returns to scale (CRS) or 
variable returns to scale (VRS);
(2) according to orientation; input-oriented, output-oriented or non-oriented; and
(3) according to multiplier lower bounds (pricing mechanism: equal bounds or DMU 
specific (Ali, Lerme and Seiford, 1995).
Extensions of the model include (for both CRS and VRS surfaces, and both input and 
output orientation):
i) the multiplicative model that defines a piecewise log-linear (Cobb-Douglas) surface 
(Chames, Cooper, Seiford and Stutz, 1982, 1983);
ii) the use of categorical variables in estimation (Banker and Morey, 1986b);
iii) the use of non-discretionary characterization of inputs or outputs that 
accommodate variables not controlled by the DMU and excludes them from the 
evaluation of the unit (Banker and Morey, 1986a);
iv) Weight restrictions [Dyson and Thanassoulis, (1988); Thompson et al., (1990)].
v) The Cost-DEA analysis (Fare et al., 1994).
The following discussion illustrates the extensions that will be used in the analysis. 
Specifically the two-staged input orientated model, the weight restricted model and the 
cost-DEA model.
The mathematical programming technique evaluates the n DMUs in the data set and 
constructs the envelopment surface as well as the projection of each actual point (Yk, Xk)
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on this surface. The radial distance <5* o f actual performance from its projection reflects 
the relative efficiency of the unit. This distance is a function of weighted output slacks 
and excess inputs: <5* = - (M-k*k +vkek).
Oriented models, input-oriented or output-oriented, maximize a proportional reduction in 
inputs (tc) or a proportional increase in outputs On) respectively, necessary to reach the 
projected point. The objective function can be stated as: mfn 0 = I - n  for the input- 
orientation and max <f» = 1+ r\ for the output-orientation.
Oriented models can be estimated with two alternative methods, in one or two stages.
One method employs an infinitesimal constant, (non-Archimedian constant, (e), satisfying 
the conditions 0 < e  < l /N , N>0), to obtain the projected point in one stage solution.
The non-Archimedean constant is a very small number (as 1 O'6) ensuring that inputs are 
non-zero and that the inputs/outputs are assigned a positive (even small) weight (Wong et 
al., 1990). The one stage, non-Archimedean, dual linear programming formulation for the 
input-oriented model for the CRS and VRS surfaces is presented below: equation (2.5)-5 
and (2.5)-6 (Ali et al, 1995).
However, the one stage non-Archimedean model can yield inaccurate results. The optimal 
radial movement (0 or <J>) is accurately measured but this movement is an intermediate 
point and not always sufficient to reach the frontier (Ali and Seiford, 1993). The radial 
movement may result in non-zero output slacks and excess inputs for efficient DMUs.
The two-stage formulation guarantees that the projected point lies on the frontier (total 
projection) and the output slacks or input excess for efficient DMUs are zero . The 
estimation involves two steps: the first step determines the maximum input reduction k
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(optimal 0) or the maximum output augmentation r\ (optimal <J>), while the second step 
identifies the projection point.
The input-oriented formulation (envelopment form) is given below: equations (2.5)-7 and
(2.5)-8 (Ali and Seiford, 1993). The input-oriented model in the first stage determines the 
optimal input reduction or the parameter 0 that defines an intermediate point (Yk, 0kXk). 
The second stage yields the projection point on the frontier1, (Yk + s , 0kXk - e).
Comparing oriented with standard formulations, the oriented models applied to the same 
set of DMUs may yield different efficient scores or projected points, but the envelopment 
surface and the set of efficient/inefficient DMUs remains the same (Ali et al., 1993).
Coelli (1997) developed an alternative multi-stage methodology for orientated models. 
This approach reaches the projected point through a sequence of radial movements. 
Another aspect of DEA estimation is the sensitivity of the constructed frontier to units that 
inputs and outputs are measured. A change in the units of measurement has no effect on 
the relative efficiency of DMUs but affects significantly the envelopment surface as well as 
the efficient scores. This dependence is associated with the lower bounds on multipliers. 
The basic DEA model assumes the value of I as the lower bound for multipliers of the 
objective function (Is +- le). This assumption implies an equal marginal evaluation across 
non-zero output slack and non-zero excess inputs. For example, the marginal worth of a 
unit of hospital output slack (admission) is equivalent to the marginal worth of a unit of 
excess hospital input (hour or clerical FTE). In this case, a units-invariant model that 
allows flexibility in the selection of lower bounds can be estimated.
1 The Second stage yields the parameter 1. which indicates efficiency without output slacks or excess 
inputs.
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CRS
Subject to: 
VRS
Subject to: 
CRS
Subject to: 
VRS
Subject to:
One Stage Approach (Input-Oriented)
Multiplier Form 
maxn.v (iYk
vXt = I Subject to:
|iY - vX < 0
|i > ep.k , v > e v k
max^v.0, (iYk + co
vXic = 1 Subject to:
pY - vX + col < 0
p. > 6 |ik v > s v k
Envelopment Form
(2.5)-5
minxj.c 0 - e ( p ks + vke)
YA. -  s  =  Yk 
0Xk - XA. - e = 0 
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
(2.5)-6
min>Ac 0 - e(|4ks + vke)
YA. -  s =  Yk 
0Xk - XA. - e = 0 
IX = I
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
Two Stage Approach (Input-Oriented, Envelopment Form)
First Stage Second Stage (2.5)-7
min e.xj,c 0 minjAe -(pks + vke)
YA. - s = Yk Subject to: YA. - s = Yk
0Xk - XA. - e = 0 0kXk - XA. - e = 0
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0 A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
First Stage 
min ejLs.e 0
YA. - s = Yk Subject to:
0Xk - XX - e = 0 
IX = 1
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
Second Stage (2.5)-8
minxAe - (pks + vke)
YA. - s = Yk 
0 %  - XA. - e = 0 
IX = I
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
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The unit-invariant model sets DMU specific bounds as
jxk > 1/yrfc r = I,..., s 
vk >l/xit i = 1, m 
and allows the distinction of marginal worth across inputs and outputs of a DMU as well 
as the distinction of marginal worth of outputs or inputs across DMUs.
Since in the unit-invariant formulation the marginal evaluation across inputs and outputs 
differs, the projection and the efficiency scores are invariant to units of measurement. 
Nevertheless, the classification of efficient DMUs that the two variations yield is the same 
(Ali et al., 1993).
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2.5.1 Weight Restrictions and DEA
DEA evaluates the relative efficiency of each DMU in order to build the envelopment 
surface “empirical frontier.” In this attempt, the set of weights (multipliers) n, and v of 
outputs and inputs, respectively, are freely determined by DEA, but remain strictly 
positive (non-zero). This positivity constraint is the only restriction imposed on the 
model. However, the flexibility of multipliers is “a strength and a weakness” in DEA 
estimation (Thomson et al., 1990). The complete flexibility of weights is the strength of 
this method. A DMU is rendered relatively inefficient with its own favorably selected set 
of weights. Sometimes the constructed empirical frontier badly depicts the actual 
performance. This may be due to misspesification of inputs or/and outputs or an 
insufficient available data set.
Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988) argued that there is excess flexibility in input /output 
multipliers in DEA. The multipliers are assigned to assess the relative efficiency of each 
DMU. But in many cases the relative “overall” performance is not reflected in the 
evaluation of a DMU as a result of this multiplier flexibility. Specifically, in DEA analysis, 
sometimes a DMU is evaluated efficient because it outperforms in a single input/output of 
minor importance while other factors are ignored. In this case, the flexibility of multipliers 
tends to benefit performance of minor factors and overlooks the performance of more 
important factors. In general, the evaluation process may assign extreme values to 
multipliers. In this case, controlling the flexibility o f virtual multipliers may improve the 
estimated frontier.
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A variety of methods of restricting the flexibility of DEA multipliers have been proposed 
[Thomson et al., (1990), Dyson and Thanassoulis, (1988) and Wong and Beasley, (1990), 
Cook et al., (1995), Chames et al., (1990)]. The restrictions involve bounds on individual 
multipliers or ratios of multipliers. However, assigning weights to multipliers is a difficult 
task. In general, the interpretation of multipliers is not clear. So, the determination of 
constraints lacks a theoretical basis. If information about the relative importance of 
factors in production is available then weight restrictions may be effectively assigned.
The polyhedral “Cone-Ratio” DEA model provides an extension to the “DEA value-free” 
model and restricts the multipliers to fall in specific cones (Chames et al., 1990). The 
polyhedral Cone-Ratio DEA model introduces additional information into the classical 
DEA model in a form of constrained virtual multipliers, termed Assurance Regions.
The setting of weight restrictions eliminates excess flexibility and inappropriate multiplier 
values and in addition allows further discrimination among relatively efficient DMIJs 
(Boussofiane et al., 1991). The efficiency rating of the restricted model will be lower than 
the unrestricted model, if the restrictions are binding.
Consider a finite number of both inputs and outputs of a productive process as well as a 
finite number of productive units (DMUs). Let’s select one of the inputs and outputs to 
be the numeraire. The marginal substitution ratio of a multiplier with respect to selected 
numeraire falls in the range o f :
0 < pr/ni < oo and 0 < Vj /vi < oo 
Setting specific nonnegative multiplier bounds, the set of restrictions can be written as:
3r — M’l-/M-i — br or ar|ii <JIr < brUi 
c; < Vi /vi < di CjVi < v; < d;Vi
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which imply that pr ranges from a^ i to bijxt and Vi ranges from qvi to d;vi.
The above relationships are equivalent to:
|ir - brjii < 0 and Vi-diVi<0 with br>a r>0  r = 2 , s
- (Xr + arfii < 0 -Vi +CiVi<0 d; > q > 0 i=2,.....m
The set of boundary conditions define the matrix of restricted output multipliers Pn, and 
the matrix of restricted input multipliers R22 which in turn define the corresponding cones. 
The intersection matrix of multiplier bounds termed Assurance Region (Thompson et al.,
1990) can be written as:
'  P 0  11 12 M=Q =
_°;I
and the vector of multipliers as: _ v_
Where Pu represents the output cone (2s-2 by s matrix) and R22 the input cone (2m-2 by 
m matrix). The 0i2 and 02i are null matrices. The corresponding cones are:
Pu|x<0, p. > 0 (defines the output cone U)
and Rz2V <0, v > 0 (defines the input cone V)
In Matrix notation, the set of multiplier restrictions can be written as
'Pu On V <0
Shi ^ 2. V
The sum form representation of input/output cones reduces the Cone-Ratio model to a 
DEA standard model with transformed data and simplifies its estimation (Chames, 
Cooper, Huang, and Sun 1990). A modified DEA model (Input-Oriented, Envelopment 
Form, VRS surface) is given below, model 2.5-9 (Thompson et al., 1995).
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Input-Oriented, Envelopment Form (AR/cone Ratio), VRS
First Stage 
(AR) min ej^e 0 
Subject to: YX - s = Yk
Second Stage 
(AR) min^c - (p.ks + vke)
Subject to: YX- s = Yfc
(2 .5)-9
X > 0, s > 0, e > 0
0Xk - XX - e = 0
Pu( t<0 
R22V < 0 
IX = I
0kXk - XX - e = 0 
PuH<0
R22V ^ 0
IX = I
X > 0, s > 0, e > 0
Empirical studies have assigned arbitrary constraints on multipliers based on assumed 
relative importance of variables or on “expert opinions” and “environmental factors” 
(Thomson et al., 1990). In a different method, Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988) proposed 
weight restrictions on individual multipliers obtained from the coefficients o f a regression 
model in the case of a single input only. In this limited case of a multiple output and single 
input production process, the restrictions reflect the allocation of the input to the 
production of each output.
Wong and Beasley, (1990), proposed a method of restricting weight flexibility based on 
the importance of each input/output in the production process. The importance of each 
input and output is reflected by their relative proportions. The proportion o f total output 
(Sk) for DMU k associated with output 1, reflects the importance of output I in the 
production process, and can be restricted to fall in the range of [a;, bj]. The specified 
proportion constraints, a, < (|i.iYik/Sk) < br, which are based on “value judgment,” prevent 
some outputs from being ignored in the evaluation process. The same approach is 
applicable to inputs.
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The imposition of bounds on multipliers to reduce their flexibility results in a different 
efficiency evaluation of DMUs (worse or improved). Cook et al., (1995), specified 
boundary conditions based not only on managerial judgment o f relative input/output 
importance in production, but also on quality and reliability o f available data.
A review and evaluation of the applied methods of restricting weight flexibility is provided 
by Allen and et al., (1997).
This paper introduces multiplier restrictions based on technologically consistent 
characteristics of the production process derived from a multiple input multiple output 
stochastic frontier model (or regression analysis in general). The “Technologically 
Consistent - Assurance Region” (TC-AR) provides an extension of the “Assurance 
Region”/Cone-Ratio DEA model [Thompson et al., (1990); Thompson et al., (1995); 
Chames et al., (1990)]. The TC-AR set o f multiplier restrictions, obtained from the 
coefficients of a theoretically consistent papametric model applied to the same body of 
data, outperforms any subjectively defined AR based on “expert opinions” or other 
environmental variables. The boundary conditions obey the productive characteristics 
assessed by a parametric model estimated in an earlier stage.
The Stochastic cost frontier analysis yields valuable information about economic 
characteristics, which is more accurate (objective) than any managerial value judgment.
The regression based boundary conditions form a “Technologically Consistent - Assurance 
Region” (TC-AR), that restricts the flexibility of multipliers towards overall efficiency. In 
addition, the differences of the two methods can be assessed and their weaknesses or 
strengths can be identified.
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Chames et al., (1978) and Banker, Chames and Cooper (1984) developed a connecting 
link between the classical production function and the DEA formulation via axiomatic 
statements and Shephard’s distance function. Banker, Conrad and Strauss, (1986) shown 
that the ratio of multipliers (in a DEA formulation) may provide estimates of:
marginal rates of transformation o f output i for j  (jii/pj) - which indicates by how 
many units of output j  can be produced for each unit reduction of output /; 
marginal rate of substitution (v; /vj); and 
marginal product of input / for output r (|4r /v;).
But economic ratios obtained from DEA solutions can not be reliably defined. As 
multipliers can be assigned values close to zero (larger than the non-Archimedean e), their 
ratios become meaningless. In addition, the great flexibility of multipliers limits their 
ability for economic interpretation.
The imposition of weight bounds, based on marginal rates of substitution obtained from a 
parametric regression model run through the same body of data, is expected to guide DEA 
estimation closer to the true production frontier and enrich the efficiency scores with 
elements of allocative efficiency. The imposition of this type of restrictions (termed 
Assurance Ratio I in the literature) yields equivalent solutions and relative efficiency 
scores regardless of input or output orientation (Allen et al., 1997).
Another important aspect of the weight restrictions in DEA analysis is the increased ability 
of the restricted model to discriminate among DMUs. As described in 2.2 the number of 
efficient DMUs increases with the dimensions of the (m + s) input/output matrix holding 
the sample size constant. However, the incorporation of restrictions provides DEA 
additional flexibility in the process of identifying the relative efficient DMUs.
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2.5.2 DEA and Overall Cost Efficiency
Overall cost efficiency is defined as the sum of technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. Let’s consider the simple case of using two inputs (xt, x2) to produce one 
output (Y) as illustrated in figure I.
The isoquant (YY’) and the isocost line CC’ determine the cost minimizing level of 
production (point A), given the vector of inputs (xl, x2), the vector of input prices (wu 
w2), and output level Y.
A firm operating at point (B) produces inefficiently above the minimum possible cost. 
The overall efficiency (total economic efficiency) of operation at point B is defined as:
OE(y, x, w)=(OK/OB)
The overall efficiency can be decomposed into its technical and allocative components. 
The technical component of efficiency, which indicates the departure from the isoquant,
TE(y, x)=(OP/OB)
X,
c
X
0 c
Figure 2.1: The Measurement of Efficiency
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The technical component of efficiency indicates that the firm can produce the same output 
at point P with a lower amount o f inputs.
The allocative component o f efficiency, which reflects the departure from the optimal 
combination of inputs is:
AE(y,x,w)=(OK/OP)
The allocative efficiency implies that the firm can produce the same output at point A with 
a different combination of inputs and a lower cost.
So, the overall efficiency is the product of its two components
OE(y, x, w) = TE(y,x).AE(y,x,w) or OK/OB=(OP/OB).(OK/OP)
[Fare et al., 1994, Farsund et al, 1980; Byrnes and Valdmanis, 1995], The above 
decomposition of total efficiency into its allocative and technical components illustrates 
the basic framework proposed by Farrell (1957).
In a DEA input-oriented framework, the overall cost efficiency can be modeled as the 
ratio of the minimum possible cost to the observed cost.
OE(y, x, w) = MinCost(y, x, w)/ObservedCost(x, w)
The minimum cost can be obtained from a cost minimizing linear programming problem.
Min*. >. x’ w 
s.t. yk  - y > 0 
-xk + x' > 0
Where x" is the obtained set of cost minimizing input quantities given the input prices and 
the output levels. Moreover, the overall efficiency can be decomposed into its technical 
and allocative components.
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The technical efficiency TE(y, x) is provided by the solution of the CRS model. Given the 
TE(y,x) and the OE(y, x, w), the ratio o f the overall cost to technical efficiency provides 
the allocative efficiency AE(y, x, w) = OE(y, x, w) /TE(y,x).
In addition, the technical efficiency can be further decomposed into its pure technical 
VRS(y, x), and scale efficiency components.
The VRS(y, x) is the input-oriented DEA model that allows for variable returns to scale, 
while the scale is the ratio of constant to variable efficiency score CRS(y, x)/VRS(y, x). 
The technical efficiency gives the proportion that inputs can be reduced and still produce 
the given levels (observed) of outputs. Scale inefficient DMUs produce beyond the most 
productive scale size (decreasing returns to scale) or produce below the most productive 
scale size. The appendix 2 .1 illustrates the computation of scale efficiencies using DEA.
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Appendix 2.1 Returns to Scale and DEA
There are different approaches that attempt to determine the scale efficiency at the 
observed point of production of every DMU as highlighted in section 2.5.
The approach o f Banker (1984) and Banker and Thrall (1992) uses the intensity variable A. 
obtained from the solution of the CRS formulation to determine returns to scale. The 
approach of Banker, Chames and Cooper, (1984), uses the sign of the single variable co 
obtained from the VRS formulation to determine returns to scale of efficient DMUs. 
Banker and Thrall, (1992), extended this approach from the single variable eo to an interval 
estimate as previously discussed.
This study applies a method developed by Fare et al., (1994), which identifies the type of
returns to scale for both efficient and inefficient DMUs. The technique is based on a DEA
formulation that accounts for non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS). Specifically, the
following additional DEA problem is solved:
NIRS min 0Jus.c 0
Subject to: YA. - s = Yk
exfc - XX - e = 0 
1A. < I
A. > 0, s > 0, e > 0
This model is the VRS formulation with the constraint IA. < 1 imposed.
The returns to scale are determined by the outcome of two ratios. The first ratio of 
technical efficiency score to pure technical score S(y, x) = CRS(y, x)/VRS(y, x) identifies
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the scale efficient DMUs. For scale efficient DMUs, S(y, x)=l and also the efficiency 
scores obtained under CRS and VRS formulations are equal (CRS(y, x)=VRS(y, x)=l). 
For the scale inefficient DMUs where S(y, x) < I the NIRS solution is used.
Specifically, the second ratio is calculated:
S(y, x) = CRS(y, x)/NIRS(y, x)
If the ratio of CRS to NIRS equals 1 then increasing returns to scale prevail. If the ratio is 
lower than I then the returns to scale are decreasing.
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3
The Hospital Cost Frontier Function
3.1 Introduction
One of the most extensive debates in the literature on the empirical investigation o f 
hospital behavior is the specification o f the functional form o f hospital cost functions. 
Basically, studies on the specification and estimation of hospital cost functions in the 
literature can be classified as following three approaches; an “ad hoc” approach, the 
neoclassical approach, and an “eclectic” approach [Breyer, 1987; Vita, 1990; Grannemann 
et al., 1986, Cowing, Holtmann and Powers, 1983; Rosko and Broyles, 1988].
The “ad-hoc” approach employs an additive-linear functional form to explain variations in 
unit costs (average costs per patient or per patient day) as a function of a set of possible 
hospital determinants. The ad hoc structure of hospital cost function is motivated by the 
“organizational anomaly” of the hospital sector which weakens the competitive profit 
maximizing economic behavior and modeling (Pauly and Redisch, 1973). The ad hoc 
character of these models also called “behavioral” has been criticized for ignoring the 
theoretical justification of production technology. Criticism focused on the absence of 
input prices from the set of the cost determinants which implies zero input substitutability, 
the inability to control for the multiple-output nature of the hospital behavior and the 
examination of economies of scale or scope using cross-sectional data [Cowing et al.
1983; Rosko and Broyles, 1988].
The second approach is based on the neoclassical theory of the firm and makes use o f the 
duality between the cost and the production function. In these models, termed
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neoclassical or technological cost functions, the total cost is a function o f input prices and 
output levels in a flexible functional form specification. This approach takes into account 
many disadvantages of the ad-hoc specification. First, it is theoretically consistent and it is 
not based on a priori restrictions (at least the restrictions can be tested before their 
imposition) and second economies o f scale or scope and input substitution elasticities are 
easily estimable from the cost structure [Cowing et al., 1983; Vita, 1990].
However, there is a number of studies that employ an “eclectic” approach which combines 
the above approaches. The third approach that combines ‘ad-hoc’ and neoclassical 
features (also called quasi-technological), expressed in a flexible functional form 
specification, has superior advantages. The cost function follows the theoretically 
consistent multiple input-output representation and includes additional variables to control 
for important behavioral features of hospitals such as teaching, ownership, the role of 
physician, market conditions, etc [Rosko and Broyles, 1988; Vita, 1990].
In early I980’s economists introduced ‘flexible functional forms’ in the estimation of 
hospital cost functions and facilitated the analysis of multi-product technologies 
(Christensen et al., 1976). One member of the family of flexible functional forms, the 
translog may be viewed as a second-order Taylor series expansion of an arbitrary 
differentiable function around a specified point. The cost function can be written as:
lnC=f[lnQ,lnW;lnX) (2.i)-l
The flexible functional form represents arbitrary technologies in the neighborhood of the 
approximation point, which is usually the sample mean (Vita, 1990). The estimated 
function provides a reasonable representation of cost behavior when it is evaluated at 
points that are in the neighborhood of the sample means. However, Vita, (1990) noted
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that flexible functional forms perform poorly when evaluated away from their 
approximation point.
The translog cost function does not impose apriori restrictions on the structure of 
production (homotheticity restriction) or on the elasticities o f substitution (homogeneity 
restriction). However, the restrictions can be statistically tested before their imposition. 
Unfortunately, the ability o f a flexible functional form specification is constrained by the 
limited data sets o f the hospital sector in both sample sizes and missing observations, given 
the large number of parameters to be estimated [Breyer (1987); Newhouse, (1994)]. In 
addition, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity, although treatable 
statistical departures from the classical regression model, always tend to limit the quality 
of estimates. So, because a complete specification is very difficult to be achieved, a trade 
off between a multi-input multi-output representation and a flexible functional form is 
necessary. There is evidence that the transiog functional form is sensitive to the 
combination of inputs and does not perform as a well-behaved function for all 
combinations of inputs (Caves and Barton, 1990).
There is a plethora o f empirical studies on hospital cost estimation that reflect the 
sequence of methodological developments, policy concerns and objectives. Economies of 
scale and scope, the marginal cost of outputs, the substitutability of inputs in the 
production as well as the effect o f market conditions and the effectiveness o f regulation to 
control cost remain the most important issues in the literature. The flexible functional 
forms have replaced the ad-hoc specification and the restrictive structural assumptions of 
neoclassical models.
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Conrad and Strauss (1983), Cowing and Holtman (1983), Grannemann, Brown and Pauly
( 1986), Vita (1990), and Breyer ( 1987) are a few representative studies that provide a 
multiple-output analysis of hospitals and the latest developments in estimation o f cost 
functions using flexible functional forms.
The flexible specification has become the standard approach to modeling the hospital cost 
behavior and it is used in this study.
3.2 Econometric “Issues”
The model is estimated in a translog specification as discussed previously. To test the 
flexibility of the functional form-against more restrictive types-the F test is used. The joint 
significance of all the higher order terms is tested.
An estimation problem that the flexible functional form models face is the problem of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, which limits its advantages. 
Multicollinearity as a sample specific phenomenon can not be avoided in general and 
results in imprecise and insignificant estimates, but it has no effect on the unbiasedness 
statistical property of the estimators.
Heteroscedasticity, a standard estimation problem in cross-sectional models, also may 
cause estimation problems and reduce the reliability of hospital cost function estimates. 
Under heterodcedasticity the estimators of an OLS model are unbiased but not efficient. 
Caudill et al., (1995) pointed out that heteroscedasticity, in a stochastic frontier 
formulation, can seriously affect the estimated firm specific inefficiency. The firm specific 
inefficiency measure, as developed in section 2.4, is based on the residuals of the estimated 
function and so it is subject to specification errors caused by heteroscedasticity. Since the
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firm specific frontier is defined according to the variation of the residuals, the presence of 
heteroscedasticity can seriously affect the estimation of frontier functions. Higher 
dispersion due to heteroscedasticity can be labeled inefficiency. Caudill et al., 1995, found 
that heteroscedasticity overestimates the coefficients of the cost function and it also affects 
the efficiency ranking o f firms by overstating the inefficiency o f small firms and 
understating the inefficiency of large firms
In this study, the residuals from the OLS regression are used as weights in the stochastic 
frontier estimation. Estimates obtained from the weighted stochastic frontier model are 
compared with a variety of estimated frontier and non-frontier estimates to assess their 
sensitivity.
The single equation model also suffers from specification errors related to endogeneity of 
outputs and input prices in a total cost function. The assumption of exogeneity of hospital 
output and price of inputs is a common practice in the literature [Carey and Stefos, 1992; 
Conrad and Strauss, 1983; Grannemann et al., 1986; Vita, 1990]. Recent studies employ 
instrumental variables in a first stage estimation and the fitted values are used in a second 
stage cost estimation. Zuckerman et al., (1994), used instrumental variables for 
endogenous tested inputs and outputs. Gaynor and Anderson (1995), also, found 
evidence of endogeneity and replaced outputs with instruments.
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3.3 Variables and Data
One of the problems in hospital cost specification is the multi-product nature of the 
hospital and how to control it in a regression analysis. The flexibility of the functional 
form contrasts with the multiple hospital output as the sample size allows only 
representation in aggregated inputs and outputs or case mix variables. Hospitals provide 
simple and complex heterogeneous services or procedures. To account for the 
heterogeneity (diversity) of hospital outputs and at the same time to limit their number, 
three categories o f outputs are used in this study: inpatient admissions, patient days and 
outpatient (net of admissions) visits.
All hospitals in the sample exhibit non-zero levels for the three categories o f outputs as 
required by the translog specification employed. The three outputs employed in this study 
can not completely control for the complexity, severity and case mix of every hospital. 
Empirical studies control for case mix according to the data available, using admissions or 
days by diagnostic category, [Vita, 1990; Grannemann et al., 1986], or using the 
Medicare’s (HCFA) case mix index (Zuckerman et al., 1994). Although the Medicare 
case mix involves a proportion o f the total hospital cases, it has been used as substitute for 
an unavailable overall measure. In this study, the 1993 Medicare case mix is used in a 
second specification to adjust admissions and inpatient days.
Hospitals can adjust most of factors of production in the short run, but potentially there 
are some fixed factors that cannot be adjusted during this period. As suggested by Breyer
(1987), the number o f maintained beds (set up and staffed) can be included in the model 
representing another type of output (size related output). However, the number of beds 
is included in many studies to reflect a proxy for capital inputs (fixed factor) and a
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measure of the hospital’s size. The inclusion of beds as a fixed input leads to a short-run 
cost functional relationship (Vita, 1990). The inclusion of both admissions and patient 
days renders the variable o f (hospital size) beds meaningless. In addition the high 
collinearity between beds and patient days creates estimation problems. For that reason, 
the number of beds is not included in the specified model.
Admitting physicians are usually not employed by the hospital and draw no salaries from 
it. However, they provide a significant portion of the labor necessary to produce hospital 
care. The omission of admitting physicians from the cost function may cause a 
specification error [Bays, 1979; Rosko and Broyles, 1988]. Physicians participate in 
management, administrative and medical/clinical activities. The Hospitals-Actual data set, 
employed in this study, includes physician-related data. So, a measure of physician-staff 
size is included to control for the physician input. This measure is calculated as the total 
annual physician hours and enters as an exogenous factor in estimation that does not affect 
the marginal costs.
The available data set permits the calculation of a variety of hospital input prices as the 
wage of labor input and the prices of capital, supplies, and contract services. Two kinds 
of labor are used.
The price (wage) of health care delivery FTE personnel (RNS) and the price of 
administrative FTE personnel (CLR) are calculated as annual cost divided by the annual 
number of hours.
The price of capital is the price level depreciation allowance (PLDA) in excess o f 
historical costs o f owned or capitalized lease equipment, as calculated by the New Jersey 
Department of Health. A price level depreciation factor - a price index that takes into
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account indexes as the Hospital Equipment Cost Index (HECI), the bureau o f  labor 
statistics (BLS) and the Producer Price Index (PPI) - is calculated each year by the 
Department of Health (New Jersey). This factor is multiplied by the amounts of actual 
depreciation reported each year to yield their replacement values. The sum o f  the 
differences between depreciation and its replacement value over the past 20 years is the 
price level depreciation allowance for each hospital.
The price of supplies (PSUP), and contract services (PCSER) are calculated as the annual 
cost per category divided by the sum of inpatient admissions and outpatient visits. These 
measures reflect the average amounts spent per patient served.
In order to control for the multidimensional character of hospital outputs a third set of 
variables is included. The vector of environmental factors includes variables that influence 
the level of hospital cost but have no effect on marginal costs or on the substitutability of 
inputs. The number of medical residents in each hospital can be included to control for 
two unmeasured hospital outputs teaching and research activity (Hadley and Swartz,
1989). Empirical studies of hospital cost behavior indicate that Medicaid patients are 
relatively more expensive to hospitals. In general, Medicaid patients stay longer than 
other patients on average, so they have higher cost per admission.
Also, outpatient visits and departmental services differ widely by category. To control for 
output characteristics, Medicare or Medicaid admissions and/or patient days, outpatient 
same day surgery visits, and MSA beds as a percentage of totals are included in 
regression.
The small sample size and the requirements, in terms of coefficients, of the employed 
functional form limit the ability to include a variety of control variables. In addition, one
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of the objectives o f this study is the comparison of the parametric and the non-parametric 
techniques, which require a comparable set of inputs and outputs.
The data used in this study, the 1993 New Jersey Acute Hospital Actuals, provides a 
detailed and definitionally uniform data set of 83 acute care hospitals that is subject to the 
State regulatory guidelines. One hospital has been deleted from the data set because its 
data included an extensive Long-Term Care Facility.
The vast majority o f hospitals are non-governmental not-for-profit organizations and a few 
are church operated or under governmental control. The sample does not include for- 
profit hospitals. However, the uniformity of the data does not insure the applicability of 
findings at the national level. The purpose of using data from a single state in this study is 
to take advantage o f a unique survey conducted by Response Analysis Corporation (RAC) 
for the state of New Jersey and involves the degree of implementation of electronic data 
interchange technology in the state. The hospital (New Jersey Actuals) data set is 
combined in a second stage estimation with the survey data.
Table 3.1 lists the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values o f the 
variables in 1993.
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Table 3-1
Descriptive Statistics: The Hospital Stochastic Cost Frontier Function
V a ria b le  Mean S td . Oev. Minimum Maximum D e s c r ip t io n
TCOST 97941.6 60665.6 16623.0 327279.0 T o ta l  H o s p ita l C ost ($000)
ADTOT 13786.4 7628.8 2028.0 39206.0 A dm iss ions T o ta l
PDTOT 95543.7 47782.9 17109.0 228331.0 P a t ie n t  Days T o ta l
VNATOT 145741.0 119484.1 10896.0 769918.0 V is i t s  Net o f  Adm. T o ta l
MBEDTOT 355.8 161 .5 86 .0 799 .0 M a in ta in e d  Beds T o ta l
HPHYS 88441.1 153027.7 0 .0 0762984.0 P h y s ic ia n  Hours (S a la r ie s )
HPHYF 49666.5 81185.7 0 .0 0540163.0 P h y s ic ia n  Hours (Fee)
PHOURS 138107.7 171950.5 3007.0 794508.0 Phys. Hours (S a la ries+ F ee)
CPHYS 3067.8 5631 .8 0 .0 40997.0 C ost ($000) S a la r ie s  P h y s ic .
CPHYF 1954.4 2348.4 0 .0 13015.0 C ost ($000) Fee P h ys ic ia n
HEMP 2724233.9 1467216.4 482146.0 6455889.0 Hours NonPhysician Employees
CEMP 46251 .9 27752.8 7712.0 149261.0 C ost ($000) S a la r ie s  Employee
CSUPP 15482.2 10438.7 1852.0 49508.0 C ost ($000) S upp lies
CDFI 7286.3 4443.2 373 .0 18662.0 C ost ($000) Deprec & In te r e s t
CCSER 5843.0 4130.2 933 .0 24817.0 C ost ($000) C o n tra c t S e rv ic e s
RNS 0.0231 0.0065 0.0168 0.0769 Wage/Hour RNS ($000)
CLR 0.0122 0.0054 0.0074 0.0423 Wage/Hour CLR ($000)
SUP 0.1148 0.0858 0.0301 0.7696 P r ic e  o f  S upp lies  ($000)
CSER 0.0457 0.0270 0.0049 0.1581 P r ic e  o f  C o n tra c t S e rv .($ 0 0 0 )
PLDA 239 .7 162.4 8 .0 769 .0 P r ic e  L e ve l D e p re c ia tio n
ADMCARE 4618.4 2403.3 886 .0 12940.0 Adm issions M edicare
PPMCARE 48727.0 23346.0 10795.0 132662.0 P a t ie n t  Days M edicare
ADMCAID 1729.3 1747.5 75 .0 9454.0 Adm iss ions M edica id
PDMCAID 10159.0 11679.0 543.0 60185.0 P a t ie n t  Days M ed ica id
PADMD 0.1244 0.0999 0.0116 0.5083 M ed ica id  Adm issions (%)
MSABED 0.6982 0.1226 0.1256 0.9560 MSA Beds (%)
VSOS 0.0278 0.0185 0.0000 0.0976 Same Day S urgery V is i t s  (%)
PLANTSF 443810.7 256592.3 56323.0 1169984.0 P la n t Square Feet (B5)
RESID 31 .7 52 .7 0 .0 254 .0 R e s id e n ts  T o ta l Number
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
3.4 The Mode!
The hospital cost function has the following structure:
C=f(Y, W; X)e*“ (3.4)-i
and its general translong specification becomes:
lnCt—lnC(Y, W; X) + vt + ut (3.4)-2
The estimated model is:
lnC(r,H'-,X) = a , + t ,a ,  Inf; + £ / ? ,  InfT, Inf; InK,
1=1 y= l 4  ,= I ^
+ lnfrj frr + i dt , t , J lnYl lnfVJ + 0o InB+ ^ 0 ( l n B ) 2
(3.4)-3
2  y = l  r =  I i= I  7=1
m  n  c
+Y,7Vt lnf^ln^ + ^ l9y InFFj InB + ^ p hX h +vt +u,
i= l 7=1 f c l
where
InC = the natural logarithm of total cost;
InF = the natural logarithm of a vector of hospital outputs; 
lnfF= the natural logarithm o f a vector of input prices; 
lnZ?=the natural logarithm of a vector of fixed factors;
X - t h e  natural logarithm of a vector of all other environmental factors that 
influence hospital costs.
The appropriate sets of parametric restrictions1 are imposed on the above cost function:
1 Appendix 3.1 provides the sets o f  parametric restrictions imposed.
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Symmetry of the translog cost function requires: y,h=Yh, for all i and h, Sir=S]r for all j  
and r, according to Young’s theorem.
Linear homogeneity in the input prices is imposed by the following restrictions:
n n  n n
ILP j  = U = 0 for all = 0 for all /; = °-
y= I  j - l  j - l  y = l
The cost function defines the minimum cost of producing a certain vector of outputs given 
the input prices. Duality theory (Shephard, 1953 and 1970) defines the link (under certain 
regularity assumptions) between the production and the cost functions o f a firm. 
Application of Duality theory with its underlying conditions o f an optimizing behavior 
precludes (eliminates) any kind of inefficiency (Fare, Grosskorpf, and Lovell 1985 ). 
However, relaxation of the more strict assumptions makes possible the coexistence of 
Duality and inefficiency. The estimation of the cost function is preferable to the estimation 
of the production function given the multi-output nature o f hospitals. The estimation of 
the cost function makes possible, based on the duality principle, the recovery of the 
characteristics of the production function. Fare and Primont, (1995), have shown that the 
cost of using duality, in terms of lost information from the conversion, is minimal for both 
deterministic and stochastic frontiers. The empirical results o f four cost specifications 
follow. Specifically, OLS estimates corrected for heteroscedasticity and OLS estimates 
with weighted variables are presented in tables 3-2 and 3-3 respectively. Table 3-4 
presents estimates pertaining to stochastic frontier. An additional stochastic cost frontier 
model with case-mix adjusted admissions and patient days is included (table 3-5).
Discussion of empirical findings follows (section 3.6).
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3.5 Empirical Results
Table 3-2:
OLS: CORRECTED FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY
Dependent v a r ia b le  i s  th e  Log o f  T o ta l C ost 
Model s iz e :  O b se rva tio n s  = 83,
Param eters = 41, D e g .F r. = 42
R-squared =0.98020, A d jus ted  R -squared = 0.96135
Model t e s t :  F[ 40 , 42J = 51 .99 , Prob va lue  = 0.00000
Breusch - Pagan c h i-s q u a re d  = 32 .7097, w ith  40 degrees o f  freedom
V a r ia b le  D e s c r ip t io n C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard E r ro r t - r a t i o P [ |T |» t I
C onstant <*0 0.23739 0.84567E-01 2 .807 0.00755
Adm issions Y1 0.32709 0.82596E-01 3.960 0.00028
Pat.Days Y2 0.24457 0.70027E-01 3.493 0.00114
V is i t s Y3 0.19339 0.62824E-01 3.078 0.00366
PhysHours PH 0.59889E-01 0.12690E-01 4.719 0.00003
RNS X1 0.47585 0.75755E-01 6.281 0.00000
RNS'RNS X11 -0.74937 0.48264 -1 .553 0.12801
CLR X2 0.15820 0.74955E-01 2.111 0.04081
CLR*CLR X22 -0.20021 0.20472 -0 .978 0.33369
S upp lies X3 0.15259 0.51074E-01 2.988 0.00468
Supp*Supp X33 -0.47286 0.21130 -2 .238 0.03059
C o n tra c t X4 0.63349E-01 0.28688E-01 2.208 0.03274
C o n tr*C o n tr X44 0.37367E-01 0.59145E-01 0.632 0.53095
Adm*Adm Y11 -0.55747 0.39814 -1 .400 0.16880
PDays'Pdays Y22 -0.65483 0.32837 -1 .994 0.05265
V is *V is Y33 -0.79222 0.22185 -3.571 0.00091
PHours*PHours PH2 0.22000E-01 0.12329E-01 1.784 0.08159
Adm*PDays Y12 0.48160 0.33203 1 .450 0.15435
Adm*Vis Y13 0.46594 0.18711 2.490 0.01681
PDays*Vis Y23 0.15800E-02 0.26528 0.006 0.99528
Adm’ RNS Y1X1 -0.58003 0.36621 -1 .584 0.12073
Adm*CLR Y1X2 0.62829 0.44002 1 .428 0.16072
Adm*Supp Y1X3 0.33013 0.17418 1 .895 0.06494
Adm*Contr Y1X4 0.35301E-01 0.10465 0 .337 0.73754
PDays*RNS Y2X1 -0.38761E-01 0.48244 -0 .080 0.93635
PDays*CLR Y2X2 -0.46881 0.56777 -0 .826 0.41364
PDays*Supp Y2X3 0.12960 0.23991 0.540 0.59190
PDays'Contr Y2X4 0.98417E-01 0.87515E-01 1.125 0.26715
Vis*RNS Y3X1 0.73322 0.32453 2.259 0.02911
Vis*CLR Y3X2 0.26382E-01 0.31327 0.084 0.93329
Vis*Supp Y3X3 -0.79407 0.19298 -4 .115 0.00018
V is *C o n tr Y3X4 -0.14295 0.97323E-01 -1 .469 0.14933
RNS*CLR X I2 0.15020 0.32007 0.469 0.64130
RNS*Supp X13 0.63535 0.26987 2.354 0.02331
RNS*Contr X14 0.59879E-01 0.12554 0 .477 0.63587
CLR'Supp X23 -0.25171E-01 0.20512 -0 .123 0.90292
CLR*Contr X24 0.21090 0.12496 1 .688 0.09887
S upp 'C on tr X34 -0.30741 0.10585 -2 .904 0.00585
% Mcaid Adm PADMD 0.55787 0.11806 4.725 0.00003
% Bed MSA MSABED -0.25213 0.10204 -2.471 0.01762
% SDS V is i t s VSDS -1.1206 0.68253 -1 .642 0.10811
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Table 3-3:
OLS: WEIGHTED REGRESSION
Dependent v a r ia b le  i s  th e  Log o f  T o ta l  C ost 
Model s iz e :  O b se rva tio n s  = 83,
Param eters = 41, D eg .F r. = 42
R-squared = 0 .99627 , A d ju s te d  R -squared = 0.99273 
Model t e s t :  F [ 40, 421 = 280 .76 , Prob v a lu e  = 0.00000
V a r ia b le  D e s c r ip t io n C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E rro r z= b /s .e . P [ |Z |> z l
C onstant Oto 0.25275 0.84183E-01 3.002 0.00268
Adm issions Y1 0.30131 0.85105E-01 3.541 0.00040
Pat.Days Y2 0.28683 0.79270E-01 3.618 0.00030
V is i t s Y3 0.19848 0.61979E-01 3.202 0.00136
PhysHours PH 0.53109E-01 0 . 13322E-01 3.986 0.00007
RNS X1 0.48219 0.74764E-01 6.450 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
RNS*RNS X II -0 .72257 0.41400 -1 .745 0.08093
CLR X2 0.13393 0.70774E-01 1 .892 0.05844
CLR*CLR X22 -0.12872 0.18600 -0 .692 0.48892
S u p p lie s X3 0.16453 0.53929E-01 3.051 0.00228
Supp*Supp X33 -0.41562 0.20139 -2 .064 0.03904
C o n tra c t X4 0.68390E-01 0.29380E-01 2.328 0.01992
C o n tr*C o n tr X44 0.45541E-01 0.58767E-01 0.775 0.43837
Adm*Adm Y11 -0.30905 0.37852 -0 .816 0.41424
PDays*Pdays Y22 -0.49379 0.32078 -1 .539 0.12372
V is *V is Y33 -0.83695 0.22071 -3 .792 0.00015
PHours*PHours PH2 0.19217E-01 0 .1 1 172E-01 1 .720 0.08543
Adm'PDays Y12 0.20382 0.29064 0.701 0.48313
Adm*Vis Y13 0.47459 0.20470 2.319 0.02042
PDays*Vis Y23 0.64678E-01 0.27840 0.232 0.81629
Adm*RNS Y1X1 -0.35683 0.34045 -1 .048 0.29459
Adm*CLR Y1X2 0.43589 0.39627 1 .100 0.27134
Adm*Supp Y1X3 0.29922 0.17866 1 .675 0.09397
Adm*Contr Y1X4 0.35577E-01 0.10902 0.326 0.74417
PDays*RNS Y2X1 -0.45720 0.42692 -1.071 0.28421
PDays*CLR Y2X2 -0.15859 0.50291 -0 .315 0.75251
PDays*Supp Y2X3 0.17756 0.24918 0.713 0.47611
PDays*Contr Y2X4 0.11505 0.89448E-01 1.286 0.19835
Vis*RNS Y3X1 0.84126 0.27369 3.074 0.00211
Vis*CLR Y3X2 -0.67339E-01 0.26668 -0 .253 0.80065
Vis*Supp Y3X3 -0.78938 0.19385 -4 .072 0.00005
V is *C o n tr Y3X4 -0.15731 0.10308 -1 .526 0.12700
RNS*CLR X I2 0.99143E-01 0.27114 0.366 0.71462
RNS*Supp X13 0.64939 0.22984 2.825 0.00472
RNS*Contr X I4 0.34095E-01 0.11532 0.296 0.76748
CLR'Supp X23 -0.61484E-01 0.19220 -0 .320 0.74905
CLR*Contr X24 0.24598 0.11474 2.144 0.03206
Supp*Contr X34 -0.33144 0.10427 -3 .179 0.00148
% Mcaid Adm PADMD 0.51848 0.12615 4.110 0.00004
% Bed MSA MSABED -0.28087 0.10213 -2 .750 0.00596
% SDS V is i t s VSOS -1.0686 0.65146 -1 .640 0.10095
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Table 3-4:
STOCHASTIC FRONTIER HOSPITAL COST FUNCTION ESTIMATES
Dependent v a r ia b le Log o f T o ta l Cost N=83
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n 193.7419
V ariance components: ct2 (v )=  0.00014 
o a (u )=  0.00131
V a ria b le  D e s c r ip t io n C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E rro r z = b /s .e - P [ | Z | > Z ]
C onstant do 0.17640 0.71887E-01 2.454 0.01414
Adm issions Y1 0.30108 0.66681E-01 4.515 0.00001
Pat.Days Y2 0.25868 0.65333E-01 3.959 0.00008
V is i t s Y3 0.20312 0.56559E-01 3.591 0.00033
PhysHours PH 0.61041E-01 0.12396E-01 4.924 0.00000
RNS X1 0.52048 0.70961E-01 7.335 0.00000
RNS*RNS X11 -0.75473 0.52520 -1 .437 0.15071
CLR X2 0.90284E-01 0.59985E-01 1 .505 0.13229
CLR*CLR X22 -0.48105E-01 0.26102 -0 .184 0.85378
S upp lies X3 0.17614 0.51440E-01 3.424 0.00062
Supp’ Supp X33 -0.35868 0.21802 -1 .645 0.09994
C o n tra c t X4 0.64857E-01 0.19408E-01 3.342 0.00083
C o n tr*C o n tr X44 0.46930E-01 0.39087E-01 1 .201 0.22989
Adm'Adm Y11 -0.28244 0.45246 -0 .624 0.53247
PDays*Pdays Y22 -0 .39837 0.36365 -1 .095 0.27331
V is *V is Y33 -0.89016 0.23416 -3.801 0.00014
PHours*PHours PH2 0.26035E-01 0 . 13404E-01 1 .942 0.05210
Adm'PDays Y12 0.11551 0.34604 0.334 0.73852
Adm*Vis Y13 0.47329 0.22929 2.064 0.03900
PDays*Vis Y23 0.15671 0.26338 0.595 0.55185
Adm'RNS Y1X1 -0.57519 0.37415 -1 .537 0.12422
Adm*CLR Y1X2 0.57526 0.34888 1 .649 0.09917
Adra'Supp Y1X3 0.25532 0.23414 1 .090 0.27550
Adm*Contr Y1X4 0.59798E-01 0.78330E-01 0.763 0.44522
PDays'RNS Y2X1 -0.19102 0.53289 -0 .358 0.71999
PDays*CLR Y2X2 -0.38897 0.51885 -0 .750 0.45345
PDays'Supp Y2X3 0.30378 0.23973 1 .267 0.20510
PDays*Contr Y2X4 0.66537E-01 0.83222E-01 0.800 0.42399
Vis*RNS Y3X1 0.89054 0.26825 3.320 0.00090
Vis*CLR Y3X2 -0.52919E-01 0.23345 -0 .227 0.82067
Vis*Supp Y3X3 -0.78224 0.19562 -3 .999 0.00006
V is *C o n tr Y3X4 -0.15214 0.70681E-01 -2 .152 0.03136
RNS*CLR X12 0.70091E-01 0.32542 0.215 0.82947
RNS*Supp X13 0.66200 0.24982 2.650 0.00805
RNS*Contr X14 0.65127E-01 0.90189E-01 0.722 0.47022
CLR*Supp X23 -0.47297E-01 0.25396 -0 .186 0.85226
CLR*Contr X24 0.18502 0.94282E-01 1 .962 0.04971
Supp*Contr X34 -0.31696 0.83259E-01 -3 .807 0.00014
% Mcaid Adm PADMD 0.56585 0.11670 4.849 0.00000
% Bed MSA MS ABED -0.24402 0.90954E-01 -2 .683 0.00730
% SDS V is i t s VSDS -0.74804 0.49548 -1 .510 0.13111
X (lamda) f f y /  O y 3.1037 1.3479 2.303 0.02130
a V(oau+o2v) 0.38030E-01 0.47614E-02 7.987 0.00000
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Table 3-5:
STOCHASTIC FRONTIER HOPSITAL COST FUNCTION ESTIMATES 
_______________ (CASE-MIX2 ADJUSTED MODEL)_______________
Dependent v a r ia b le  
I t e r a t io n s  com p le ted  
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  
V ariance  com ponents:
Log o f  T o ta l Cost 
54
174.7303 
<j2(v)= 0.00045 
e2(U)= 0.00121
N=83
V a ria b le  D e s c r ip t io n C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E rro r Z=b/S. e . P [ | Z | » z l
C onstant “ O 0.12021 0.75246E-01 1 .598 0.11015
Admissions Y1 0.34391 0.74093E-01 4.642 0.00000
P a t. Days Y2 0.17888 0.82609E-01 2.165 0.03036
V is i t s Y3 0.15264 0.68795E-01 2.219 0.02650
PhysHours PH 0.71686E-01 0 .1 1664E-01 6.146 0.00000
RNS XI 0 .49978 0.73774E-01 6.774 0.00000
RNS*RNS X11 -0 .89748 0.40723 -2 .204 0.02753
CLR X2 0.31656 0.61144E-01 5.177 0.00000
CLR*CLR X22 -0.63247E-01 0.17805 -0 .355 0.72242
S upp lies X3 0 . 16710E-01 0.58371E-01 0.286 0.77467
Supp*Supp X33 -0 .98315 0.19791 -4 .968 0.00000
C o n tra c t X4 0.41732E-01 0 .30717E-01 1.359 0.17427
C o n tr*C on tr X44 0 .43441E-01 0.52690E-01 0.824 0.40968
Adra'Adm Y11 0.13802 0.48015 0.287 0.77377
PDays'Pdays Y22 -0.54141 0.34351 -1 .576 0.11500
V is 'V is Y33 -1 .0915 0.24019 -4 .544 0.00001
PHours*PHours PH2 0 .1 6863E-01 0 .1 1394E-01 1.480 0.13888
Adm*PDays Y12 -0.11841 0.36604 -0 .323 0.74632
Adm'Vis Y13 0.44069 0.23873 1.846 0.06489
POays*Vis Y23 0.14323 0.30574 0.468 0.63945
Adm*RNS Y1X1 -0 .96703 0.38631 -2 .503 0.01231
Adm'CLR Y1X2 1.1281 0.33875 3.330 0.00087
Adm*Supp Y1X3 0.36144 0.26015 1.389 0.16473
Adm'Contr Y1X4 0.12111 0.98870E-01 1.225 0.22059
PDays*RNS Y2X1 0.41931 0.44349 0.945 0.34441
PDays*CLR Y2X2 -1 .5974 0.36465 -4.381 0.00001
PDays*Supp Y2X3 0.28691 0.29852 0.961 0.33650
PDays*Contr Y2X4 0.11142 0.10330 1.079 0.28077
Vis*RNS Y3X1 0.56821 0.28556 1.990 0.04662
Vis*CLR Y3X2 0.58314 0.23569 2.474 0.01335
Vis*Supp Y3X3 -1 .0907 0.19359 -5 .634 0.00000
V is *C o n tr Y3X4 -0 .25336 0.10880 -2 .329 0.01988
RNS*CLR X I2 -0.94325E-01 0.26763 -0 .352 0.72451
RNS*Supp X13 0.78708 0.21759 3.617 0.00030
RNS*Contr X I4 0.10453 0.11484 0.910 0.36267
CLR'Supp X23 0.36072 0.20589 1 .752 0.07977
CLR*Contr X24 0.11809 0.11322 1.043 0.29695
Supp*Contr X34 -0 .32744 0.97609E-01 -3 .355 0.00079
% Mcaid Ada PADMO 0.54461 0.11524 4.726 0.00000
% Bed MSA MSABED -0.18585 0.98249E-01 -1 .892 0.05854
% SDS V is i t s VSDS 0.87740 0.55818 1 .572 0.11598
X  (lamda) CU/Cy 1.6357 0.34825 4.697 0.00000
a  ^ (o 2u+o2») 0.40760E-01 0.51905E-02 7.853 0.00000
2 Appendix 3.2 briefly evaluates this model.
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3.6 Cost Function Diagnostics
The economic behavior of the firm has a “dual” representation o f  its optimum properties, 
as the two functions, (production and cost), contain the same information. Duality theory 
ensures that under certain regularity conditions the cost function can be used to derive a 
description of the characteristics of the production function. The development of duality 
theory that links the production with the cost function advanced significantly the 
estimating techniques of the two functions. Assuming cost minimizing behavior and 
certain regularity conditions (positivity, homogeneity, monotonicity, and concavity), a 
well-behaved cost function can be estimated empirically and the structure o f production 
can be recovered (Fare and Primont, 1995). The production function limits the empirical 
analysis to a single output or an aggregated output index and so it is subject to possible 
misspecification problems. However, the cost function can be used in the estimation of 
multiple output as well as multiple input productive units.
The cost and its “dual” production characteristics are derived in this section. The OLS 
characteristics are almost similar to the stochastic frontier characteristics.
Multicollinearity as expected exists in this single equation model. The VIF indicators have 
values above 10 for the outputs and inputs. Particularly the squared and the interaction 
variables are highly correlated. Despite the high degree of collinearity, the majority of 
coefficients are statistically significant (OLS model). The explanatory power of all 
equations estimated is very good - a characteristic of the translog specification -and the 
model overall is highly significant. The functional form was tested against the simpler 
Cobb-Douglas. The null hypothesis that all the higher order terms jointly equal zero is 
rejected.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Testing the specification for omitted variables, the Ramsey RESET-test fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. The probability value for this test (F- 
test) is 96 percent. The Ramsey-test uses powers of the fitted values of the original 
model, which will be zero under the assumption of no specification error.
Also, a specification test, the link test, based on Tukey (1949) and Pregibon (1980) for the 
specification of the dependent variable can be used for the correct specification of the 
independent variables. The dependent variable is regressed on its prediction and its 
prediction squared. The significance of the two coefficients in this regression provides 
evidence of incorrect specification. The link test, also, supports the correct specification 
hypothesis of the model.
The presence of heteroscedasticity is not significant (OLS model) as the Breusch-Pagan 
test indicates (Table 3-2). A second test, the Coo-Weisberg for heteroscedasticity, that 
models the variance as a function of the fitted values of the dependent variable indicates 
homescedastic errors. However, the presence of a lower degree of heteroscedasticity can 
bias the inefficiency index, so a weighted model is estimated based on the residuals of the 
OLS regression.
From the analysis that follows, the model exhibits all the expected properties of a well- 
behaved cost function. The cost function evaluated at the point o f means is an increasing 
function of outputs and input prices.
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The cost elasticities for the three output measures (Admissions, Inpatient Days and 
Outpatient Visits) are obtained by differentiating the cost function with respect to each 
output.
(3.6)-l
dlnC
- f t
ra c ' r m c ^
d\n Yt j
= In Yh + £  ^  In W} -nr. In B  (i= I. m)
Because of the normalization of variables around their means the cost elasticities equal to 
the first order output coefficients (the higher order terms equal zero).
To derive the marginal cost estimates, the cost elasticity o f each output is multiplied by the 
fitted cost and divided by the actual output.
MCrt =aly (3.6)-2
The output elasticities and marginal costs are consistent with the findings reported in the 
literature. The marginal cost of admitting one more patient is $1,888.5. The marginal 
cost of an additional patient day is $263.3 while the extra visit costs the hospital $80.1, all 
evaluated at their means.
Table 3-6: Output Cost Elasticities and Marginal Costs
0.32709 0.30108 $2,076.2 $1888.5
(3.960) (4.515) (3.960) (4.515)
0.24457 0.25868 $226.1 $236.3
(3.493) (3.959) (3.493) (3.959)
0.19339 0.20312 $77.2 $80.1
(3.078) (3.591) (3.078) (3.591)
a: t-slalistics in parentheses 
b: asymptotic z-statistics in  parentheses
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The overall economies o f scale for a multi-product translog cost function are determined 
according to the following formula (Cowing and Holtman, 1983), which is the extension 
of the single-output function:
(3.6)-3
m I n  (  m m m m n m
SC E  = l - £  = I + £  Y , r , h + £  £  <f>t] \n W s + £  x t In
Since the variables are mean-scaled all the second order terms equal to zero. Therefore,
m
the SCE reduces to: SCE = 1—
I
Table 3-7: Economies o f scale
OLS Frontier
0.23495 0.23712
(4.570) (5.383)
Asymptotic z-statistics in  parentheses
Positive SCE value indicates scale economies and negative SCE value indicates scale 
diseconomies.
SCE reflects the percentage change in total cost resulted from a simultaneous percentage 
change in all three outputs. Which means that a 10% proportional increase of all outputs 
(holding physician hours constant) would increase total cost by 2.4% (less than 10%). 
The Allen-Uzawa partial elasticities of substitution for the translog cost function, are 
calculated a s :
(3.6)-5
f  \
S* + S .SH '
r , >
( s a+ p ; - p )II
l  S 'Sk J I  f i A  J
and au —
I  s ;  ) {  p ;  J
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Because of normalization of the sample the first order coefficients are cost elasticities and 
fitted shares of inputs. The factor demand for inputs elasticities, own and cross, can be 
obtained using the above elasticities o f substitution:
Gih =  (Jiffih and e i i = ° ii^ i  (3.6)-6
Table 3-8: Allen-Uzawa Factor Demand Elasticities (Own-Cross) -Frontier
-1.9296 1.2968 4.2789 1.5246 0.23389
(-2.226) (0.344) (1-971) (0.987) (0.261)
0.22495 -1.4425 -0.17824 2.9431 -0.98706
(0.368) (-0.516) (-0.119) (1.895) (-1.260)
1.4481 -0.34774 -2.8603 -1.7108 0.58718
(4.011) (-0.114) (-1.719) (-2.140) (0.645)
0.18999 2.1142 -1.7346 -0.21156 0.19893
d-153) (1.187) (-2.162) (-0.384) (0.701)
0.06662 -1.6207 0.49420 0.45471 -0.03294
(0.273) (-1.044) (0.552) (0.604) (-0.043)
Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses
The expected negative sign of own price elasticities is obtained for all inputs indicating 
negatively sloped demand for inputs and a well-behaved cost function. Supplies is the 
most elastic input to price changes. The own price elasticities of RN and Supplies are 
statistically significant at the 2.6 and 8.6 levels of significance, respectively. The 
elasticities of CLR, Contract Services and Capital are statistically insignificant.
The cross-price elasticities of demand are the indicators of net substitution in production. 
The positive cross-price elasticities of demand indicate substitute factors and the negative 
complementary factors. The negative elasticity of substitution reflects the absence o f 
competition between the two factors but also reflects the lack of opportunities to gain in
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efficiency by substituting a cost inflated input (Estaugh, 1992). The cross-price elasticity 
reveals high and significant substitutability between RN Services and Supplies, and 
complementarity between supplies and contract services.
Table 3-9: Allen-Uzawa Factor Elasticities o f substitution
PC SL'R
2.4916
(0.35 L)
8.2212 -L.9742
(2.381) (-0.113)
2.9293 32.598 -26.745
(1.009) (1-159) (-1-737)
0.44938 -10.933 3.3337
(0.263) (-1.035) (0.594)
3.0672
(0.635)
Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses
The elasticities o f substitution that measure the change in relative input shares caused by 
the change in their relative prices, indicate the large substitution possibilities between RN 
Services and Supplies, RN Services and Contract Services. The elasticities of substitution 
are different from unity and support the translog specification against the Cobb-Douglas.
3.7 Stochastic Frontier Estimated Inefficiency
Table 3-10
Descriptive Statistics: Hospital Stochastic Frontier Cost Inefficiency
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 1 "'Quart Median S^Quart
INEFFICIENCY 
COST INEF/NCY
0.0404 
$4,292
0.0417
$7,132
0.0027
$127
0.1528
$50,016
0.0403 0.0777 
$12,599 $25,071
0.1153
$37,544
Note: Cost: Inefficiency is in thousand of dollars.
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The results indicate that the average inefficiency is 4.04 percent of total costs. The 
exponential specification yielded comparable results. The coefficient of correlation 
between the normal and exponential specification equals 0.9443. The hospital specific 
inefficiency ranges between 0.27 and 15.28 percent. Eleven hospitals have an inefficient 
index that exceeds 10 percent.
This estimate can be translated into a dollar value. Inefficiency causes each hospital on 
average $4,292.67 thousand additional spending. The excess cost of inefficient hospitals 
ranges between $127.2 and $50,015.71 thousand.
Appendix 3.3 illustrates the distribution o f the hospital stochastic cost frontier function. 
Since the determinants of hospital performance are o f considerable interest, the estimated 
hospital specific inefficiency (index) of the stochastic frontier is modeled in section 6.
The stochastic inefficiency scores will be compared with inefficiency estimates obtained 
using alternative DEA formulations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
Appendix 3.1 
Parametric Restrictions of the Hospital Cost Function
Economic theory requires that the cost function be linearly homogeneous in all input
prices:
n n n n
=  t  = 0  for all r. =  0 foraU i:
y=l y=I y=l 7=1
L P r i  P i ~ p 2  -p 3  +p4 +Ps = i Ps = l-(P i +A  +P-0
£ 5 jr  - 0  for all r S n  ~P iz ~Pis ~Pt4 -P is =0 Pis = -  (P it ~Piz ~Pt3 ~ Pi-t)
P j2  ~  P l2  -  P 3 3  —  P 3 4  - P 3 S  = 0  S 2 S  “  *  ( P l2  -  & 2 2  ^  P 2 3  -  P 2 4 )
P l3  ~ p 23  ~ P l3  + P 34  ~ p 3S  = 0  8 3 3  =  -  ( 8 1 3  ~  8 3 3  ~ p 33  ~ P 3 4 )
Pl4 ~P24 P34 —P44  ~< Sj5  =0 PlS ~ ~ ( P/4 ~P24 -P 34  — P44)
Pis ~P:s -P 33 ~P ts ~Pss ~0 Pss = " (Pis ~Pzs ~p3s ~Pis)
y ^ j  =0 for all j tfaixi <hix2+<hiX3+■fir 1x 4 T<faixs=0 0 rix s= -(<j>Yixi^  <fcix2~ <faix3~ <hix-i)
tfozxi^ <t>Y2X2+<h2X3~<t>Y2X4~4>Y2XS—0 <hzXS~ ~(^Y2XI ~<hzX2~<t>T2X3~'hzX-O
0T3XI + <t>Y3X2 ~ <pY3X3 ~ <f>Y3X4 + <j>Y3XS= 0 <f>Y3XS= ~(<Pr3XI ^  </>Y3X2 ^  0Y3X3 + 0Y3X-l)
<hEDXlJr(hEDX2^<t>BEDX3Jr<hEDX4^<hEDXS
4>BEDXS= ~(0BEDX1 ^  0BEDX2 ~ <t>BEDX3 ~ <f>BEDX4)
Appendix 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics o f the Case Mix Adjusted Stochastic Frontier Model
The marginal costs of outputs for the case mix adjusted model are:
V a ria b le M a rg in a l Cost S tandard  E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [ |Z |> z ]
Adm issions $1934.9 416.8 4.642 0.00000
In p a t ie n t  Days $ 146.5 67 .7 2 .165 0.03036
O u tp a tie n t V is i t s $ 53 .9 24 .3 2.219 0.02650
The inefficiency index obtained from the case mix adjusted model averages 3.39 percent.
It ranges between 0.33 and 14.44 percent. The marginal cost of the case mix adjusted 
model is higher for the admissions and lower for the patient days and outpatient visits than 
the marginal costs obtained from the unadjusted model.
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Appendix 3.3 
The Distribution o f the Stochastic Frontier Hospital Cost Inefficiency
The distribution of the hospital cost inefficiency is illustrated below.
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Figure 3.1: Hospital Specific Inefficiency
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Figure 3.2: The Distribution of Hospital Cost Inefficiency
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4
The Administrative Hospital Cost Frontier Function 
4.1 Introduction
The administrative cost debate motivated by the work of Himmelstein and Woolhandler 
(1986) and Woolhandler and Himmelstein (1991). The two studies advocate a single­
payer health care system for the United States and evaluate the administrative cost savings 
that could be achieved under such a system. A number of studies continued the debate 
presenting estimates of the costs of administering health care as part of a proposed overall 
reform of the health care system [Himmelstein et al. (1986); Hellander et al. (1994);
Poullier (1992); Sheils et al. (1992); Woolhandler et al. (1991)] as well as providing or 
criticizing definitional and theoretical issues [Thorpe (1992); Gauthier et al. (1992);
Danzon (1992)]. The lack of a common conceptual definition on administrative costs and 
the lack of adequate and consistent information from which to make calculations resulted 
in estimates that vary widely and in most cases can not be compared. The character of the 
research environment within which the search for “accurate estimates” o f administrative 
costs is taking place actually describes the complexity of the health care system itself.
At least one researcher has concluded that administrative costs account for almost one 
fourth of all health care expenditures (Hellander et al., 1994). This alone focuses attention 
on the question of efficiency in administration.
Several definitions of administrative costs have been used by researchers pursuing the 
problems of measuring such costs. The National Health Account’s (NHA) definition is 
widely used as the basis for estimating insurers’ administrative costs. However, this
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definition excludes the administrative costs incurred by providers, employers and 
consumers and understates the level o f administrative cost of the health care system 
(Evans, 1990).
Thorpe (1992) provided the basis for the conceptual framework for accurate measurement 
of administrative costs. He developed four functions (transaction related activities, 
benefits management, selling and marketing, and regulation/compliance) for each of six 
sectors (insurers, hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, employers, consumers) of the 
health care system. Thorpe pointed out the difficulty o f identifying administrative costs.
He described the components of each function, but existing studies illustrate how difficult 
the operationalization of the concept is rather than a conceptual definition as such.
Studies published after Thorpe’s conceptual framework continue to speculate and 
accumulate information from different sources to form estimates. One of the most 
important impediments is the lack of reliable accounting-type data.
4.2. Hospital Administration and its Structure
The difficulty of measuring administrative costs of hospitals is attributed to multi-product 
nature of hospital services, diversity of services, and to the variety of inputs used.
Hospitals are organizations consisting of many departments that perform different 
functions but each department supports the hospital’s main objective; the provision 
(production) of health care (AHA, 1986). In addition to medical care, hospitals produce 
clinical research and medical education programs.
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The administrative department provides a variety of complex functions. The first step in 
deriving an estimate o f the total cost o f administration is the provision of a descriptive list 
of these functions and services.
The following table illustrates Thorpe's listing o f administrative cost functions in hospitals. 
The hospital is guided to its objectives by the policy-making administrative staff that 
manages all hospital’s operations. The policy-making administrative staff includes the 
CEO (chief executive officer), presidents, vice-presidents, and heads o f the departments. 
The complexity of hospital’s administration depends mainly on its type (f.e. HMO), the 
size of the hospital, as well as on government initiatives, reimbursement policies, market 
and social forces, physician and medical staff integration, and medical technology.
The admitting office performs a variety of tasks such as providing information and 
communication services, appointing, scheduling, reservation, reception, registration, 
orientation, census management, coordination o f initial tests, and discharge notification. 
The admitting office often performs all these functions for inpatient, outpatient and 
emergency patients. The degree o f automation (i.e. manual level -typewriters-, automated 
or computerized) of this administrative function may affect admitting office’s costs and 
efficiency significantly. Computerized admitting offices allow patient 
registration/scheduling etc to be centralized, eliminating duplication, reducing paperwork 
and permitting intra-hospital flow of information.
The fiscal department performs the business functioning o f the hospital firm dealing with 
patient accounts and payroll services as well as accounting services, budgeting, 
monitoring, and auditing. The billing function, one of the most complex functions of the 
fiscal department, consists of patient eligibility verification, claims submission and claims
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processing, coordination of benefits, collection of payments and remittance advice. The 
complexity of this function is heavily influenced by the multiple-payer character of the 
American health system as well as by the technological level of the function.
Table 4-1.
Function Output Costs Factors Influencing 
Costs
Transaction Related Patient Care, Sales. 
Revenue
Admitting, Billing, 
Account Receivable. 
Collections
Type o f MIS. 
Uniformity of 
reimbursement system
Benefits Management as above Quality assurance. 
Medical records. 
Data processing
% o f bills elect/ly filed. 
Scope and mixed of 
services
Sales and Management Clinical Outcomes. 
Research. Education
Strategic planning. 
Finance control. Public 
relation. Advertising
Market Competition. 
Regulation. Ownership 
(public, for-profit etc)
Regulation/Compliance as above Peer Review 
Organizations
State and Federal Laws
Source: Thorpe, £ ,  1992.
Computerization o f this function is very important to administrative efficiency. Intra­
hospital information networks that facilitate the flow of information among departments 
and inter-computer networks that link the hospital with its trading partners (payers, 
employers, physicians, patients) can provide organizational advantages streamlining 
administrative costs. Under the supervision o f the chief financial administrator or another 
administrator, the data processing department (Hospital Information System), one of the 
most dynamic hospital departments, coordinates the flow of information within the 
hospital and with other parties located outside through computerized technology.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The medical record department, an important element of administration, is responsible for 
maintaining patient records. Medical records involve the functions of record filing, 
indexing, storing, sand retrieving patient’s medical and administrative information. Like a 
health information bank for patients, medical records, provide information to practitioners 
and facilitate the flow of information for reimbursement policies, quality assurance and 
utilization review. The department’s costs depend on the system used: paper or 
electronic. The computerized patient record recommended by the Institute of Medicine 
provides the state of the art technology for this department and a promise for significant 
cost savings.
Hospitals use a variety of Information Systems (AHA, 1986):
1. Shared-systems where the hospital shares a computerized information system with 
other hospitals,
2. “Tumkey-systems” where the venture installs and maintains the information system,
3. Customized-systems installed, developed and maintained by own technical resources,
4. Contracted facilities management services, where the hospital contracts on-site 
management, technical and data processing services.
The information system services are available for administrative as well as medical and 
patient care needs.
EDI is a relatively new technology, which is gaining popularity in the health care industry. 
However, EDI systems have a different mission from the traditional intra-hospital 
information systems. EDI technology links the hospital with its outside partners by 
crossing its organizational boundaries.
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4.3 Review of the literature
The literature provides a variety o f administrative cost estimates of the U.S. health care 
system. Most estimates were created for comparisons of the current system with other 
systems (mainly the single payer Canadian health care system) and for reform proposals. 
Based on different definitions of what constitutes administrative cost and on incomplete 
data, the administrative cost estimates can not be compared. However, reported estimates 
indicate the existence and the magnitude of the administrative problem and the need for 
reform. Almost all studies include the three sectors of hospitals, payers and physicians in 
their estimates, which provide a base for comparisons.
Himmelstein and Woolhandler (1986) estimates initiated the administrative debate labeling 
the administrative cost, “waste,” and emphasizing the need for reform of the system 
overall. They estimated the cost of administration to be $73.6 billion (in 1983 dollars) for 
the three sectors consuming almost one fifth of the total amount spent on health care. In a 
revised estimate for 1987, Woolhandler and Himmelstein (1991) shown that the 
administrative cost for the three sectors ranged between $90.4 and $ 114.0 billion. The 37 
percent increase of administration between 1983 and 1987 alarmed policy makers and 
initiated the debate. The estimate o f $118.4 billion for 1991, reported by GAO, (1991), 
was not consistent with the rate of growth of previous studies but confirmed the existence 
of the problem. Lewin-VHI, (1993), estimated an $125,6 billion administrative cost for 
1991, based on the US CBO, (1991), study, while Sheils et al, (1992) reported an estimate 
of $175 billion for the same year.
Lewin-VHI, (1993) synthesized the above studies in a single estimate expressed in 1991 
dollars. The synthesis provides an average estimate that links the differences of estimated
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methods. This estimate equals to $126.1 billion for the three sectors of the United States 
system. One of the latest studies by Hellander, Himmelstein, Woolhandler and Wolfe, 
(1994), following the sequence of Himmelstein et al, (1986) and Woolhandler et al, (1991) 
reported that administration consumed about 25 percent of the total health care 
expenditures ($220.3 billion) in 1993.
Table 4-2.
Estimates of Administrative Cost*. A review of the Literatureb
Year Hospitals
Health
Insurance Physicians Total
Hospital administration 
% o f Total Hospital Exp.
1983' $26.9 $15.6 $31.1 $73.6 18.3%
1987“ $39.3 $25.3 $25.8-49.4 $90.4-114.0 20.2%
19913 $43.7 $42.8 $31.9 $118.4 15.4%
19914 $93.9 $38.2 $43.3 $175.4 33.4%
1991s $41.0 $38.6 $45.9 $125.6
19936 $81.7 $54.3 $84.3 $220.3 24.8%
19917 $44.7 $38.1 $43.3 $126.1
19908 $63.5 24.8%
19949 26.0%
(a) In billions of dollars.
(b) Tsaprounis and Kirchhoff (1994)
(1) Himmelstein and Woolhandler (1986)
(2) Woolhandler and Himmelstein (1991)
(3) GAO (June 1991. April 1992)
(4) Sheils et ah. (1992)
(5) CBO estimates calculated by Lewin-VHI (1993) and based on US CBO Dec.. 1991.
(6) Hellander etal„ (1994)
(7) Lewin-VHI (1993): A synthesis estimate that combines (2), (3). (4) and (5) in 1991 dollars.
(8) Woolhandler et aL. (1993)
(9) Woolhandler etaL. (1997)
Hospital administration on the above studies ranges between 15.4 and 33.4 percent of
total hospital costs, Table 4-2. The above studies used different definitions of
administration and different data sources. The definitions used by Himmelstein et al.,
(1986), Woolhandler et al., (1991), Hellander et al., (1994), and GAO, (1991) share a
common definitional base including items such as general accounting, medical records.
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data processing, patient accounting and admitting. However, their data sources and 
estimated assumptions are very different. The first two studies use data on hospital 
administration from a single state (California), the third uses Medicare cost reports, and 
finally, GAO estimates are based on American Medical Association’s Monitrend data. 
Sheils et al., (1992), define as administrative all functions but patient care, and include 
cafeteria and hospital net revenue in their estimate inflating administration to 33.4% of 
total.
Woolhandler and Himmelstein, (1997) continued the sequence of health care 
administrative cost studies and found that in 1994 the administrative share of hospitals 
reached 26 percent on average. The share of administration ranged between 22.9 percent 
for public hospitals to 34 percent for for-profit hospitals.
They concluded that competition and market forces tend to influence the size of 
administration.
The administrative cost is influenced heavily by the state’s regulatory/competitive 
environment. In 1980’s eight states adopted mandatory rate-setting programs and four 
states, including New Jersey and New York, implemented an all-payer regulatory 
approach. Studies found that hospitals that operate in a regulatory state environment 
(New York) incur lower administrative costs than hospitals that operate under more 
competitive systems (California’s selective contracting competitive environment). 
Specifically, the percentage o f administrative to total operating cost was estimated to be 
14.14% in New York and 22.47% in California (Marder, 1993).
Himmelstein et al., (1996) analyzed employment data (US Bureau of the Census March 
Current Population Survey) for the period 1968-1993. During this period the
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administrative employment of the health care sector increased from 0.719 to 2.792 million 
FTEs. The share o f the health care employment to total employment increased from 18.1 
percent to 27.1 percent. They found that a large proportion (27 percent) o f health care 
employees produce mostly paperwork. This study will test the hypothesis posed by the 
authors: “Does more administration increase efficiency or waste time and trees?”
In addition, the effects of competition, and other hospital specific and hospital area 
characteristics will be investigated.
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4.4 The Cost o f Administration
The data used in this study, the 1993 New Jersey Actuals, provide a detailed and 
definitionally uniform data set (for 83 acute care hospitals) subject to the state regulatory 
guidelines. However, the uniformity of the state data does not insure applicability of 
findings at a national level.
Table 4-3.
Total Cost % of Total % of Administrative
($000) Cost Cost
Mean TCOST ADMC
TCOST 97941.57 100.00
ADMC 14323.78 15.14 100.00
A&G 6879.96 7.09 46.61
FIS 4112.05 4.55 30.04
MRD 957.10 1.05 7.03
PCC 952.25 1.03 6.84
OGS 866.59 0.84 5.72
PHY 195.27 0.20 1.23
DEPR 360.56 0.38 2.53
The total administrative cost is the sum of the following functions:
• A & G: Administrative and General (Outside Collection Costs etc),
• FIS: Fiscal (Inpatient Admitting/Billing/Accounts Receivable, Outpatient
Registration/Billing/Accounts Receivable, Payroll),
• MRD: Medical Records,
• PCC: Patient Care Coordination (includes Utilization Review),
• OGS Other General Services Costs (includes only the items: Plant Related
Security/other, and Clinically Related-Tumor Registry/Medical Library/Photo),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
• PHY: Physician Coverage (includes the items: Medical Administration-Non 
Graduate Medical Education Programs).
• DEPR Deprecation and interest attributed to administration.
Costs related to Education and Research were excluded from the analysis. The following 
table provides a summary of the administrative functions:
4.5 Variables and Data
The total administrative cost is the dependent variable and is derived by summing up the 
costs of all non-patient functions devoted to administration.
The vector of output includes the number of inpatient admissions and outpatient visits as a 
proxy of the administrative production. The administrative hospital cost function, as the 
total hospital cost function, is a multi-product function in nature, but its outputs can be 
approximated by the total number of patients served (admitted inpatients and outpatients). 
A natural measure of administrative output, and a common base of administrative cost 
savings studies, is the number of claims. However, the definition of a “claim” is not 
common or widely accepted. A HCFA study (Lewin-VHI, 1993) and WEDI (WEDI,
1992, 1993) consider any line item on a billing statement (visit, test, procedure performed) 
as a separate claim.
Lewin-VHI defines a claim as the entire medical bill and not as a line item. A medical bill 
on average includes four line items “claims” (Lewin-VHI, 1993). Every inpatient 
admission and outpatient visit includes an unspecified number o f “claims” as defined 
above. In this study a definition similar to that of Lewin-VHI is considered.
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The vector of input prices includes:
(1) the hourly wage o f the administrative personnel (total cost of clerical personnel divided 
by total hours),
(2) the price of administrative supplies and other expenditures is calculated as 
expenditures on administrative supplies and other expenditures divided by the number of 
beds,
(3) the price of contract services and lease services is calculated as expenditures divided 
by the sum of admissions and visits.
(4) the price of capital calculated as depreciation and interest of administrative equipment 
plus the proportion of fixed plant depreciation devoted to administration (total fixed plant 
depreciation multiplied by the share of administrative area) divided by the percentage of 
administrative area to total hospital.
(5) the wage of physicians on administrative tasks is calculated as cost per hour.
Other administrative cost determinants include hospital beds that reflect the size of the 
hospital.
The data set used in this study, the 1993 New Jersey Actuals, described in previous 
section.
The level o f administrative costs depends on state and federal regulations and policies. 
Regulations at the state or national level affect the administrative functions as well as the 
total operating cost. Possibly the effect is different and cost control policies may reduce 
hospital’s cost growth but at the same time impose additional regulatory burden on the 
administrative function. The proportion of administration to total hospital cost does not 
necessarily mean inefficiency, so California spends on hospitals per capita less than New
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York (Thorpe et al. 1992). The share o f administration to total cost for the state of New 
Jersey is 15.14 % almost equal to that provided by Thorpe above for the state of New 
York. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimation are presented in the 
following table (4-4).
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Table 4-4
Descriptive Statistics: The Administrative Stochastic Cost Frontier Function
V a ria b le Mean S td . Dev. Mininum Maxiaun D e s c r ip t io n
TCOST 97941.57 60665.64 16623.00 327279.00 T o ta l H o s p ita l C ost ($000)
AMC 14323.78 9062.08 2594.16 63051.35 A d m in is t ra t iv e  C ost ($000)
ADTOT 13786.45 7628.88 2028.00 39206.00 Adm issions
VNATOT 145741.00 119484.08 10896.00 769918.00 O u tp a tie n t V is i t s
MBEDTOT 355.86 161.52 86.00 799.00 Number o f  Beds
HPHYS 4175.72 11000.68 0.00 63374.00 Hours o f  P h y s ic ia n s  on Adm.
CPHYS 202.55 457.73 0.00 2781.00 Cost o f  P h y s ic ia n s  ($000)
EH 460571.88 225567.85 94624.00 1151835.00 Employee Hours
EC 7207.55 4280.71 1315.00 29281.00 Employee C ost ($000)
HCLRE 95309.67 69802.16 9259.00 372882.00 Hours o f  C le r ic a l  Personnel
CCLRE 1187.20 988.26 98.00 4956.00 Cost o f  C le r ic a l  Per ($000)
WSUP 3995.23 3169.33 693.00 17306.00 Cost o f  S upp l & O th e r ($000)
WCON 2674.71 2445.43 324.00 15746.00 Cost o f  C o n tr & Lease ($000)
WCAP 760.40 480.45 14.14 2019.38 Cost o f  C a p ita l ($000)
PLANTSF 438757.33 253911.77 56323.00 1169984.00 P la n t S ize  (H o s p ita l)
ADMPLT 63810.52 39377.29 5325.00 171025.00 P la n t S ize  (A d m in is tra t io n )
FTEEH 221.43 108.45 45.49 553.77 FTE Employees
FTEHPHYS 2.01 5 .29 0.00 30.47 FTE P h y s ic ia n s
FTEHCLRE 45.82 33.56 4.45 179.2702 FTE C le r ic a l
FTEEC 31.78 5 .25 21.44 69.0664 FTE Employee Cost
FTECPHYS 107.51 107.78 0.00 938.1405 FTE P h y s ic ia n  C ost
FTECCLRE 25.47 11 .25 15.42 88.0540 FTE C le r ic a l  Cost
H1 0.0122 0.0054 0.0074 0.0423 W a g e /H o u r-C le ric a l ($000)
X2 10.6255 4.8027 4.1911 29.8379 P ric e  o f  S u p p lie s  ($000)
X3 0.0199 0.0121 0.0031 0.0638 P ric e  o f  C o n tra c t ($000)
X4 57.1974 43.4479 1.4962 249.2130 P ric e  o f  C a p ita l ($000)
WPHY 0.0518 0.0517 0.0010 0.4510 W age/H our-Physic ian  ($000)
AGPLT 0.1115 0.0637 0.0086 0.3160 AG&G P la n t S ize  (%)
FISPLT 0.0240 0.0158 0.0000 0.0693 FIS P la n t S ize  (%)
MRDPLT 0.0125 0.0062 0.0000 0.0325 MRD P la n t  S ize  (%)
PCCPLT 0.0047 0.0032 0.0000 0.0164 PCC P la n t S ize  (%)
PLT 0.1527 0.0669 0.0216 0.3502 % AD M /Tota l p la n t  s iz e
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4.6 The Model: Hospital Administrative Cost Function
The administrative cost function follows the translog functional form:
lnADC=f(InY, lnP; InX) + e 
The translog as a second order approximation to an arbitrary administrative cost function 
allows first and second order effects to be investigated and the possibility o f functional 
restrictions to be statistically tested before their imposition, 
where
InADC = the natural logarithm o f total administrative cost;
InY  = the natural logarithm of a vector of hospital administrative outputs; 
lnP = the natural logarithm of a vector of administrative input prices;
A = the natural logarithm of a vector of a fixed factor;
X= other environmental factors that affect the administrative function; 
e is the composite error (v + u)
The translog approximation of the administrative cost function can be written as:
InADCXQP,X)=a0 +Jjx. InQ +Z/? lnP InQ InQ
<=t /=! 2 1=1
+-ZZ<?r InP.Pr tag InP +0O \nA+—0QnA)2
2 y=l r=l r=l 7=1 2
m  n  k
+Jjrt InQ InP inA+]£pkXk +v +«.
/=1 ‘ y=I 1 1 h=l ' '
The appropriate sets o f parametric restrictions are imposed on the above function: 
Symmetry of the translog cost function requires: y,h=Yh, for all i  and h, 8ir=Sjr for all j  
and r, according to Young’s theorem.
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Linear homogeneity in the input prices is imposed by the following restrictions:
ft ft ft ft
y > ,  = I; = 0 for all r. 0,, =  0 for all 1, 2 > , = 0 :
Since a number o f hospitals do not employ physicians in administrative functions and so 
their prices equal zero, a small value was assigned to these hospitals before taking logs. 
The dependent variable (total administrative cost) and the input prices are normalized.
The price of capital is the normalization factor. The characteristics of the production 
function are recovered from the cost function. The application of Duality theory discussed 
in the previous section.
The empirical results of a variety of cost functions, OLS and stochastic frontier that allow 
for comparisons, follow. First, OLS estimated functions are presented; two OLS 
corrected for heteroscedasticity models (tables 4-5 and 4-6). Second, the system of 
equations, of the cost function and the factor cost share equations, is estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation of constrained linear systems, (SURE). The results are 
presented in table 4-7. Finally, the stochastic cost frontier estimated model is presented 
(table 4-8).
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4.7 Empirical Results:
T a b l e  4 - 5
OLS: Corrected For Heteroskedasticity
Dependent v a r ia b le  i s  th e  Log o f  T o ta l A d m in is t ra t iv e  C ost 
Model s iz e :  O b se rva tions  = 83,
Param eters = 36 , D eg .F r. = 47
R -squared = 0 .98483 , A d ju s te d  R -squared = 0 .97354
Model t e s t :  F [ 35, 47] = 87 .1 9 , Prob va lu e  = 0.00000
Breusch - Pagan ch i-s q u a re d  = 31 .3420 , w ith  35 degrees o f  freedom
V a r ia b le  D e s c r ip t io n  C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard  E r ro r  t - r a t i o  P [ |T |> t l
C onstan t 0.10775 0 .1 9739E-01 5.459 0.00000
Adm issions Y1 0.26585 0.77814E-01 3.416 0.00132
V is i t s Y2 0.30630 0.42395E-01 7.225 0.00000
Adm'Adm Y11 -0.36169E-01 0.49824 -0 .073 0.94244
V is 'V is Y22 0.21724 0.15051 1 .443 0.15554
Beds BED 0.32155 0.85942E-01 3.742 0.00050
Beds*Beds BED2 -0.73919E-01 0.48151 -0 .154 0.87865
Adm*Vis Y1Y2 -0.27433E-01 0.11824 -0 .232 0.81754
Adm*Beds Y1BED -0.70993E-01 0.45183 -0 .1 5 7 0.87582
V is*Beds Y2BED 0.32769E-01 0.22551 0.145 0.88509
CLR HI 0.33192 0.55526E-01 5.978 0.00000
CLR*CLR H11 -0.61259 0.10700 -5 .725 0.00000
S u p p lie s X2 0.31740 0.27762E-01 11.433 0.00000
Supp*Supp X22 -0.12957 0.97344E-01 -1 .331 0.18958
C on tr/Lease X3 0.29253 0.24516E-01 11.932 0.00000
C o n tr*C o n tr X33 0.89627E-01 0.55862E-01 1 .604 0.11532
Phys Wage WP 0.25137E-01 0.17663E-01 1 .423 0.16129
PhysW*PhysW WP2 0 . 15277E-01 0.87801E-02 1 .740 0.08841
Adm*CLR Y1H1 -0.11949 0.32375 -0 .369 0.71374
Adm*Supp Y1X2 0.70493E-02 0.19678 0 .036 0.97158
Adm*Contr Y1X3 -0.41885E-01 0.11593 -0.361 0.71950
Adm*PhysW Y1WP 0.53081E-01 0.43412E-01 1 .223 0.22753
Vis'CLR Y2H1 0.17951 0.12928 1 .389 0.17153
Vis*Supp Y2X2 -0.20537 0.98571E-01 -2 .083 0.04268
V is 'C o n tr Y2X3 0.17959 0.57475E-01 3 .125 0.00305
Vis*PhysW Y2WP 0.93901E-02 0.21023E-01 0 .447 0.65717
CLR*Supp H1X2 0.32655 0.90355E-01 3 .614 0.00073
CLR*Contr H1X3 0.19050 0.58249E-01 3 .270 0.00201
CLR*PhysW H1WP 0 . 15904E-02 0.24533E-01 0 .065 0.94858
S upp 'C on tr X2X3 -0.20655 0 .35310E-01 -5 .850 0.00000
Supp*PhysW X2WP -0.1821 IE-01 0.21023E-01 -0 .8 6 6 0.39074
Contr'PhysW X3WP 0 . 12444E-01 0 . 17529E-01 0.710 0.48129
Beds*CLR BEDH1 -0.20255 0.41895 -0 .4 8 3 0.63101
Beds*Supp BEDX2 0.18929 0.27396 0.691 0.49300
Beds*C ontr BEDX3 -0.80516E-02 0.13627 -0 .059 0.95313
Beds*PhysW BEDWP -0.56438E-01 0.48645E-01 -1 .1 6 0 0.25183
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T a b l e  4 - 6
OLS: Corrected for Heteroscedasticity(WHITE’S Method)
V a ria b le  D e s c r ip t io n  C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard E r ro r  z = b /s .e . P [ |Z |> z I
C onstant 0.10775 0.22923E-01 4.701 0.00000
Adm issions Y1 0.26585 0.11003 2.416 0.01568
V is i t s Y2 0.30630 0.57138E-01 5.361 0.00000
Adm*Adm Y11 -0.36169E-01 0.62480 -0.058 0.95384
V is *V is Y22 0.21724 0.20018 1.085 0.27781
Beds BED 0.32155 0.13289 2.420 0.01553
Beds*Beds BED2 -0.73919E-01 0.70642 -0.105 0.91666
Adm'Vis Y1Y2 -0.27433E-01 0.17746 -0.155 0.87714
Adm'Beds Y1BED -0.70993E-01 0.62002 -0.115 0.90884
Vis*Beds Y2BED 0.32769E-01 0.26980 0.121 0.90333
CLR HI 0.33192 0.75656E-01 4.387 0.00001
CLR*CLR H11 -0.61259 0.15399 -3.978 0.00007
S upp lies X2 0.31740 0.39434E-01 8.049 0.00000
Supp*Supp X22 -0.12957 0.11660 -1.111 0.26645
C ontr/Lease X3 0.29253 0.35803E-01 8.171 0.00000
C o n tr*C o n tr X33 0.89627E-01 0.86006E-01 1.042 0.29736
Phys Wage WP 0.25137E-01 0.24989E-01 1.006 0.31444
PhysW'PhysW WP2 0.15277E-01 0 . 13156E-01 1 .161 0.24554
Adm*CLR Y1H1 -0.11949 0.41884 -0 .285 0.77543
Adm*Supp Y1X2 0.70493E-02 0.25924 0.027 0.97831
Adm*Contr Y1X3 -0.41885E-01 0.19821 -0.211 0.83264
Adm*PhysW Y1WP 0.53081E-01 0.67087E-01 0.791 0.42881
Vis*CLR Y2H1 0.17951 0.19007 0.944 0.34495
Vis*Supp Y2X2 -0.20537 0.13238 -1 .551 0.12081
V is *C o n tr Y2X3 0.17959 0.94816E-01 1.894 0.05822
Vis*PhysW Y2WP 0.93901E-02 0.26948E-01 0.348 0.72750
CLR’ Supp H1X2 0.32655 0.12723 2.567 0.01027
CLR*Contr H1X3 0.19050 0.89922E-01 2.118 0.03413
CLR*PhysW H1WP 0.15904E-02 0.36437E-01 0.044 0.96518
Supp*Contr X2X3 -0.20655 0.52947E-01 -3.901 0.00010
Supp*PhysW X2WP -0.1821 IE-01 0.33235E-01 -0.548 0.58372
Contr*PhysW X3WP 0 . 12444E-01 0.20887E-01 0.596 0.55133
Beds'CLR BEDH1 -0.20255 0.52451 -0.386 0.69937
Beds'Supp BE0X2 0.18929 0.34591 0.547 0.58422
Beds*C ontr BEDX3 -0.80516E-02 0.23634 -0.034 0.97282
Beds'PhysW BEDWP -0.56438E-01 0.79410E-01 -0.711 0.47726
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T a b l e  4 - 7
C o n s t r a in e d  MLE f o r  M u l t i v a r i a t e  R e g r e s s io n  Model(SURE)
C onstra ined  MLE f o r  M u l t iv a r ia te  R egression Model 
F i r s t  i t e r :  0 F= 229.7493 lo g |a |=  -19.72551 
L a s t i t e r :  4 F= 627.3829 lo g |a |=  -29.30705 
Number o f o b s e rv a tio n s  used in  e s t im a t io n  = 83
V a r ia b le  D e s c r ip t io n  C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard  E rro r  z = b /s .e . P [ | Z | > z l
C onstant A 0.50385E-01 0.23851E-01 2.112 0.03465
Adm issions Y1 0.19862 0.93726E-01 2.119 0.03408
V is i t s Y2 0.20137 0.38970E-01 5.167 0.00000
Adm*Adm Y11 0.50279 0.59870 0.840 0.40102
V is 'V is Y22 0.24510E-01 0.13801 0.178 0.85904
Beds BEO 0.44579 0.11702 3.810 0.00014
Beds'Beds BED2 -0.27064 0.83666 -0 .323 0.74633
Adm'Vis Y1Y2 -0.40023 0.18088 -2 .213 0.02692
Adm'Beds Y1BED -0.12173 0.66199 -0 .184 0.85410
V is 'B eds Y2BED 0.39542 0.25571 1 .546 0.12202
CLR H1 0.50348 0.84464E-02 59.610 0.00000
CLR*CLR H11 -0.25755E-01 0.29676E-01 -0 .868 0.38545
S u p p lie s X2 0.27416 0.96308E-02 28.467 0.00000
Supp'Supp X22 0.19282E-01 0.32127E-01 0.600 0.54838
C ontr/Lease X3 0.19188 0.94560E-02 20.292 0.00000
C o n tr 'C o n tr X33 -0.64353E-02 0.28365E-01 -0 .227 0.82052
Phys Wage WP 0 . 18062E-01 0.28552E-02 6.326 0.00000
PhysW*PhysW WP2 0.19991E-01 0.65064E-02 3.073 0.00212
CLR'Supp H1X2 -0.18675E-01 0 . 10246E-01 -1 .823 0.06835
CLR'Contr H1X3 0.53012E-01 0.17209E-01 3.080 0.00207
CLR'PhysW H1WP 0.73530E-03 0.47386E-02 0.155 0.87669
Supp*Contr X2X3 -0.25102E-01 0 . 14009E-01 -1 .792 0.07315
Supp'PhysW X2WP -0.12251E-01 0.96358E-02 -1 .271 0.20359
Contr'PhysW X3WP -0.23907E-01 0.82954E-02 -2 .882 0.00395
Adm'CLR Y1H1 0.31732E-01 0.36486E-01 0.870 0.38445
Adm'Supp Y1X2 0.34861E-01 0 .33631E-01 1 .037 0.29994
Adm 'Contr Y1X3 -0.60857E-01 0.30177E-01 -2 .017 0.04373
Adm'PhysW Y1WP -0.22144E-01 0.98696E-02 -2 .244 0.02485
V is'CLR Y2H1 0.25798E-02 0.48559E-01 0.053 0.95763
V is 'S upp Y2X2 -0.32826E-01 0 .4 8 1 17E-01 -0 .682 0.49510
V is 'C o n tr Y2X3 0.23026E-01 0.44767E-01 0.514 0.60700
Vis'PhysW Y2WP -0.41272E-01 0.14073E-01 -2 .933 0.00336
Beds'CLR BEDH1 -0.40584E-01 0.17767E-01 -2 .284 0.02236
Beds'Supp BEDX2 0.35414E-01 0.19704E-01 1 .797 0.07229
B eds 'C on tr BE0X3 0.34183E-01 0 . 19400E-01 1 .762 0.07807
Beds*PhysW BEDWP 0.27843E-01 0.86496E-02 3.219 0.00129
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Table 4-8
Stochastic Frontier: Hospital Administrative Cost Function
Dependent v a r ia b le  T o ta l A d m in is t ra t iv e  C ost
Number o f  o b s e rv a tio n s  83
I t e r a t io n s  com pleted 46
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  178.6454 
V ariance  components: <j2(v) = 0.00047 
« 2 (u )=  0.00092
V a ria b le  D e s c r ip t io n C o e f f ic ie n t S t .  E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [ |Z |>z ;
Constant A 0.79655E-01 0.13635E-01 5.842 0.00000
Admissions Y1 0.28767 0.60194E-01 4.779 0.00000
V is i t s Y2 0.31466 0.31465E-01 10.000 0.00000
Adm’ Adn Y11 -0.82132E-01 0.26246 -0 .313 0.75433
V is *V is Y22 0.24597 0.97615E-01 2.520 0.01174
Beds BED 0.29241 0.74449E-01 3.928 0.00009
Beds'Beds BED2 0.13417 0.46840 0.286 0.77453
Adm*Vis Y1Y2 0.28865E-01 0.11338 0.255 0.79904
Adm*Beds Y1BED -0.90907E-01 0.32358 -0.281 0.77875
Vis*Beds Y2BED -0.79144E-01 0.15913 -0 .497 0.61893
CLR HI 0.36033 0.32556E-01 11.068 0.00000
CLR*CLR H11 -0.69362 0.11047 -6 .279 0.00000
S upp lies X2 0.29754 0.20301E-01 14.656 0.00000
Supp’ Supp X22 -0.16280 0.52694E-01 -3 .089 0.00201
C ontr/Lease X3 0.29408 0.17917E-01 16.413 0.00000
C on tr*C on tr X33 0.86547E-01 0.49798E-01 1 .738 0.08222
Phys Wage WP 0.17684E-01 0.14276E-01 1 .239 0.21547
PhysW*PhysW WP2 0.12605E-01 0.65967E-02 1.911 0.05602
Adm*CLR Y1H1 -0.18620 0.22094 -0 .843 0.39935
Ado'Supp Y1X2 0.35040E-01 0.12609 0 .278 0.78109
Adm*Contr Y1X3 -0.37890E-01 0.13833 -0 .274 0.78415
Adm'PhysW Y1WP 0.50527E-01 0 .58021E-01 0.871 0.38384
Vis*CLR Y2H1 0.12446 0.10245 1.215 0.22444
V is 'S upp Y2X2 -0.16578 0.63475E-01 -2 .612 0.00901
V is 'C o n tr Y2X3 0.20421 0.62681E-01 3.258 0.00112
Vis*PhysW Y2WP 0.14836E-01 0 .2 2 1 14E-01 0.671 0.50230
CLR'Supp H1X2 0.40345 0.76269E-01 5.290 0.00000
CLR*Contr H1X3 0.18206 0.54694E-01 3.329 0.00087
CLR'PhysW H1WP 0.28806E-01 0.29052E-01 0.992 0.32143
Supp*Contr X2X3 -0.21818 0.32318E-01 -6.751 0.00000
Supp*PhysW X2WP -0.34037E-01 0.17654E-01 -1 .928 0.05386
Contr*PhysW X3WP 0.16928E-01 0.13823E-01 1.225 0.22072
Beds*CLR BEDH1 -0.62514E-01 0.25855 -0 .242 0.80895
Beds'Supp BEDX2 0.16140 0.15947 1.012 0.31147
Beds’ C ontr BEDX3 *0 .77117E-01 0.17496 -0.441 0.65938
Beds*PhysW BEOWP -0.37977E-01 0.53979E-01 -0 .704 0.48171
X CTtt/®v 1.4003 0.32105 4.361 0.00001
a V (Ov2+Cu2) 0.37343E-01 0.44341E-02 8.422 0.00000
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The results are subject to considerable degree o f multicollinearity. However, the 
coefficients of outputs and input prices remain significant and have the expected sign. All 
higher order coefficients are jointly significant (at the 0.2 percent level), so the translog 
specification is supported against the Cobb-Douglas.
The RESET test provides no evidence for omitted variables in the specification (the 
hypothesis of no omitted variables can not be rejected at traditional levels of significance). 
Also, the link test [Tukey (1949); Pregibon (1980)], indicates that there is no 
specification error.
Heteroscedasticity is not a serious problem in this model. The Breusch-Pagan and the 
Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroscedasticity are not significant at the traditional levels.
The empirical results indicate a well-behaved cost function that exhibits all the desirable 
properties.
The cost elasticities and the marginal costs of administrative outputs are presented below:
Table 4 -9: Output Cost Elasticities and Marginal Costs
H g g y i
0.26585 0.28767 331.96 356.94
(3.416) (4.779) (3 .416) (4.779)
0 .30630 0.31466 2 4 .044 24 .544
(7 .225) (10.000) (7 .225) (10.000)
Asymptotic z-stattstics in parentheses
The marginal administrative cost of an admission is $356.94. The marginal administrative 
cost of an additional outpatient visit is $24,544, both evaluated at their means.
The overall economies of scale for the administrative cost function are presented below:
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Table 4-10: Economies o f Scale
O LS F ro n tie r
0 .43387 0.42889
(5.557) (4.719)
Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses
SCE reflects the percentage change in total cost resulted from a simultaneous percentage 
change in all outputs. Which means that a 10% proportional increase of all outputs would 
increase total administrative cost by 4.3% (less than 10%).
The Allen-Uzawa factor demand elasticities and partial elasticities of substitution for the 
administrative cost function follow:
Table 4-11: Allen-Uzawa Factor Demand Elasticities (Own-Cross)
— -2.5646 1.7163 0.9794 1.9893 2.9720
lillllBB (-8 .019) (6.059) (4.581) (0.818) ( 1 1 9 1 )
llliiiiBi 1.4172 -1.2496 -0.4443 -1 .6272 0.6783
(5 .698) (-6.876) (-3.708) (-0 .897) (0.435)
0.7993 -0.4392 -0.4116 1.2514 -1.9240
BlIIMiMI (5 .543) (-3.397) (-2.431) (1.407) (-0.957)
^ ■ 1 0.0976 -0.0967 0.0753 -0 .2695 -0.7826
(1.262) (-1.589) (1.396) (-0 .616) (-0.900)
0 .2505 0 .0692 -0.1987 -1 .3439 -0.9437
(1-795) (0.482) (-1.679) (-0 .814) (-0.555)
Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses
The administrative cost function is a well-behaved cost function. The own-price 
elasticities of demand for inputs are all negative. The elasticity o f administrative 
personnel, supplies, and contract services are statistically significant. However, the 
demand elasticities of physician and capital inputs are insignificant at the traditional levels.
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Table 4 -12: Elasticities of Substitution
4.7631
(6.063)
2.7181 -L.4934
(5.054) (-3.312)
5.5208 -5.4689 4.2551
(0.834) (-0.890) (1-391)
8.2482 2.2798 -65425
(1.250) (0.435) (-0.971)
-44.257
(-0 .756)
Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses 
The following table highlights key statistics for the inefficiency index obtained from the 
administrative stochastic frontier cost model.
Table 4-13
Descriptive Statistics 
Administrative Stochastic Frontier Cost Inefficiency
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 1"Quart Median 3rtQuart
INEFFICIENCY 0.0334 0.0350 0.0027 0.1748 0.0457 0.0887 0.1318
COST INEF/NCY $470.28 $581.88 $26.24 $3,535.12 $903.5 $1,780.7 $2,657.9
ADMIN. COST $14,323.8 $9,062.1 $2,594.2 $63,051.3 $17,708 $32,823 $47,937
Note: Cost: inefficiency is in thousand of dollars.
The mean inefficiency of the hospital administrative cost function is 3.34 percent and
ranges between 0.27 and 17.48 percent. The cost inefficiency expressed in dollars
averages $470.28 thousand and ranges between $26.24 and $3,535.12 thousand.
Appendix 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the inefficiency index obtained from the 
administrative cost function. The determinants o f  the administrative function are 
investigated in section 6.
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Appendix 4.1
The Distribution o f the Stochastic Frontier Administrative Cost Inefficiency 
The distribution of administrative cost inefficiency is illustrated below.
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Figure 4 .1: Administrative Hospital Specific Inefficiency
H i s t o g r a m  f o r  V a  r i a 0  I e  i N
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Figure 4.2: The Distribution of the Administrative Cost Inefficiency
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5
The Data Envelopment Analysis Models
5.1 Introduction
Data Envelopment Analysis, the non-parametric technique, provides an attractive 
alternative to econometric technique for evaluating the performance o f a productive unit 
relative to its peer group. Sherman ( l984) suggested DEA as a “complement” to 
regression since it provides a flexible framework for modeling multiple-input multiple- 
output technologies. Indeed the mathematical programming technique is applicable to a 
multiple input and multiple output environment, as the regression technique, and in 
addition, provides insights into areas that the regression fails to focus on.
Data Envelopment Analysis can be used as a method of benchmarking relative firm 
performance in the industry, which can assign a numerical “grade” and a relative ranking. 
In addition, DEA provides the amounts of output slacks and the amounts o f excess inputs 
that separate hospitals for an optimal (projected) level of performance. However, both 
techniques, regression and DEA, are superior to the traditional ratio analysis methods for 
assessing hospital performance.
This section applies the DEA estimating method to the same body of data employed in the 
previous two sections. Specifically, the hospital and the hospital administrative functions 
are estimated using the New Jersey 1993 Acute Care Hospital Actuals.
The DEA methodology has been accepted as the most appropriate method of analyzing 
the behavior of hospitals and not-for-profit organizations in general (Sherman, 1984). The
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majority of DEA models that assess hospital performance focus on technical efficiency and 
its components. The overall cost-minimizing performance can be evaluated and both 
allocative and technical efficiency levels can be measured, if the level of input prices is 
available (Fare et al., 1994).
As developed in the second section, the DEA technique builds, the “empirical frontier’’, a 
piecewise linear surface that envelops the data and evaluates the performance of its DMU 
relative to this structure. In this analysis, DEA, also, identifies the weak areas of 
performance in terms of input over-consumption and output under-production and 
provides their relative magnitudes.
In this section, hospital performance (total and administrative) is evaluated using both 
types of envelopment forms; Constant Returns to Scale and Variable Returns to Scale.
All models estimated have an input orientation, which means, a proportional reduction of 
inputs is maximized (given the level of outputs) for each DMU.
First, a production function is estimated, which incorporates the output and input levels, 
allowing complete flexibility in the selection of weights. The full flexibility of assigned 
weights may result in weights that vary widely across DMUs. Also, their distribution 
tends to favor some factors (not always the most important factors in the production 
function) and ignore others. The Cone-Ratio and Assurance Region methods provide the 
latest developments of restricting the weights of DEA estimation technique and 
incorporating additional (price) information into estimation. Second a weight-restricted 
model is developed and estimated. The objective is to measure the firm specific 
performance exploring the advantages of alternative techniques. However, a cost- 
minimizing DEA model may be proved the non-parametric analog of the stochastic cost
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frontier since it incorporates directly output levels and input prices into estimation. Third, 
the components o f overall cost efficiency will be obtained as described in section 2.5.2 
using the cost-minimizing DEA model.
It is common in the empirical literature of DEA analysis to employ statistical tools 
(regression analysis) to explain the variability o f the efficiency index (Grosskopf, 1996). 
The modeling of efficiency/inefficiency scores is the subject of the next section.
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5.2 Hospital Efficiency: Data, Variables, and Empirical Results
In this section, hospital performance is evaluated using the DEA approach. The same 
inputs and outputs, used in estimation o f the cost stochastic frontier, define the process of 
evaluating the cost efficiency of 83 hospitals (DMUs).
The three hospital outputs are: (i) the number of annual admissions (AD), (ii) the number 
of annual inpatient days (PD), and (iii) the number of annual outpatient visits (VTS).
The six inputs employed are the following: (i) the annual cost (hourly wage times labor 
hours) for RN services, (CRNS); (ii) the annual cost (hourly wage times labor hours) for 
clerical services, (CCLR); (iii) the annual cost of Supplies (CSUP); (iv) the annual cost of 
Contract Services (CCSER); (v) the cost of Capital defined as depreciation and interest 
(CDFI); and (vi) The number of Physician Hours, (PH).
The first five inputs are considered controllable (discretionary), while the number of 
physician hours is included as an non-discretionary input. The descriptive statistics are 
given below:
Table: 5 -I
Descriptive Statistics: The Hospital DEA Model (n=83)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Admissions AD tyi) 13786.45 7628.88 2028.00 39206.00
Patient Days PD Cya) 95543.76 47782.99 17109.00 228331.00
Outpatient Visits Vis (y>) 145741.00 119484.08 10896.00 769918.00
Cost of RN CRNS (Xi) 12114.98 7589.27 1712.00 35320.00
Cost of Clerical Eng>. CCLR (Xa) 1187.20 988.26 98.00 4956.00
Cost o£ Supplies CSUP ( x 3) 15482.16 10438.69 1852.00 49508.00
Cost o f  Contract Ser. CCSER (X4> 5843.04 4130.18 933.00 24817.00
Cost o£ Capital CDFI (Xs) 7289.54 4470.07 373.00 18662.00
Physician Hours PH (X«) 138107.71 171950.52 3007.00 794508.00
As noted by Ali, A. I., (1995) the wide range o f values of variables in the data set as well 
as the large variability in the values of a single variable can create computational problems
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in DEA estimation. The values of multipliers, also, are sensitive to the values of the 
variables. In orienting models there is an inverse relationship between the values of 
variables and the assigned multipliers. The physician hours variable varies considerably 
among hospitals, but its non-discretionary characterization affects only the selection o f the 
peer group and not the efficiency ranking.
The CRS model yields overall (technical plus scale) efficiency. The VRS model yields 
pure technical efficiency. Since the inputs are measured in terms of expenditures (price 
times quantity) they reflect also the choice of input prices and not only amounts. Efficient 
hospitals can achieve optimal performance by reducing the level o f utilized productive 
resources by a percentage and still produce the same amounts of outputs. Therefore, one 
hospital’s performance can be improved either by a reduction of inputs or by an 
augmentation outputs. The model estimated is input-oriented unit invariant presented in 
section 2.5, models (2.5)-7 and (2.5)-8 and optimizes the input reduction necessary to 
achieve the level of observed outputs. Table 5-2 summarizes the estimates of hospital 
DEA analysis.
All Hospitals Inefficient Hospitals Efficient Hospitals
Mean Mean
Model Efficiency Min Max Efficiency Min Max Number Number (% o f All)
CRS (D 0.8619 0.36 1.00 .7708 .36 .97 50 33 (39.76)
(0) 0.9042 0.41 1.00 .8410 .41 1.0 50
VRS 0) 0.9287 0.47 1.00 .8259 .47 .99 34 50 (60.24)
(0) 0.9427 0.51 1.00 .8601 .51 1.0 34
' Note: 0 (theta), the measure of radial efficiency, indicates the proportional reduction of inputs necessary to reach the 
frontier. 1 (Iota) measures total efficiency since takes into account relative prices and residual changes (entire “facet- 
defining plane”) as obtained from the two-staged approach (equations 2.5-7 and 2.5-8).
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The constant returns to scale envelopment form identifies 33 (39.76 percent of all) 
efficient hospitals and the variable returns to scale 50 (60.24 percent of all).
The mean efficiency of the CRS model which combines both technical and scale 
efficiencies is 0.8619. The pure technical efficiency is 0.9287 as measured by the VRS 
model. The VRS estimated efficiency is one component of overall efficiency, so its scores 
are lower than the CRS. The technical efficiency score indicates that hospitals could 
reduce inputs by as much as 14 percent and still support the same level of outputs.
Scale inefficiency is a major component of the technical inefficiency. The scale efficiency 
score is estimated using the Fare et al, (1994), approach described in the appendix 2.1.
The majority of hospitals experience decreasing returns to scale. Specifically, 48 hospitals 
operate under decreasing returns to scale (mean efficiency 0.78), 31 under constant 
returns to scale (mean efficiency I) and 4 under increasing returns to scale (mean 
efficiency 0.81).
Table:5 -3 Hospital DEA: Returns to Scale
Ave. No Of P a tie n t No Of C ost pe r C ost per C ost pe r
Type E f f /c y H o s p ita ls Adm issions Days BEOS Adm ission P a t. Day Bed
IRS 0.81 4 5,483 40,681 158.5 $8,661 $1 ,129 $299,314
CRS 1.00 31 12,940 90,360 329.9 6,589 904 241 ,143
0RS 0.78 48 15,024 103,463 389.1 7,377 1,045 275,542
Note: In estimation o f returns to scale all inputs, including physician hours, were considered 
discretionary.
Table 5-3 illustrates that DEA efficiency estimates support the traditional economic theory 
of a U-shaped average cost curve. Variables that are indicative of size of operation like 
the number of beds, admissions and patient days as well as the cost per unit o f these 
variables reveal the relationship between hospital scale of operation and level of efficiency.
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The average number of admissions of hospitals operating at increasing returns to scale is 
5,483. The average number of admissions of efficient hospitals is 12,940 and increases to 
15,024 for hospital operating under decreasing returns to scale. The number of patient 
days and the number of beds also follow the same pattern. The cost per admission, patient 
day and bed supports the traditional theory of the U-shaped average cost curve. The 
average cost is lower at the constant returns to scale portion of the average cost curve. 
Byrnes and Valdmanis, (1994), reported similar findings.
The DEA model provides information about the potential improvements in inputs and 
outputs by projecting the inefficient DMU on the empirically constructed frontier.
Table:5 -4 Hospital DEA: Average Output Slacks
Model H o s p ita ls A dm issions
P a tie n t
Days
O u tp a tie n t
V is i t s
CRS A l l 83 337.25 719.20 25 ,518 .36
In e f f i c ie n t 50 559.83 1 ,193 .87 42,360.48
VRS A l l 83 84.77 689.71 13,197.03
I n e f f i c ie n t 34 206.93 1,683.71 32,216.28
The output slack and the excess consumption of inputs analysis indicates potential 
improvements in efficiency by component. For example (under CRS) inefficient hospitals 
can increase admissions by 559.83, a 4.06 percent potential improvement and outpatient 
visits by 42,360.48, a 29.07 percent potential improvement (Table 5-4). Even if the DEA 
model as an input-orientated optimizes the input potential improvement, the output slacks 
signal hospitals that perform well below their possibilities.
Table 5-5 provides the input adjustments needed to make the average hospital efficient. 
The average hospital, for example, in order to optimize performance (under CRS) has to 
reduce the utilized level of RN services by $1,837.55 thousand, a 15.17 percent
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improvement. So, the efficient employment o f the RN services could save sample hospitals 
$152,516.7 thousand. Similarly, spending for supplies and contract services could be 
lowered by an average $2,531 and $1,295 thousand respectively.
Table 5 -5 Hospital DEA: Average Excess Inputs
Model H osp ita ls RNS CLR CSUP CSER CDFI
CRS A l l 1 ,837 .55 288.43 2 ,5 31 .03 1,295.20 1 ,564.01
I n e f f  50 3 ,0 50 .33 478.79 4,201 .51 2,150 .03 2 ,5 9 6 .2 5
VRS A l l 1 ,055 .70 113.00 1 ,451 .42 965.06 688 .80
In e f f  34 2 ,5 7 7 .1 4 275.85 3 ,5 4 3 .1 8 2,355.89 1 ,681 .49
The following table (5-6) summarizes the efficient levels o f  factors o f production and the 
efficient allocation o f inputs in more detail.
Table 5 -6 . Hospital DEA: Efficiency Analysis (Means)
Actual
Value
Projected 
Efficient Value
Potential 
Improvement (Slacks)
CRS VRS CRS VRS
Outputs
Adm issions 13,786.45 14,123.70 13 ,871 .22 337.25 84.77
P a tie n t Days 95 ,543 .76 96 ,262 .96 96 ,2 3 3 .4 7 719.20 689.71
V is i t s 145,741.00 171,259.36 158,938.03 25,518.36 13,197.03
Inputs
RNS 12,114 .98 10,277.43 11 ,059 .28 1,837.55 1,055 .70
CLR 1,187 .20 1 ,898.77 1 ,074 .20 288.43 113.00
CSUP 15,482 .16 12,951.13 14 ,030 .74 2,531.03 1,451.42
CSER 5 ,8 4 3 .0 4 4 ,547 .84 4 ,8 7 7 .9 8 1,295.20 965.06
CDFI 7 ,2 8 9 .5 4 5 ,725 .53 6 ,6 0 0 .7 4 1,564.01 688.80
The reported slacks provide information about the relative contribution of inputs and 
outputs to inefficiency. The average potential improvement of inputs is $7,516.22
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thousand (7.67%) evaluated under a CRS surface, which implies the level of overall 
inefficiency (technical and scale). For VRS surface, which is a measure o f pure technical 
inefficiency, the average improvement is $4,273.98 thousand (4.36%). The potential 
improvement is the difference between actual and projected levels of inputs and outputs 
for the two surfaces (CRS, VRS).
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5.2.1 The TC-AR Extension: Weight restricted DEA and Hospital Efficiency
DEA in the process of evaluating the efficiency of each DMU freely determines the value 
of input and output multipliers that maximize the relative performance. The following 
table (5-7) presents descriptive statistics o f DEA input and output multipliers.
The obtained multiplier values can be characterized as the sets of coefficients that define 
the envelopment structure and reflect the marginal evaluation (price) of each input and 
output. The relative location of each DMU on the envelopment surface is given by the 
weighted average of inputs and outputs where the multipliers serve as weights.
(iiAD + (0.2 PD + (03 VIS - v (RNS - v2CLR - V3CSUP - v4CSER - V5CDFI + co < 0
Efficient DMUs are located on the envelopment surface so the weighted average of 
outputs and inputs equals zero. The weighted average o f inefficient DMUs is lower than 
zero and its location is compared against a projection on the surface. The projected point 
on the surface is a convex combination of efficient DMUs, the peer group or the 
comparison set. For an inefficient DMU, the differences between actual location and its 
projection determines the amounts of output slacks and excess inputs. The CRS 
envelopment surface goes through the origin and its constant term a  equals zero. For 
VRS surfaces © can be positive, negative or zero indicating decreasing, increasing or 
constant returns to scale, respectively. But as noted in section 2.5, different values may 
exist for © so its value and sign are not unique.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
However, the flexibility of DEA multipliers was criticized as distorting the actual 
evaluations of inputs and outputs of some DMUs. Banker et al., (1988) reported that 
DEA misspecified DMUs as efficient in cases where the set of inputs or outputs included 
at least one variable with extreme values (very low or very large). This inability of DEA 
to handle boundary points of the production possibility set can possibly lead to differences 
in estimates comparing with the stochastic model. Table 5-7 summarizes the input and 
output multipliers obtained from the CRS and VRS models. The values of multipliers for 
a number of DMUs are very close to zero.
Table 5 -7  Hospital DEA: Input and Output multipliers
Variable Mean
CRS
Min Max Mean
VRS
Min Max
AD 0.0027 0.00004 0.04437 0.0103 0.00003 0.24013
PD 0.0018 0.00000 0.11691 0.0024 0.00001 0.13768
VIS 0.0002 0.00000 0.01442 0.0000 0.00000 0.00051
RNS 0.0085 0.00003 0.54802 0.0049 0.00003 0.08034
CLR 0.0038 0.00020 0.08303 0.0502 0.00020 2.60230
CSUP 0.0038 0.00002 0.10028 0.0128 0.00002 0.63343
CSER 0.0098 0.00004 0.61252 0.0027 0.00004 0.08087
CDFI 0.0176 0.00005 1.31687 0.0159 0.00006 1.00238
The variability of DEA multipliers is more indicative in a ratio form. In the following table
the matrices indicate the range of a number of multiplier bounds that DEA freely 
determined. The range is given in the form of ratios of multipliers. The multiplier of 
admissions is p t, the multiplier of patient days is p.2 and the multiplier of Visits p.3. Inputs, 
CRNS/CCLR/CSUP/CSER/CDFI are numbered Vj to vs, respectively. The matrix Pu 
indicates that the multiplier ratio of admissions to patient days (pi /p.2 ) ranges between 
0.1567 and 1,694.67, which means that the multiplier of patient days (P2) ranges between 
0 .1567pi and l,694.67pt. Also, the matrix R22 indicates that the CCLR multiplier ranges 
between 0.0096vi to 7.7917vi (relative to the multiplier of CRNS). The great flexibility
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of the marginal evaluations allowed by DEA may result in extreme evaluations for some 
inputs/outputs. This flexibility eventually diminishes the validity o f the estimated 
performance.
The wide variation of weights for the same factor is considered “inappropriate” in the 
recent literature of DEA (Roll and Golany, 1993). To avoid unrealistic weighting of 
inputs and outputs specific bounds are developed and imposed on them. This study 
incorporates empirically evaluated standards into DEA estimation and attempts to restrict 
the DEA multipliers in a range o f values that reflect the actual importance of each factor 
of production. The restrictions are derived from the parametrically evaluated productive 
characteristics of the hospital cost function and form a Theoretically Consistent Assurance 
Region (TCAR).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Ia b ls  5 ;S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Hospital DEA: The obtained range of DEA multipliers, the CRS model 
The matrix o f input ratios: The matrix of output ratios:
Vl v2 v3 v4 v5 Ft F2 F3
'-0.0096 I 0 0 O'
7.7917 -1 0 0 0
-0.0228 0 L 0 0 -0.1567 I 0
72.5249 0 -1 0 0 1694.6648 -I 0
P i  I —
-0.0033 0 0 I 0 -0.8497 0 1
20.8051 0 0 -1 0 1333.8608 0 -1
-0.0395 0 0 0 I
17.0408 0 0 0 -1
Note: The two matrices (Pi i, R22) form the Q matrix with dimensions 2(s+m-2) x (s+tn).
The coefficients : Vi =cms, v2 =cclr. v3 =csup, v4 =cser. v5 =cdfi.
Pi =admissions. p2 =patient days. p3 =outpatient visits
The absence of clear interpretation and theoretical basis for the DEA multipliers renders 
the task of assigning multiplier bounds very difficult. Existing studies assign constraints
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on multipliers based on assumed relative importance, existed “price/cost” information, 
expert opinions, or environmental factors [Thomson et al., 1990; Thompson et al., 1996]. 
This study is the first attempt in the economic literature to link the two alternative 
evaluations of productive performance. The restrictions for output and input weights are 
not based on “environmental” factors but are derived from the parametrically evaluated 
productive characteristics of the hospital cost function. The incorporation of weight 
restrictions in DEA based on the empirical results obtained from the stochastic frontier 
parametric model seems more appropriate.
The output weight matrix is derived from the marginal rate of output transformation. The 
input weight matrix is derived from the marginal rate o f input substitution. Specifically, 
ratios based on the marginal costs of hospital outputs and input prices provide the bounds 
of output weights and reflect the relative importance o f  each output in the production 
process. The multiplier bounds are defined by the minimum and maximum values of the 
respective marginal cost ratios. The following table (5-9) provides the matrices of 
imposed restrictions. The imposed range for the multiplier p.2 o f patient days (PD) relative 
to the multiplier of admissions (AD) decreases from (0.1567|x1 - l,694.67pi) to (5.85pi 
- I3.48p.i). Similarly, the imposed range for the multiplier v2of cost of clerical employees 
(CCLR) relative to the multiplier Vi of cost of RN services (CRNS) is set to (1.99vi - 
12.54vi), which is higher than that originally obtained by DEA.
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Table 5 -9
Hospital DEA: The Weight Restrictions
The matrix o f input ratios:
Vi
The matrix of output ratios:
R-n =
V2 v 3 v 4 v 5 M’t H2 r i 3
r-L .99 I 0 0 o'
12.54 -L 0 0 0
-0 .7 2 0 1 0 0
7.03 0 -1 0 0
-0 .3 7 0 0 I 0
8.40 0 0 - I 0
-0 .53 0 0 0 I
59.82 0 0 0 -1 '-5 .8 5 I 0
0 -0 .1 7 I 0 0 13.48 -1 0
0 2.40 -1 0 0 -5 .32 0 1
0 -0 .0 7 0 1 0 P n = 48.44 0 - I
0 2.71 0 - I 0 0 -0 .5 7 I
0 -0 .2 2 0 0 I 0 5.31 - I
0 19.74 0 0 - I
0 0 -0 .09 1 0
0 0 3.24 - I 0
0 0 -0 .3 7 0 I
0 0 21.18 0 - I
0 0 0 -0 .13 1
0 0 0 93.32 -1
Note: The two matrices (Pi w R2 2) form the Q matrix with dimensions 2(s+m-2) x (s+m).
The coefficients : Vi =cms. v 2  =ccir. v3 =csup, v4 =cser. v5 =cdfi.
m =admissions. ji2 =patient days. p3 =outpatient visits
The weight restriction matrices of the hospital function are entered in estimation 
following the specification 2.5-9. The results of the restricted function are presented 
below. Compared to efficiency levels of the unrestricted model, the restricted model 
yielded lower levels of efficiency, table (5-10). The area of search for the optimal 
solutions has been decreased and the efficiency scores on average are lower. The 
multiplier bounds, derived empirically, are consistent with the actual importance of factors 
of production or consistent with the underlying objectives of each DMU. The restricted
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DEA estimates reflect an overall technical efficiency assessment [Chames et al., 1990; 
Allen et al., 1997].
Table 5 -1 0  Hospital DEA: Weight Restricted Efficiency Estimates
Model
All Hospitals 
Mean 
Efficiency Min Max
Inefficient Hospitals
Mean
Efficiency Min Max Number
Efficient Hospitals 
Number (% o f All)
CRS (I) 0.7974 0.29 1.00 .7697 .29 .98 73 10 (12.05)
(0) 0.8167 0.30 1.00 .7916 .30 1.0 50
VRS (I) 0.8486 0.33 1.00 .8036 .33 .99 64 19 (22.89)
(0) 0.8618 0.35 1.00 .8208 .35 1.0 64
The interpretation o f the efficiency scores derived from a binding weight restricted model 
differs from the interpretation of the unrestricted model. The efficiency score does not 
reflect the radial reduction of inputs necessary to move the inefficient DMU to its optimal 
location on the frontier (Allen et al., 1997). The potential improvement of inputs is given 
in the following table.
Table 5-11 Hospital DEA: Weight Restricted Excess Inputs
Model Hospitals RNS CLR CSUP CSER CDFI
CRS A l l 3 ,5 9 9 .8 3 372.09 3 ,9 1 4 .0 3 1 ,703 .32 2 ,1 7 3 .4 5
In e f f  73 4 ,0 9 2 .9 6 423.06 4 ,4 5 0 .1 9 1 ,936 .66 2,471 .18
VRS A l l 2 ,6 2 4 .6 2 29 .98 3 ,4 1 2 .7 3 2 ,1 4 2 .0 6 1 ,430 .23
In e f f  64 3,403 .81 38.89 4 ,4 2 5 .8 8 2 ,777 .99 1 ,854 .83
The input adjustments have change dramatically. All input targets (but the CLR, under 
VRS) are much higher indicating increased opportunities for savings. The CRS model 
implies a potential improvement of $11,762.72 thousand and the VRS a potential
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improvement of $9,639.62 thousand. As noted by Allen et al., 1997 the weight restricted 
DEA can yield a substantially different input and output mix. How the estimated DEA 
inefficiencies, obtained from both the restricted and unrestricted specifications, are related 
to that obtained form the stochastic frontier will be investigated in the following section.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
L12
5.3 Administrative Hospital Cost Efficiency
The administrative performance of hospitals is evaluated in this section with the DEA 
methodology. The number of admissions (AD), and the number o f outpatient visits (VIS) 
are the two variables that approximate the administrative output (the number of patients 
served). The administrative function includes six inputs. Four are considered 
discretionary and two non-discretionary.
The discretionary inputs are: The cost of administrative personnel (EC); the total cost of 
supplies and other expenditures (WSUP); the total cost of contract and lease services 
(WCON); and the total cost of capital (WCAP), measured as annual depreciation and 
interest of all administrative sections. The cost associated with Physicians on 
administrative tasks (CPHY) and the number of maintained beds (BED) are entered as 
non-discretionary inputs and reflect the size of the hospital, which is closely related to 
administrative complexity.
Table: 5-12
Descriptive Statistics: The Administrative DEA Model
V a r ia b le Mean S td . Dev. Mininum Maximum D e s c r ip t io n
O utputs (y>) ADTOT 13786.4 7628.8 2028.0 39206.0 A dm issions
(y2) VNATOT 145741 .0 119484.1 10896.0 769918.0 O u tp .V is its
In p u ts (X,) EC 7207.6 4280.7 1315.0 29281.0 C ost (Employees)
(X2) WSUP 3995.2 3169.3 693.0 17306.0 C ost (S u p p lie s )
(X3) WCON 2674.7 2445.4 324.0 15746.0 C ost (C o n tr . Serv)
(x«) WCAP 760.4 480.4 14.1 2019.4 C ost (C a p ita l)
(Xs) CPHYS 202.5 457.7 0 .0 2781.0 C ost (Phy/Adm in.)
(X„) MBEDTOT 355.8 161.5 86.0 799.0 Number o f  Beds
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The two uncontrollable factors do not affect the efficiency rating of the hospital but the 
selection of the peer group (Morey and Dittman, 1996).
The two-staged, input-oriented, and unit invariant model (models 2.5-7 and 2.5-8) is 
estimated for both CRS and VRS surfaces. As the measurement of inputs reflects, also, 
the choice of input-prices (and not only amounts), the estimated efficiency incorporates 
elements of allocative and not only technical efficiency.
Table 5-13 Administrative DEA: Efficiency Estimates2
All Hospitals Inefficient Hospitals Efficient Hospitals
M ean Mean
Model Efficiency Min Max Efficiency Min Max Hospitals Hospitals (% o f All)
CRS (D 0.8297 0.44 1.00 .7562 .44 .989 58 25 (30.12)
(9) 0.8642 0.44 1.00 .8057 .44 .998 58 25
VRS (D 0.8757 0.44 1.00 .7895 .44 .985 49 34 (40.96)
(9) 0.8955 0.44 1.00 .8229 .44 .996 49 34
The results indicate that 30 percent o f hospital administrative departments are technically 
efficient. Under a VRS evaluation the efficient portion is 41 percent (pure technical 
efficiency). The constant returns to scale envelopment form identifies 25 efficient 
hospitals and the variable returns to scale identifies 34, with mean efficiencies 0.8297 and 
0.8757, respectively. The CRS model indicates that inputs can be proportionately 
reduced by 17 percent and still produce the same output levels. Scale inefficiency 
accounts for a large portion of this percentage. The analysis of efficiency reveals that the
~ Note: 9 (theta), the measure o f radial efficiency, indicates the proportional reduction o f inputs 
necessary to reach the frontier.
I (Iota) measures total efficiency since takes into account relative prices and residual changes (entire 
“facet-defining plane”) as obtained from the two-staged approach (equations 2.5-7 and 2.5-8).
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majority of hospitals experience increasing returns to scale. The following table 5-13 
summarizes the results.
Table 5-14 Administrative DEA: Returns to Scale3
Ave. No o f Cost p e r
Type E f f /c y H o s p ita ls AO VIS BEOS Adm ission V is i t Bed
IRS 0 .8 7 38 9 ,292 78,169 259 .0 $ 1 ,1 3 6 .7 $106.9 $ 4 2 ,9 0 8 .6
CRS 1.00 21 14,668 182,748 33 9 .7 927 .5 96 .9 3 7 ,2 7 5 .3
DRS 0 .8 6 24 20,131 220,348 523 .4 1 ,112 .9 141 .4 3 8 ,1 7 0 .9
The VRS surface indicates that 24 hospitals operate under decreasing returns to scale 
(mean efficiency 0.86), 38 under increasing returns to scale (mean efficiency 0.87) and 21 
under constant returns to scale.
The administrative hospital function indicates a U-shaped average cost path. The 
administrative cost per admission, outpatient visit, and bed of hospitals operating under 
constant returns to scale averages $927.5, $96.9 and $37,275.3, respectively. Hospitals 
operating under decreasing or increasing returns to scale face a higher average cost.
The relationship between scale efficiency and levels o f hospital variables that indicate size 
is the expected one. The hospital specific returns to scale evaluation is an additional tool 
for decision-makers provided by DEA.
3 The function includes 5 inputs; the cost o f employees, the cost o f supplies and other expenditures, the 
cost o f contract and lease services, and the number o f beds. All inputs and outputs are considered 
discretionary.
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Table 5-15 Administrative PEA: Average Output Slacks
Model H o s p ita ls  A dm issions V is i t s
CRS A l l  83 0 .0 0  832.73
In e f f  58 0 .00  1 ,191 .66
VRS A l l  83 0 .0 0  1 ,751 .18
In e f f  49 0 .0 0  2 ,966 .28
Table 5-15 presents the output targets. Hospitals produce the maximum possible amount 
of the first proxy administrative output, admissions but a lower amount of the second one, 
outpatient visits. On average, the hospital production could increase by 832.73 and by 
1751.18 visits for the CRS and VRS surfaces respectively; a potential improvement of 
0.57 percent and 1.2 percent respectively. The production of admissions is efficient.
Table 5-16 Administrative DEA: Average Excessive Inputs
Model Hosp EC WSUP WCON WCAP CPHY BED
CRS A l l 83 1 ,220 .70 981 .57 969.16 219.63 144.04 45.59
In e f 58 1 ,746 .87 1,404.65 1,386.90 314.30 206.12 65.24
VRS A l l 83 1 ,094 .38 804.07 742.54 174.32 144.82 42.55
In e f 49 1 ,853 .74 1 ,362.00 1 ,257 .77 295.28 245.31 72.08
Table (5-16) presents the analysis of potential improvement of inputs. The average 
hospital, for example, could save $1,220.7 and $1,094.38 thousand from the efficient 
employment of the administrative personnel under the CRS and VRS surfaces 
respectively.
The actual levels of inputs and outputs, the potential levels of operation under efficiency, 
and their difference labeled potential improvement are presented in table 5-17.
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The results indicate that the average hospital spends $3,535.1 thousand (CRS surface) on 
administration above the optimal level ($2,960.13 for the VRS surface). The CRS model 
indicates a 24.68 percent overall potential improvement (input savings) from the 
movement to efficient frontier, while the VRS indicates a 20.67 percent.
Table 5-17 Administrative DEA: Efficiency Analysis (Means)
A c tu a l
Value
P ro je c te d  
E f f ic ie n t  Value
P o te n t ia l  
Im provem ent (S la cks )
CRS VRS CRS VRS
Outputs
Adm issions 13,786.4 13 ,786 .5 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
V is i t s 145,741.0 146,573.7 147,492.2 832.7 1,751 .2
EC 7,207 .6 5 ,9 8 6 .9 6 ,113 .2 1 ,220 .7 1 ,0 9 4 .2
WSUP 3 ,995 .2 3 ,0 1 3 .6 3,191.1 981 .6 804 .2
WCON 2,6 7 4 .7 1 ,705 .5 1 ,932 .2 969.2 742.5
WCAP 760.4 540.8 586.1 219.6 174.3
CPHY 202.5 58 .5 57.7 144.0 144.8
BED 355.8 310.2 313.3 45 .6 4 2 .6
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5.3.1 The TC-AR Extension: Weight restricted DEA and Administrative Efficiency
For the administrative function of the previous model DEA freely assigns the input and 
output multipliers. The following table presents descriptive statistics of multipliers .
Table 5 -18  Administrative DEA: Input and Output multipliers
Variable Mean
CRS
Min Max Mean
VRS
M in Max
AD 0.0016 0.0001 0.0233 0.0042 0.0000 0.0668
VIS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010
EC 0.0018 0.0000 0.0169 0.0092 0.0000 0.1387
WSUP 0.0029 0.0001 0.0421 0.0048 0.000 L 0.1839
WCON 0.0009 0.0001 0.0106 0.0014 0.0001 0.0372
WCAP 0.0144 0.0005 0.3210 0.0114 0.0005 0.3025
The range of multipliers in ratio form is presented below. The ratio o f output weights, 
admissions to visits, for example, which reflects the marginal rate o f output transformation
ranges between 1.64 and 462.6, (table 5-19). As illustrated in previous sections for the 
hospital cost function, the weights obtained sometimes do not reflect the actual 
importance of factors in production or exhibit considerable flexibility, which is considered 
inappropriate.
Following the same methodology, weight bounds are developed and a weight restricted 
DEA model is estimated for the administrative hospital function.
The construction of bounds presents the most difficult empirical issue in restricted DEA 
analysis. The popular choice in the literature is the selection o f bounds based on existing 
“price/cost” information or based on expert opinions about optimal importance of factors 
in production (Thompson et al., 1996).
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Table 5-19___________________
Administrative DEA: Obtained Range of DEA Multipliers
CRS: The matrix of output ratios
Ut M-2
— L.6402 L
462.8621 -1
VRS: The matrix of output ratios
Hi F2
—0.7346 1
1187.4813 -1
The TC-AR incorporates weight restrictions in DEA Analysis based on the empirical 
results obtained from the stochastic administrative cost frontier (parametric model). 
Specifically, the ratios of marginal costs of inputs and outputs evaluated at their actual
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CRS: The matrix of input ratios:
Vl V2 v3 v4
'-0.0041 1 0 o'
47.5381 - I 0 0
-0.0864 0 I 0
18.6935 0 - I 0
-0.0108 0 0 1
1.5113 0 0 -1
0 -0.1507 I 0
0 115.8683 - I 0
0 -0.0046 0 I
0 35.3389 0 - I
0 0 -0.0012 I
0 0 3.5766 - I
VRS: The matrix of input ratios:
V! v2 v3 v4
■ -0.0097 I 0 0
113.0281 -1 0 0
-0.0470 0 I 0
523.8543 0 - I 0
-0.0032 0 0 I
116.4976 0 0 -1
0 -0.0356 I 0
0 694.6103 -1 0
0 -0.0044 0 I
0 154.4712 0 - I
0 0 -0 .0080 1
0 0 3.5249 - I
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levels (every hospital) are obtained. The multiplier bounds are defined as the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the marginal cost ratios.
Table:5 -20.
_________________Administrative DEA: The Set Weight Restrictions
CRS. The matrix o f output ratios: Cl
Ul
Pu =
-4.72 1
16.48 - I
R r, =
The matrix o f input ratios:
Vl v: V3
-  0.27 1 0 o'
0.79 -1 0 0
-0.16 0 L 0
0.67 0 -L 0
-7.21 0 0 I
49.10 0 0 - I
0 -0.25 I 0
0 L.63 -L 0
0 -10.68 0 1
0 113.95 0 - I
0 0 -14.76 I
0 0 207.13 -1
The introduction o f weight restrictions in DEA is expected to discriminate among 
otherwise relatively efficient hospitals. Hospitals that appear efficient based on favorably 
selected weights will be reassessed with the imposed bounds. The obtained set of efficient 
hospitals will reflect the desired evaluative standards.
Table 5-21 Administrative DEA: Weight Restricted Efficiency Estimates
All Hospitals Inefficient Hospitals Efficient Hospitals
Mean Mean
Model Efficiency Min Max Efficiency Min Max Hospitals Hospitals (% o f All)
CRS (I) 0.5724 0.22 1.00 .5563 .22 .903 80 3 ( 3.61)
(9) 0.5728 0.22 1.00 .5567 .22 .905 80 3
VRS (I) 0.6633 0.25 1.00 .6119 .25 .962 72 11 (13.25)
(0) 0.6633 0.25 1.00 .6119 .25 .962 72 11
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Both the number of efficient hospitals and the efficiency scores are significantly lower 
compared to unrestricted model. However, the effectiveness of the new model will be 
considered in the next section that provides efficiency analysis and comparison of the 
alternative models.
The potential improvement of inputs appears, also, significantly higher. The amounts of 
input contraction necessary for efficient operation have almost doubled.
Table 5 -22 Administrative DEA: Weight Restrictive Excessive Inputs
Model Hosp EC WSUP WCON WCAP CPHY BED
CRS A l l S3 2 ,9 6 1 .5 6 1 ,631 .27 1 ,753 .00 292.52 183.35 108.15
In e f 80 3,072.61 1 ,692 .44 1 ,818 .74 303.48 190.23 112.21
VRS A l l 83 2 ,427 .83 1,441 .08 1 ,559 .28 334.81 169.22 103.08
In e f 72 2 ,798 .75 1 ,661 .25 1,797.51 385.96 195.07 118.83
Hospitals can save on average from $2,961.56 thousand on employees to $183.35 
thousand on physician costs. The total savings equal $6,821.1 and $5,932.22 under the 
CRS and VRS formulations, respectively.
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5.4 The Hospital Cost-minimizing DEA Function
In this analysis an alternative non-parametric DEA formulation will be used. This method 
is based on Fare et al., (1994), as described in the appendix 2.5.2, and involves the 
estimation of a cost function via linear programming. However, except the levels o f 
outputs and levels of inputs, input prices must be entered into estimation. The procedure 
involves the estimation of overall cost efficiency the analog of the stochastic cost frontier. 
The variables used in this hospital specification include:
a) The set of outputs; Admissions, Patient Days, and Outpatient Visits.
b) The set of inputs; Hours of service o f Registered Nurses, hours of service of Clerical 
personnel, hours of service of physicians, the number of beds, and a proxy of capital 
input constructed from the total cost of depreciation and interest and the price level 
depreciation allowance.
c) The set of input prices; the wage o f RN, the wage of clerical personnel, the wage of 
physicians, a proxy price for supplies and contact services, a proxy price for capital.
The input prices are calculated given the total cost of each input. The additional 
information required over and above even a regression cost analysis is the set of both input 
levels and input prices. The number o f beds is used as an input in this analysis and its 
price is the ratio o f cost of supplies and contract services to beds. Other studies used the 
number of beds as a proxy o f the capital input [Grosskopf and Valdmanis, (1987); Ferrier 
and Valdmanis, (1996)].
The overall cost efficiency is obtained as the ratio of the minimum cost o f operation to 
actual cost:
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OE(y, x, w) = MinCost(y, x, w)/ObservedCost(x, w)
So the estimation o f overall cost efficiency is more demanding in terms of data 
requirements but yields technical and allocative efficiencies.
The minimum cost necessary to produce the observed set of outputs can be obtained using 
a cost minimization linear programming problem.
Minx.*, x* w 
s.t. y k - y > 0  
-sk + x* > 0
Where x# is the obtained set of cost minimizing input quantities given the input prices and 
the output levels.
The overall efficiency can be decomposed into its technical and allocative components.
The technical efficiency TE(y, x) is provided by the solution of the CRS model. The ratio 
of the overall cost to technical efficiency provides the allocative efficiency AE(y, x, w). 
This alternative DEA specification takes into account the fact that a technically efficient 
DMU may be allocatively inefficient utilizing the wrong mix of inputs.
The technical efficiency gives the proportion that inputs can be reduced and still produce 
the given levels (observed) of outputs. Scale inefficient DMUs produce beyond the most 
productive scale size (decreasing returns to scale) or produce below the most productive 
scale size while not taking full advantage of the most productive scale size. The appendix
2.1 illustrates the computation o f scale efficiencies using DEA 
Descriptive statistics follow (table 5-23).
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Table 5-23
Descriptive Statistics: The Hospital Cost-Minimizing DEA Model
V a r ia b le Mean S td . Oev. Minimum Maximum D e s c r ip t io n
ADTOT 13786.4458 7628.88 2028.00 39206.00 A dm issions
PDTOT 95543.7590 47782.99 17109.00 228331.00 P a tie n t Days
VNATOT 145741.0000 119484.08 10896.00 769918.00 O u tp a tie n t V is i t s
HRNSE 530473.1325 322184.23 89700.00 1478990.00 RNS Hours
HCLRE 95309.6747 69802.16 9259.00 372882.00 CLR Hours
HPHY 138107.7108 171950.52 3007.00 794508.00 P h y s ic ia n  Hours
MBEDTOT 355.8554 161.52 86.00 799.00 Number o f  Beds
H_CAP 32.1038 12.39 12.06 73.27 C a p ita l In p u t
WRNS 0.0231 0.0065 0.0168 0.0769 RNS Wage ($000)
WCLR 0.0122 0.0054 0.0074 0.0423 CUR Wage ($000)
WPHY 0.0432 0.0125 0.0237 0.0743 P h y s ic ia n  Wage ($000)
W_SUPCON 58.3043 19.59 33.17 149.26 Suppl e tc  P r ic e  ($000)
PLDA 241.2530 162.69 8 .00 769.00 C a p ita l P r ic e  ($000)
CRNSE 12114.9759 7589.27 1712.00 35320.00 RNS C ost ($000)
CCLRE 1187.2048 988.26 98.00 4956.00 CLR C ost ($000)
CPHY 5000.9759 6200.12 147.00 42870.00 P h y s ic ia n  C ost ($000)
CSUP_C0N 21325.1928 13542.94 4060.00 66008.00 Suppl e tc  C ost ($000)
CDFI 7289.5422 4470.07 373.00 18662.00 C a p ita l C ost ($000)
The following table presents the empirical results for the hospital cost-minimizing DEA 
function.
Table 5-24 Hospital Cost-DEA: Efficiency Estimates
D e s c r ip t io n ___________  Mean S td . Dev. Minimum Maximum
CRS
T e c h n ic a l E f f ic ie n c y  
A l lo c a t iv e  E f f ic ie n c y  
C ost E f f ic ie n c y
VRS
T e c h n ic a l E f f ic ie n c y  0.9426747 0.0724857 0.7180000 1.0000000
A l lo c a t iv e  E f f ic ie n c y  0.8836145 0.0817906 0.6710000 1.0000000
C ost E f f ic ie n c y  0.8332892 0.1054963 0.5560000 1.0000000
On average the technical efficiency, which measures the proportion that inputs could be 
reduced and still produce the same output levels, is 0.92 and 0.94 under the CRS and 
VRS, respectively. The allocative efficiency, which indicates the departure from the
0.9220120
0.8509759
0.7845904
0.0831634
0.0775591
0.1027437
0.6810000
0.6380000
0.5530000
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.0000000
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optimal mix of inputs, is lower than the technical and averages 0.85 and 0.88, respectively. 
The cost efficiency, which indicates the departure from the minimum possible cost of 
operation, averages 0.78 and 0.83 for the CRS and VR.S, respectively.
The technical efficiency score (CRS) implies an 8.45 percent of excess inputs. The 
allocative efficiency (CRS) score indicates that 17.5 percent of the cost can be avoided 
with the right input mix. Finally, the cost efficiency (CRS) implies that on average the 
observed cost exceeds the minimum cost by 27.45 percent.
The cost minimizing levels of inputs derived from the solution of the DEA model are given 
below:
Table 5-25 Hospital Cost-DEA: The Cost Minimizing Input Levels
M e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n i m u m M a x i m u m D e s c r i p t i o n
A c tu a l
HRNSE 530473.13 322184.23 89700.00 1478990.00 RNS Hours
HCLRE 95309.67 69802.16 9259.00 372882.00 CLR Hours
HPHY 138107.71 171950.52 3007.00 794508.00 P h ys ic ia n  Hours
MBEDTOT 355.86 161.52 86.00 799.00 Number o f  Beds
H_CAP 32.10 12.39 12.06 73.27 C a p ita l In p u t
CRS P o te n t ia l
HRNS 463953.82 260123.03 53998.84 1190882.78 RNS Hours
HCLR 78070.31 45462.42 8874.95 225895.00 CLR Hours
HPHY 33899.09 47619.05 3249.70 332019.00 P h ys ic ia n  Hours
BEOS 317.45 157.00 58.56 734.31 Number o f  Beds
H_CAP 17.36 8 .94 2 .47 40.76 C a p ita l In p u t
VRS P o te n t ia l
HRNS 469830.91 299652.86 89700.00 1405710.00 RNS Hours
HCLR 81545.55 53626.31 9259.00 314162.00 CLR Hours
HPHY 37697.84 47562.10 3007.00 332019.00 P h ys ic ia n  Hours
BEOS 328.45 157.48 86.00 799.00 Number o f  Beds
H_CAP 22.52 4 .67 12.07 46.63 C a p ita l In p u t
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5.5  The Administrative Cost-minimizing DEA Function
In this section the administrative hospital function will be estimated via the cost- 
minimizing DEA formulation. The variables used in this specification include:
d) The set of outputs; Admissions, and Outpatient Visits.
e) The set o f inputs; hours of service of administrative employees, hours of service of 
physicians in administrative positions, the number o f beds, and a proxy of capital input 
the administrative area as a percentage to total plant.
f) The set of input prices; the wage o f administrative employees, the wage of 
administrative physicians, a proxy price for supplies, contact services, lease services 
and other services, a proxy price for capital.
The input prices are calculated given the total cost of each input. Using the same 
methodology for the administrative function, the overall cost efficiency is obtained as the 
ratio of the minimum cost o f operation to actual cost:
OE(y, x, w) = MinCost(y, x, w)/ObservedCost(x, w)
And its two components the technical and allocative efficiencies as described above.
The technical efficiency TE(y, x) is provided by the CRS model, which includes levels of 
outputs and inputs, and the allocative efficiency from the ratio of the overall cost to 
technical efficiency AE(y, x, w)= OE(y, x, w)/TE(y, x).
Descriptive statistics for the administrative hospital cost-minimizing function are presented 
below, table 5-26.
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Table 5-26
Descriptive Statistics: The Administrative Cost-Minimizing DEA Model
V a r i a b l e M e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n i m u m M a x i m u m D e s c r i p t i o n
AOTOT 13786.4 7628.9 2028.0 39206.0 A d B lss io ns
VNATOT 145741.0 119484.1 10896.0 769918.0 O u tp a tie n t V is i t s
EH 460571.9 225567.8 94624.0 1151835.0 Enployee Hours
HPHY 4175.7 11000.7 0 .0 63374.0 P h y s ic ia n  Hours
MBEDTOT 355.8 161 .5 86 .0 799.0 Number o f  Beds
PLT 15.3 6 .7 2 .2 35.0 C a p ita l  In p u t
WEMP 0.0153 0.0025 0.0103 0.0332 Employee Wage ($000)
WPHY 0.0518 0.0517 0.0000 0.4510 P h y s ic ia n  Wage ($000)
WJ3THER 18.2 6 .9 10.9 56 .3 S u p p lie s  e tc .  P r ic e  ($000)
WCAP 5719.7 4344.8 149.6 24921.3 C a p ita l  P r ic e  ($000)
EC 7207.5 4280.7 1315.0 29281.0 Employee C ost ($000)
CPHY 2 02 .6 457 .7 0 .0 2781.0 P h y s ic ia n  C ost ($000)
CAP 760.4 480 .4 14.1 2019.4 S u p p lie s  e tc ,  Cost ($000)
C_0THER 6669.9 4846.9 1168.0 31010.0 C a p ita l  C ost ($000)
The empirical results indicate that the cost efficiency averages 0.3 and 0.41 for the CRS 
and VRS models, respectively. Allocative efficiency accounts for a very large portion of 
the total cost efficiency.
Table 5-27 Administrative Cost-DEA: Efficiency Estimates
D e s c r i p t i o n  M e a n  S t d .  D e v . ________ M i n i m u m _________ M a x i m u m
CRS
T e ch n ica l E f f ic ie n c y  0.805024 0.148341
A llo c a t iv e  E f f ic ie n c y  0.354675 0.150630
Cost E f f ic ie n c y  0.287988 0.146327
VRS
T e ch n ica l E f f ic ie n c y  0.881602 0.115739 0 .583  1 .00
A llo c a t iv e  E f f ic ie n c y  0.469867 0.206508 0 .193  1 .00
Cost E f f ic ie n c y  0.421265 0.216812 0 .148  1 .00
The technical efficiency is comparable to that obtained from the previous models.
Even if the construction of input prices is based on proxy input units (beds and the capital 
input), the magnitude of allocative inefficiency can not be attributed solely to specification 
error. In addition, the technical efficiency, which is based on the same proxy inputs, falls 
into the range obtained from alternative models estimated in section 5.3.
0 .508  1.00
0 .1 4 7  1 .00
0 .105  1 .00
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One of the disadvantages of this model is the data requirements. Except for the level of 
inputs, the prices o f inputs must be available, which makes the construction o f health care 
models prohibitively difficult.
Data Envelopment Analysis provides a variety of alternative models and yields a detailed 
record o f performance for each hospital. The results provide hospital administrators with 
valuable information about overall performance as well as information by functional 
component.
However, modeling the efficiency score in a second stage will enable decision-makers to 
identify potential determinants of performance and will provide an additional managerial 
tool. The results o f the alternative DEA formulation (hospital and administrative) will be 
modeled in the following section.
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6
Modeling inefficiency
6.1 Introduction
One of the objectives of this study is to model the inefficiency of hospital administration 
obtained from the stochastic frontier and the DEA models as well as the inefficiency of the 
total hospital sector. In this methodology, the first stage establishes the optimal (frontier) 
performance of a set o f productive units while the second explains the gap between the 
optimal and the actual performance. Factors associated with inefficient performance are 
identified and their effect on the cost efficiency/inefficiency is estimated.
Modeling inefficiency enables us to identify possible determinants of inefficiency and 
quantify their contribution to inefficiency. Also, based on assumptions about the 
distribution of the efficiency index, different sets of hypotheses can be tested for a variety 
of DMU characteristics.
By reducing inefficiency hospitals can produce a given level o f output with fewer 
productive resources and lower overall expenditures.
It is common in the empirical literature of efficiency analysis to employ statistical tools 
(regression analysis) to explain the variability of the efficiency index.
Modeling inefficiency in a second stage is a difficult task as the model of inefficiency 
involves the identification of factors that belong to the second stage and not in the first 
(Dor, 1994). In the stochastic frontier, omitted variables can upward bias the residuals 
and the inefficiency index. Also, correlation between the explanatory variables in the two
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stage model will affect the coefficients of the second stage regression. In this case, the 
coefficients will not be unbiased and consistent (Grosskopf, 1996).
The stochastic frontier model yields a hospital specific index of inefficiency. Specifically, 
the residuals of the model provide the composite error e,- (e, = u, + vj) of inefficiency and 
noise. To isolate the inefficiency component, the expected value o f Ui conditional on £i is 
obtained, which reflects the individual hospital-specific departure from the optimum 
frontier (Jodrow et al., 1982). The stochastic frontier yields an index that measures the 
degree of inefficiency. The efficient hospitals are assigned the value o f zero while the 
inefficient ones a value above zero.
The DEA technique evaluates the hospital performance and constructs an efficiency index. 
Hospitals that perform efficiently have an index of performance equal to I and form the 
best practice frontier against which all other hospitals are evaluated.
This study will investigate the administrative hospital efficiency and the potential benefits 
of electronic data interchange (EDI). Concerns about the administrative efficiency in the 
hospital sector and the intensified criticism posed the following questions:
Is the administrative component of hospitals inefficient?
Does more administration increase or decrease hospital efficiency?
How efficient is the administrative function of hospitals?
Does Electronic Data Interchange improve the efficiency of administration?
The inefficiency of hospital administration is costly as it was evaluated empirically in 
previous sections. However, it pays to investigate its determinants.
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6.2 Econometric Issues
The determinants o f efficiency/inefficiency are modeled according to the following general 
model:
Stochastic Frontier Inefficiency Score = f  (Independent Variables)
DEA Transformed Inefficiency Score = f  (Independent Variables)
Studies model the inefficiency (efficiency) index using a variety of techniques. Ordinary 
Least Squares regression analysis is the simple and the most popular method of explaining 
the variations of a given dependent variable. A number of applications that analyze 
estimated inefficiencies employ OLS. Vitaliano and Toren, (1994), among others, used 
OLS regression and the residuals from the stochastic frontier as a dependent variable 
modeling the determinants of nursing home inefficiency.
However, since the efficiency score is constrained to fall between 0 and 1 OLS is not 
appropriate as it yields biased estimates. Since OLS yields biased and inconsistent 
estimators other studies proposed transformations of the bounded by zero or unity index 
to an unbounded score using a transformed variable. Other propositions involve the 
transformation In(l-y/y), where y is the DEA efficiency score (Lovell, Walter and Wood, 
1995). If the dependent variable is bounded below by zero then a simple logarithmic 
transformation can remove the OLS bias.
The DEA efficiency index is treated as a censored variable by Kooreman (1994), who 
employed the tobit technique. In addition, he transformed the efficiency index into a 
binary variable (grouping DMUs into efficient and inefficient ones) and used the probit 
technique. Ferrier and Valdmanis (1996) modeled rural hospital efficiency using the 
reciprocal of the efficiency index as dependent variable. So, they estimated a censored at
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I Tobit model since the reciprocal of the efficiency index is bounded below by I and it is 
unbounded above.
Since the dependent variable is continuous but ranges between 0 and I, OLS estimation 
does not seem appropriate for estimation. Actually, for the DEA efficiency index a large 
percentage of observations take the value of one and the remaining form a continuous 
variable that is close but lower than one. Furthermore, while the dependent variable 
(efficiency or inefficiency index) is strictly positive and ranges between zero (0) and one 
( 1), the whole range of the explanatory variables (Xi) is available. This combination of 
discrete and continuous elements form a variable that is neither normally distributed nor 
homoscedastic (Chilingerian, 1995).
The distribution of the DEA index is best described by a censored distribution and the 
most appropriate model for estimation is the Tobit, since a large number of values is 
censored at the value of 1 (or 0 for the inefficiency index). The Tobit model takes into 
account the nature of distribution of the efficiency score and in addition the interpretation 
of its coefficients is similar to that o f an OLS model.
Chilingerian, (1995), points out that, in this case, censoring is a result of the mathematical 
derivation and not that o f a stochastic mechanism, but is a good approximation for the 
nature of an efficiency score. So, he used the normalization:
Inefficiency score = [(l/y)-l] 
for computational reasons following the suggestion of Greene (1993a), and employed the 
Tobit technique. Rosko et al., (1995), used the negative of the above transformation: 
Efficiency score= -l[(l/y)-l]. This transformation bounds the DEA score in one direction
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censoring it at zero. The efficient DMUs take the value of zero while the inefficient ones 
take negative values.
This study employs the Tobit technique to model the inefficiency index. The dependent 
variable is the stochastic frontier inefficiency score without any transformation or the 
transformed DEA efficiency score. The transformation used for the DEA type efficiency 
scores is that proposed by Chilingerian, (1995), DEA Inefficiency Score = [(l/y)-l].
6.3 Data and Variables
The additional data set used in this section were obtained from the Medicare’s (HCFA) 
Impact file for the year 1993 and the 1993 County and City Data Book of the Bureau of 
Census. Also, the 1993 survey of the health care sector conducted by Response Analysis 
Corporation (RAC) for the state of New Jersey will be used.
_________________________________Table 6-1
D e s c r ip t iv e  S t a t is t ic s :  H o s p ita l I n e f f ic ie n c y  Model 
V a r ia b le  Mean S td . Dev. Minimum Maximum D e s c r ip t io n
SAMC 0.1514 0.0236 0.0908 0.2089 The Share o f  A d m in is t ra t io n
SAMC2 0.0235 0.0072 0.0082 0.0436 The Share o f  Adm in. Squared
MBEDTOT 355.8554 161.5196 86.0000 799.0000 Number o f  Beds
MILESTH 4.4390 4.3634 0.0000 19.0000 M ile s  to  th e  N ea res t H o s p ita l
INC 17193.3012 6675.2674 7033.0000 41673.0000 Income Per C a p ita , County
HS 72.6506 11.6015 43.3000 93.3000 High Schoo l Educ. (% ), County
OCRATE 0.7214 0.0930 0.4706 0.8920 Occupancy Rate
CMI 1.3265 0.2149 1.0864 2.6039 Case M ix Index
UNCOM_C 9965.6506 11130.7672 -388.0000 94673.0000 Uncompensated Care ($)
MALPR 444.4819 1169.5726 0.0000 9465.0000 M a lp ra c tic e  C ost ($ )
PROFIT 4805.0723 7080.4846 -30631.0000 25915.0000 P r o f i t  ($)
HOSP 8.0241 4.0030 1.0000 16.0000 No o f  H o s p ita ls  in  County
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6.4 The Model
The first modei to be estimated is an OLS corrected for heteroscedasticity.
y, = P'x+u,
Where : y, is the inefficiency index
P is a k x 1 vector of parameters
x, is a k x 1 vector of explanatory variables
u, is the error term which by assumption is i.i.d. distributed: u ~ N(0, a 2) 
The second model follows the Tobit specification:
y . = )
P ' x. + U, i f y { > 0
0 Otherwise
i f i y  -^ 'x,cr!)
prob{yi > 0) = prob(y. > 0)./(y  \y > 0) = <t»---- !------- !------
with ^
prob{yi = 0) = prob(ut <~p 'x t) = (1 -0 )
The maximum likelihood function of this model is:
f = nD-<t>]n /to-, -/?i.)/<r]
0 I
The log likelihood becomes:
L = Ilog(l-<l>)+Ilog-r LT -I -L tV , -fii, f  
0 1 v2  K (f 1 2cr
Note: The dependent variable is: (1) the inefficiency index derived from the stochastic frontier model 
(Hospital and Administrative functions), or (2) the transformation ((l/y)-l), where y is the efficiency 
index obtained from Data Envelopment Analysis type of models.
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6.5 Modeling Hospital Inefficiency
In this section the hospital inefficiency is modeled. The dependent variable is the 
inefficiency index obtained from the stochastic (6.5.1) and the transformed efficiency index 
obtained from the alternative DEA type of models (6.5.2). The Tobit technique is used.
6.5.1 The Stochastic Frontier
The possible influences of the hospital inefficiency are hospital characteristics (variables 
not included in the first stage) and hospital area characteristics. The stochastic frontier 
yielded the following results:
Table 6-2
Hospitals: The Stochastic Frontier Inefficiency Model
TOBIT E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le :  The S to c h a s t ic  F r o n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX (M ean=0.04037,S.D .= 0.0417) 
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  163.0317
V a r ia b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [|Z |£ Z I
C onstan t -0.59852 0.17217 -3.476 0.00051
SAMC 6.3177 1.8137 3.483 0.00050
SAMC2 -19.292 5.8333 -3.307 0.00094
MBEDTOT 0.36668E-04 0.31802E-04 1.153 0.24891
MILESTH 0.48006E-04 0.35907E-04 1.337 0.18124
INC -0.32435E-05 0 .1 1166E-05 -2.905 0.00367
HS 0.19656E-02 0.65049E-03 3.022 0.00251
OCRATE -0.50624E-01 0.45350E-01 -1 .116 0.26430
CMI 0.49536E-01 0.29580E-01 1.675 0.09400
UNCOM_C 0.12902E-05 0.41885E-06 3.080 0.00207
MALPR -0 .68051E-05 0.44597E-05 -1 .526 0.12703
PROFIT -0.74162E-06 0.61574E-06 -1 .204 0.22842
cr 0.33940E-01 0.26342E-02 12.884 0.00000
OLS S t a t is t ic s :
OLS: Ft2 = 0.32932 Adj -R2 = 0.22541 Model t e s t :  F [1 1,711= 3 .1 7 , Prob va lu e  = 0.00154 
Breusch-Pagan chi-squared = 13.4573, (with I I  <Lf.)
The results indicate that only a small portion of variation in hospital inefficiency can be 
explained by the available set o f independent variables. The main objective o f this analysis 
is to assess the effect of administration on hospital inefficiency. The independent variables
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
except the administrative variable control for size, market demand, competition and other 
hospital or area characteristics.
It was hypothesized that hospital administration influences inefficiency. The results 
support this hypothesis. The effect of administration on inefficiency is positive, significant, 
and nonlinear. Inefficiency as a function of administration increases at a decreasing rate 
and reaches a maximum when the administrative share exceeds 17 percent. The 
percentage of administrative cost to total hospital cost serves as a proxy measure of 
administration. The results indicate that holding other variables constant, the larger the 
administrative share the more inefficient the hospital is.
The number of beds, which indicate size, also, has a positive linear and significant effect 
on inefficiency. Excessive growth of the firm creates inefficiency pressures. The size- 
caused inefficiency can be the result of exhausted gains from the division of labor, as well 
as reduced coordination and decision making congestion (Fare et al, 1985).
The variable “miles to the nearest” hospital is an indicator of competition in a hospital’s 
area. It is assumed that the higher the number of miles from the nearest hospital the lower 
the degree of competition. The positive sign indicates that (the lower the degree of 
competition) the higher the number of miles the higher the inefficiency. So, competition 
promotes efficient operation. The relationship between efficiency and competition has 
been documented in the literature. Libenstein (-1966, 1976 -) among others connected 
competitive forces with his “X-efficiency” theory. Studies that examined the effect of 
competition on hospital costs reported a significant relationship. Zwanziger and Melnick 
(1988) analyzed the behavior of California’s hospitals under different competitive regimes 
and found that competition lowered hospital costs significantly.
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Other variables that explain overall hospital inefficiency are the per capita income, and the 
percentage of high school graduates. Per Capita Income has the expected sign and it is 
related to market demand in the area. The percentage of high school graduates in the area 
is another environmental factor that influences the market demand for the hospital services 
as well as the market for inputs. The positive sign implies the presence of educational 
effects on demand and a pressure for higher wages in the market.
The effect of occupancy rate (also, a market demand indicator) is negative but not 
significant and indicates that holding the hospital size constant, the higher the occupancy 
rate, the higher the efficiency level. Both, the Medicare case mix index and 
uncompensated care influence inefficiency. The malpractice cost was included as a proxy 
measure o f quality. If higher levels of malpractice costs indicate lower levels of quality 
then the coefficient of malpractice cost implies a positive relationship of quality and 
inefficiency. Quality is costly to the hospital, as it requires more inputs and greater 
administrative effort to be produced. The frontier cost equation does not include a case 
mix index and a quality adjuster, so since both quality and case mix are more costly to the 
hospital, they are expected to have a positive effect on inefficiency.
Regulation, a major determinant of inefficiency, can not be controlled, since all hospitals 
operate under the same regulatory environment. Type of ownership is another suspected 
cause o f inefficiency but its effect can not be determined in this study, since almost all 
hospitals are not-for-profit (there is no private hospital in the sample). However, the 
coefficient of profit is negative (but not significant) indicating that the profitable hospitals 
are more efficient.
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The percentage of administrative cost to total averages 15.14 and ranges from 9.08 to 
20.89. There are 31 hospitals that spend 1 percent below the mean and 33 hospitals that 
spend one percent above the mean. The first group of hospitals has an average 
inefficiency index o f 1.91 while the second group’s inefficiency index averages 5.19. The 
t-test supports the hypothesis that hospitals with a lower than average administrative share 
are more efficient than hospitals with a higher than average administrative share.
Table 6-3: Hospital Inefficiency and Hospital Administration
V a ria b le Cases Mean S td . Dev. Minimum Maximum
In e f f ic ie n c y
In e f f ic ie n c y
31 0.0191402 
33 0.0510887
0.0153571
0.0490808
0.0028696
0.0027302
0.0686672 1 "  
0.1528228 2nd
group
group
H ypothes is Test P -Value
Ho: mean ( I * 1 group)-m ean (2nd group )=0 t= -3 .5 5 3 7 P > | t | =0.0007
Ho: I n e f f  D is t r (1 rt g ro u p )= In e f f D is t r  (2nd group) F=8.457 P> F =0.0000
A Test proposed by Banker, (1993), uses the half-normal or exponential distribution 
assumptions of the inefficiency index to test hypotheses on efficiency differences between 
groups (appendix 6.1). To apply this test, let’s consider the above two groups of 
hospitals. The first group (31 hospitals) spends less than 14 percent on administration, 
while the second group (33 hospitals) spends more than 16 percent. Since the stochastic 
frontier is modeled on the assumptions of a half-normally distributed inefficiency term, the 
half normal distribution is the most appropriate to use. Under this assumption the 
Banker’s test statistic is: T = 8.457
The test statistic follows the F-distribution with (33, 31) degrees o f freedom. The test 
statistic is statistically significant at less than 0.01 levels of significance. The test implies 
that hospitals with lower levels of administration are significantly more efficient.
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6.5.2 Modeling Hospital Inefficiency: The DEA Models
The second stage analysis is applied to the alternative Data Envelopment Analysis models 
estimated in the previous section. The main objective of this model is to test if 
administration influences hospital inefficiency. The Data Envelopment Analysis constructs 
the best practice based, not only on the sets of output and levels, but also on the model’s 
priorities. However, it is expected to yield a relative ranking of DMUs not necessarily 
comparable with that obtained via the stochastic frontier. In addition, the set o f DEA 
inefficiency determinants is expected to be different from the stochastic one. The 
stochastic frontier supports the hypothesis of inefficient hospital administration. The size 
of administration is the main determinant of the cost inefficiency.
The administrative function of hospitals is not expected to be among the main 
determinants of the hospital production function and the influences of its technical 
efficiency. The empirical results o f the DEA modeling are not consistent with the results 
obtained from the stochastic frontier, in general. In addition, the weight restricted DEA 
results are more correlated with the production-optimizing behavior o f hospitals than with 
the cost- minimizing one. However, the cost-minimizing DEA criterion, as expected, 
yields comparable results with the stochastic model.
The following table presents the empirical estimates of two DEA models; the constant 
returns to scale cost-DEA efficiency and the variable returns to scale cost-DEA efficiency. 
The coefficient of administration is not statistically significant but has the expected sign in 
both models. The remaining variables are comparable.
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Hospitals: The DEA Inefficiency Model
TOBIT ESTIMATES
Dependent v a r ia b le :  C ost In e f f ic ie n c y  (CRS) 
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n :  42.72806
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [|Z |> Z I
C onstant 1.0997 0.66132 1 .663 0.09635
SAMC 0.81531E-01 6.8905 0.012 0.99056
SAMC2 -0.75326 22.093 -0 .034 0.97280
MBEDTOT -0.69486E-04 0.12002E-03 -0 .579 0.56261
HOSP 0.55363E-02 0 .42176E-02 1 .313 0.18930
INC -0 .52851E-05 0.43997E-05 -1.201 0.22965
HS -0.17346E-02 0.25945E-02 -0 .669 0.50376
OCRATE -1.1124 0.17685 -6 .290 0.00000
UNCOM C 0 .2 2 1 12E-06 0.16445E-05 0 .134 0.89304
c m 0.14829 0.11427 1 .298 0.19439
MALPR 0 . 12548E-04 0 .17149E-04 0.732 0.46436
PROFIT - 0 . 14660E-05 0.23697E-05 -0 .619 0.53616
a 0.12969 0 . 10541E-01 12.303 0.00000
Dependent v a r ia b le :  C ost In e f f ic ie n c y  
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n :  18.75853
(VRS)
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [|Z |> Z I
C onstant -0.85360E-01 0.76853 -0.111 0.91156
SAMC 8.4039 8.0100 1.049 0.29410
SAMC2 -28 .100 25.706 -1 .093 0.27433
MBEDTOT 0.22001E-03 0.14293E-03 1 .539 0.12373
HOSP 0.31588E-02 0.49380E-02 0.640 0.52238
INC -0.47527E-05 0.51052E-05 -0.931 0.35188
HS -0.26426E-02 0.30188E-02 -0 .875 0.38135
OCRATE -0.55304 0.21128 -2 .618 0.00886
UNC0M_C 0.37585E-06 0.19154E-05 0.196 0.84443
CMI 0.19588 0.13264 1 .477 0.13975
MALPR - 0 . 12367E-05 0.1991 IE -04 -0 .062 0.95047
PROFIT -0.29136E-05 0.27483E-05 -1 .060 0.28906
c 0.15018 0.13251E-01 11.333 0.00000
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6.6 Modeling the Administrative Hospital Efficiency
The inefficiency o f the administrative function, obtained from the stochastic frontier 
model, is explained by a set of hospital characteristics, like payer-mix, and other 
environmental variables that imply organizational complexity and possibly influence 
inefficiency. The additional data were taken from the Medicare’s (HCFA) Impact files, 
the County and City Data Book of the Bureau o f Census, and the Health Care Survey 
(1993) conducted by Response Analysis Corporation for the State o f New Jersey.
 _____________________________________
D e s c r ip t iv e  S t a t i s t i c s :  The A d m in is t ra t iv e  I n e f f ic ie n c y  Model
V a r ia b le  Mean S td . Dev. Minimum Maximum D e s c r ip t io n
PADMC 0.3677 0.1084 0.0965 0.6720 M edicare A dm iss ions (%)
PADMD 0.1246 0.1005 0 .0116 0.5083 M ed ica id  A dm iss ions (%)
PADCHAR 0.0333 0.0485 0.0000 0.2569 C h a r ity  Care Adm iss ions (%)
PADHM0 0.0781 0.0606 0 .0000 0.2809 HMO A dm iss ions (%)
DSH 0.1583 0.1272 0.0271 0.6274 DSH Percentage
IRB 0.0808 0.1186 0 .0000 0.5220 IRB R a tio
HS 72.6506 11.6015 43.3000 93.3000 H igh S choo l Grad (% ), County
BS 22.6012 12.6393 5.8000 63.2000 B a c h e lo r 's  Degree (%), C ounty
POVH 10.6904 8.2103 1.8000 38.8000 Households be low  p o v e rty  (%)
MILESTH 4.4390 4.3634 0.0000 19.0000 M ile s  to  th e  N ea res t H o s p ita l
BIRTH 659.9880 629.6005 59.0000 4992.0000 B ir th s  N o .(<2500 gram s), County
SIXF 7.4386 1.7502 4.4000 12.6000 Age 65-74 (% ), County
The results indicate that Medicare and Medicaid admissions have a positive effect on
inefficiency while HMO (excludes Medicare and Medicaid HMO) and charity related 
admissions have a negative effect. The IRB variable (residents to bed ratio) represents the 
administrative complexity of teaching hospitals, but it is not significant in this model. The 
“miles to the nearest hospital” variable that implies competitive pressures in the market is 
not significant in the Tobit specification. The coefficient tends to be negative implying 
that competition influences inefficient behavior. The environmental factors HS, BS, 
BIRTH, POVH and SIXF indicate influences on demand for hospital services and demand
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for hospital inputs that affect the administrative function. The variable Birth that measures 
low birth weight (number of cases, less than 2,500 grams) has a positive (and mostly 
significant) effect across equations, indicating the burden that premature births place on 
hospitals.
Table 6-6
A d m in is t ra t io n : The S to c h a s t ic  F ro n t ie r  In e f f ic ie n c y  Model
TOBIT E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le :  The S to c h a s tic  F r o n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX (M ean=0.04037,S.D .= 0 .0417) 
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  180.7159
V a r ia b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [ | Z | « I
C onstant -0.29424 0.65338E-01 -4 .503 0.00001
PADMC 0.58847E-01 0.52536E-01 1.120 0.26266
PADMD 0.46389 0.12420 3.735 0.00019
PADCHAR -0.17393 0.79217E-01 -2 .196 0.02812
PADHM0 -0.62349E-01 0.65742E-01 -0 .948 0.34293
DSH -0.19810 0.10355 -1 .913 0.05573
IRB 0.59821E-02 0.33821E-01 0 .177 0.85961
HS 0.36189E-02 0.80002E-03 4.523 0.00001
BS -0.14708E-02 0.54152E-03 -2 .716 0.00661
POVH 0 . 14000E-02 0.84320E-03 1 .660 0.09684
MILESTH -0.26989E-04 0.29649E-04 -0 .910 0.36268
BIRTH 0 .1 7575E-04 0.57099E-05 3.078 0.00208
SIXF 0.44806E-02 0 . 19726E-02 2.271 0.02313
CT 0.27427E-01 0.21287E-02 12.884 0.00000
OLS: R2 = 0.37813 A d j-R 2 = 0.27152 Model t e s t :  F [12 ,70J=  3 .5 5 , Prob va lu e  = 0.00039 
Breusch-Pagan ch i-sq u a re d  = 39.6720, (w ith  12 d . f . )
The Percentage of households in the county below the poverty level and the percentage of 
individuals between 65 and 74 have a strong positive effect on inefficiency (stochastic and 
DEA). However, this effect is not consistent across all DEA surfaces. The DSH1 
variable (the disproportionate share adjustment payments), indicates the regulatory
1 The DSH payments compensate hospitals for serving a large proportion o f  low-income patients. Low-
income patients are sicker than the average patient and therefore, more costly to treat. Hospitals DSH 
payments are made according to the sum o f two percentages; the percentage o f  Medicare inpatient days 
that receive supplemental security income (SSI) payments and the percentage o f Medicaid to total 
inpatient days.
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environment in which hospitals operate and the administrative burden that it possibly 
places on them. The coefficient of DSH is negative and statistically significant which 
indicates that the administrations of high DSH hospitals are more efficient.
The efficiency index of the alternative DEA formulations when regressed on the same set 
of independent variables yielded similar as well as different results. An outcome that it is 
expected given the assumptions and priorities of the alternative models are different.
Two representative regressions are presented in appendix 6.2. The overall fit of the 
models is weak as most of the coefficients are insignificant. After all, the regressions have 
shown that the optimizing priorities o f the stochastic cost frontier and DEA are different. 
Even within DEA there are significant differences in efficiencies.
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6.7 Electronic Data Interchange
The use of computerized technology in the hospital setting is extensive and involves 
almost every organizational and clinical aspect. The major areas include medical 
education and research, patient care and medical records, medical expert systems, 
diagnostic support systems, and financial management. The impact of computerized 
medical technology on hospital and in general on health care expenditures is expected to 
be significant.
Hospital expenditures have consistently risen with overall health care expenditures for the 
last twenty years, and medical technology is considered one of the major components of 
hospital cost growth. However, (information) technology can be used as a cost reduction 
mechanism able to streamline the administrative complexity of the health care system. 
Among the strategies of reducing the administrative cost o f a health care system is the 
application of electronic data interchange (EDI). Electronic Data Interchange is a unique 
computerized-communication system of transferring information (data) directly between 
computer applications of two organizations.
The electronic data interchange technology extends the boundaries o f hospital’s health 
information system and provides the link between the hospital and its trading partners 
(patients, employers, insurance companies, government). Electronic data interchange 
implies the cooperation of at least two or more geographically dispersed common systems. 
The physical distance becomes unimportant as the flow of information exchanged and 
transactions carried out involve telescopic time (Holland et al., 1992).
Adoption of EDI technology involves the use of a uniform billing and record keeping 
system using common formats and standards.
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The Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI), a not-for-profit organization 
was established in 1991 to examine the potential effect o f electronic communication 
technology on health care administration. The WEDI group estimated in two successive 
reports that the development of a national electronic communication network in health 
care could create significant administrative savings (WEDI, 1992 and 1993).
Electronic data interchange, in a hospital setting, can be applied to transactions that 
involve a variety of functions;
(a) Financial functions that include transactions such as claim submission, coordination of 
benefits, claims payment remittance and notice.
(b) Administrative functions that include transaction such as enrollment, eligibility 
verification, claims inquiry, provider referrals/authorizations, test of order and results, 
prescription orders, managed-care pre-authorizations, material management, and 
provider appointment scheduling.
(c) Clinical functions that include transactions such as prescription records, medical tests 
and results, and medical records.
In 1992, WEDI estimated possible annual administrative savings through automation of 
claims submission, claims inquiry, enrollment, eligibility verification and 
payment/remittance advice transactions. These five core transactions could result in 
savings ranged between $4 and $10 billion for a single year. In 1993, WEDI expanded the 
analysis to cover six more EDI applications; health care material management, prescription 
ordering, test ordering, results reporting, coordination o f benefits, referrals and pre­
authorizations, provider appointing and scheduling. As reported, total savings from the 
core and the six additional transactions ranged from $12.9 to $26 billion (WEDI, 1992,
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1993). Other studies reported substantial savings from the implementation o f a set of EDI 
applications. The estimates are based on different sets of applications and assumptions. 
However, they are not comparable but indicative of the potential savings. According to 
Lewin-VHI et al., (1993), the estimates of four representative studies range between $1 
and $9.4 billion.
Currently market participants widely believe that the operationalization and assimilation of 
computerized technology can substantially reduce administrative costs.
WEDI reported that the average unit cost of electronic processing is lower than that of on 
paper processing which can be considered as a gain in efficiency. The philosophy of 
WEDI project is based on the following hypothesis: If “on a per transaction basis, the 
cost to perform claims related transactions electronically is lower than the cost to 
perform the same transaction manually, ” then the savings from automation would be 
significant.
Electronic interchange of information has become a good substitute for other methods of 
exchanging information. In addition, the technology may be applied to patient records and 
to management control.
Based on the demonstrated ability of computers to influence the administrative 
functionality and efficiency of many administrative sections, hospital decision-makers 
embraced the advanced technology of electronic data interchange to streamline hospital 
administrative costs and seek efficient practices for the administrative problems.
The development of Electronic Data Interchange has been influenced by a variety of 
regulations and policies. HCFA is developing the Medicare Transaction System and by
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the year 1998 all Medicare claims, payments, and coordination of benefits transactions will 
be processed electronically (Wagner and Lynn, 1994).
The Health Information Network and Technologies (HINT) project investigated the 
degree of implementation of electronic data interchange (EDI) technology in the state of 
New Jersey. The survey conducted by Response Analysis Corporation (RAC) involved 
three major areas (administrative functions); eligibility, claims processing, and medical 
information communication and storage (medical records).
The sample size is too small to be representative at the national level but it is indicative of 
the trends of computerization of the hospital sector. Hospital administrators answered 
two different questionnaires. One involved eligibility and claim processing and the second 
the medical record department. However, the response rate is very low and limits the 
objectives for this study. Basically, the survey focuses on three administrative functions: 
Insurance eligibility verification, health insurance claims processing and communicating 
and storing other medical information. The main findings of the survey for claims 
processing and medical records are discussed below.
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6.7.1 Hospital Claims Processing and Administrative efficiency
The majority of hospitals process claims on paper (includes telephone and fax) and a 
relatively smaller proportion use both means, paper and electronic (ED I). In 1993, 76 % 
of hospitals use telephone to confirm insurance eligibility and only 15 % use electronic 
methods, while devoting approximately 66 staff hours per week to conduct this volume at 
an average total cost of $3.81 (per check).
The majority of hospitals (81%) process health insurance claims both on paper and 
electronically. Approximately 14% of hospitals process claims only on paper and there is 
no hospital that processes claims electronically only.
The average number of claims processed per week is 600. It takes 116 staff hours per 
week to process the above volume on paper and only 82 electronically. However, the cost 
per claim does not differ substantially ($0.67 or 15%). Electronic processing costs less 
($3.80) than on paper ($4.50). Other sectors report gains form conversion to electronic 
processing that range from 24% (pharmacies) to 37% (payers). The average rejection rate 
of initial claims is substantially lower, (47%), for electronic than for paper transactions as 
well as for follow-up claims, (45%).
Another cost advantage of electronic processing in this survey is the turnaround of 
payments. The average age of accounts receivable is 66 days for paper claims and 37 for 
electronic. However, it is not clear if hospitals decide the method of processing claims 
according to the complexity of a claim to be processed, or according to the fact that the 
second entity does not accept electronic processed claims.
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Modeling the effect o f electronic data interchange and specifically the claims processing 
function is a difficult task because of the very limited number o f observations (maximum 
15). However even if a model can not be completely specified, the results are indicative of 
the true EDI effect on administrative inefficiency.
Only the OLS estimates are presented because of the limited data set. The first two 
models explain the inefficiency score of the stochastic frontier. Controlling for the effect 
of payer-mix; the percentage of Medicare claims, the percentage of Medicaid claims and 
the percentage of HMO claims, the percentage of insurance eligibility checks confirmed 
electronically has a negative and significant effect on administrative inefficiency. Only 15 
percent of hospitals use EDI for insurance eligibility checks and 76 percent of hospitals 
use Paper processing which includes phone and fax equipment. In the second specification 
the coefficient of the percentage of insurance eligibility checks performed by phone is 
positive and significant implying that paper processing influences the inefficiency of 
administration. The results are consistent and relatively stable across the different DEA 
formulations. The weight restricted DEA as well as the Cost-minimizing DEA yield 
similar results.
Other variables that indicate the effectiveness of Electronic Data interchange in this 
function is the price per claim (paper or electronic). The reported average cost per 
electronic claim processing is negatively related to inefficiency while the average cost per 
paper claim processing is positively related. The results are similar for the hours spent on 
the claims processing variable.
EDI is an organizational tool with strategic advantages. The EDI transactions are subject 
to high quality standards since the information keyed only once at the beginning of the
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function can be translated, checked in syntax and accuracy of information, and 
outperforms any manual operation. The regressions confirm the advantages of EDI.
Table 6-7
Modeling the effect of EDI: Claims Processing 
(The Stochastic Frontier Inefficiency)
OLS E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le :  The S to c h a s t ic  F ro n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX
OLS: R2 = 0.8351 Adj-R 2 = 0 .5466 Model t e s t : F [7 ,4 ]=  2 .8 9 4 , Prob va lue  = 0 .1606
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E r ro r  t - r a t i o P[ | T | a t 1 D e s c r ip t io n
INTERCEP -0 .031816 0.05880274 -0.541 0 .6 1 7 2
MCAID 0.006437 0.00236061 2.727 0 .0 5 2 6 M edica id  C laim s
MCARE 0.000066584 0.00079045 0.084 0 .9 3 6 9 M edicare C laim s
HMO -0 .001757 0.00136545 -1 .2 8 7 0 .2 6 7 7 HMO C laim s
HIEC 0.000517 0.00025888 1 .999 0 .1163 Hours on IEC
ACP 0.006703 0.00470070 1 .426 0 .2 2 7 0 Ave Cost on Paper
ACE -0.005943 0.00466075 -1 .275 0 .2713 Ave C ost E le c t C la im
IECEL -0 .001192 0.00045466 -2.621 0 .0588 IEC E le c t r o n ic a l ly
OLS E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le : The S to c h a s t ic F ro n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX
OLS: R2 = 0 .8063  Adj -R2 = 0 .6402 Model t e s t : F [6 ,7 J=  4 .8 5 5 , Prob va lue  = 0 .0286
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E rro r t - r a t io P [ I T | a t I
INTERCEP 0.007732 0.06530711 0.118 0.9091
MCAID 0.003889 0.00218003 1.784 0 .1177 M edica id  C la im s
MCARE -0 .000750 0.00066519 -1 .1 2 7 0 .2 9 6 8 M edicare C la im s
HMO -0 .002718 0.00119351 -2 .2 7 7 0 .0 5 6 9 HMO C laim s
HPC 0.000114 0.00011094 1 .029 0 .3 3 7 6 Hours Paper C la im s
HEC -0 .000340 0.00010977 -3 .0 9 4 0 .0 1 7 5 Hours E le c t r  C la im s
IECPH 0.000960 0.00038728 2.479 0 .0423 IEC by phone
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Table 6-8
Modeling the effect of EDI: Claims Processing
(The DEA Inefficiency)
OLS E s tim a te s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le :  T h e  W eight R e s tr ic te d  (TCAR) DEA, VRS tra n s fo rm e d  In e f f ic ie n c y
OLS: R2 = 0.6767 A d j-R 2 = 0 .2887  Model t e s t : F [6 ,5 j=  1 .7 4 4 , Prob va lu e  = 0.2790
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E rro r t - r a t i o P [ |T |2 :t ]
INTERCEP -0.103618 0.62105023 -0 .1 6 7 0.8740
MCAID 0.057196 0.02466464 2.319 0.0681 M e d ica id  C la im s
MCARE 0.007437 0.00834626 0.891 0.4137 M edicare  C la im s
HMO -0.019024 0.01382974 -1 .376 0.2274 HMO c la im s
HIEC 0.003401 0.00211888 1 .605 0.1694 Hours on IEC
ACP -0.041378 0.03566623 -1 .160 0.2984 Ave C ost on Paper
IECEL -0.005864 0.00459902 -1 .2 7 5 0.2584 IEC E le c t r o n ic a l ly
OLS E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le :  The Cost E f f ic ie n c y  Cost-DEA, CRS tra n s fo rm e d
OLS: R2 = 0.8378 A d j-R 2 = 0.6431 Model te s t : F [6 ,5 I= 4 .3 0 3 , Prob v a lu e  = 0.0654
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard  E r ro r t - r a t i o P [1 T i a t  I
INTERCEP 0.171714 1.76716326 0.097 0.9264
MCAID 0.041359 0.07149799 0.578 0.5880 M e d ica id  C laim s
MCARE 0.090655 0.02396641 3.783 0.0129 M ed ica re  C laim s
HMO -0.072587 0.04118388 -1 .762 0.1383 HMO C laim s
ACE -0.115049 0.10960173 -1 .050 0.3419 Ave C ost E le c t
ACP 0.153785 0.13822205 1.113 0.3165 Ave C ost on Paper
IECEL -0.038138 0.01371022 -2 .782 0.0388 IEC E le c t r o n ic a l ly
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6.7.2 Hospital Medical Records and Administrative efficiency
Information is recorded and stored on paper during the period o f encounter by the 
majority of hospitals. This information is recorded and stored mainly using a paper system 
(86% on paper, 2% electronically). 94% of medical records are stored on paper in the 
short-run (first year). Other medical information like admissions and lab tests is more 
likely to be stored on a computerized system. 75% of hospital computerized medical 
records allow intra-hospital access but fewer than 50% allow inter-hospital access. The 
level of computerization is 59% for hospital records (59% of hospitals have computerized 
medical records).
The response rate for the survey is higher for the medical records departments (35 
observations) but the information from the types of the questions asked is limited.
The results, however, are mixed. A large percentage of hospitals records and stores the 
information on paper initially and after some period of time the records are computerized. 
The majority of hospitals have computerized medical records and the number is increasing 
but the level of accessing and communicating the information within or outside is not 
clear. The stochastic frontier inefficiency is regressed on a set o f payer-mix variables and 
selected variables from the medical records questionnaire. The percentages of Medicare, 
Medicaid confirm the results obtained above. They have a positive and significant effect 
on inefficiency. The coefficient of the HMO is insignificant.
The entry and storage of information during the period of encounter (on paper or on 
computer) is one set of variables included in the model. The second set involves 
electronic access to computerized information (admissions) from locations in the hospital
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or outside the hospital. The vast majority o f hospitals store the records on paper, so the 
paper storage appears to influence efficiency. The entry o f information on paper is 
positively related to inefficiency while on computer it is negatively related, but the 
coefficients are not significant. Both electronic access from locations within the hospital 
and electronic access from remote locations influence efficient performance. However, 
their effect is not significant.
Table 6-9
Modeling the effect of EDI: Medical Records
Dependent v a r ia b le :  
OLS: R2 = 0.6045 Adj
OLS E s tim a te s  
The S to c h a s tic  F r o n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX
-R2 = 0.4350 Model t e s t :  F [6 ,1 4 j= 3 .5 6 7 , Prob va lue  = 0 .0234
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard E r ro r t - r a t i o P [|T |a :t l
INTERCEP 0.017910 0.14172814 0.126 0.9012
PADMC 0.342486 0.08442330 4.057 0.0012 % Adm M edicare
PADMD 0.188292 0.08762404 2.149 0.0496 % Adm M ed ica id
PADHMO 0.095773 0.10977793 0.872 0.3977 % Adm HMO
COMP -0.000922 0.00121342 -0 .759 0.4602 Comput s to ra g e
STOREP -0.001346 0.00120523 -1 .117 0.2827 S to re d  on Paper
X34 -0.014219 0.03191893 -0 .445 0.6628 E le c t Acc to  Adm In
Dependent v a r ia b le :  
OLS: R2 = 0 .6239 Adj
OLS E s tim a te s  
The S to c h a s tic  F r o n t ie r  INEFFCIENCY INDEX
-R2 = 0.4044 Model t e s t :  F [7 ,1 2 ]=  2 .8 4 3 , Prob va lu e  = 0.0538
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard E rro r t - r a t i o P11T |a t 1
INTERCEP -0.081760 0.06651140 -1 .229 0.2425
PADMC 0.327792 0.11394900 2 .877 0.0139 % Ada M edicare
PADMD 0.183255 0.08632075 2.123 0.0552 % Adm M ed ica id
PADHMO 0.071573 0.11860512 0.603 0.5574 % Adm HMO
RESTADC 0.007942 0.05101281 0 .156 0.8789 R es iden ts  (ADC)
PAPER 0.000974 0.00119579 0 .815 0.4310 E n te red  on Paper
STOREP -0.001333 0.00118014 -1 .129 0.2809 S to re d  on Paper
X39 -0.014611 0.01714133 -0 .8 5 2 0.4107 E le c t Acc to  Adm o u t
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Appendix 6.1 Hypothesis Testing:
Banker (1993) developed a statistical test for the efficiency/inefficiency evaluation of 
DEA. He showed that the efficiency of two groups of DMUs can be statistically 
compared. First, some distributional assumptions must be made about the inefficiency 
index. Specifically, the inefficiency index can be considered as a “stochastic variable with a 
monotone decreasing probability function.” Given that the sample size is sufficiently 
large, the derived inefficiency component approximates the probability distribution of the 
true but unknown inefficiency. This probability distribution can be the half normal or the 
exponential.
Let’s consider two groups of hospitals (Gl and G2). To test if the inefficiency o f one 
group is statistically different from the other, the null hypothesis is formed:
H o  : o> =07 H i  : a t  > a>
Under the assumption of exponentially distributed observations the test statistic is:
jeq
j ^ i .
Which follows the F-distribution with (2Gi, 2 G2) degrees of freedom.
Under the assumption of half normal distribution the test statistic is:
jeG i________ _
5 > /)2'G>
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Which follows the F-distribution with (Gi, G2) degrees o f freedom. The decision rule 
rejects the null if the test statistic exceeds the F-critical value (at a given level of 
significance). That means the G2 group is more efficient than the Gi group or the 
inefficiency of the G! group exceeds the inefficiency of the G2 group.
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Appendix 6.2 Administration: The DEA Inefficiency Models
TOBIT E s tim a te s
Dependent v a r ia b le :  The W eight R e s tr ic te d  (TCAR) DEA (CRS) INEFFCIENCY INDEX 
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  -63.92243
V a ria b le C o e f f ic ie n t S tandard E r ro r z = b /s .e . P [|Z |£ Z J
C onstant -0.38068E-02 1.1475 -0 .003 0.99735
PADMD -3 .4596 2.3209 -1.491 0.13606
PADCHAR 1.6869 1.4823 1.138 0.25509
PADHMO -1 .2749 1.0401 -1 .226 0.22030
DSH 2.3533 1.8267 1.288 0.19765
IRB 1.0759 0.60425 1.781 0.07499
HS 0.15199E-01 0.14942E-01 1.017 0.30905
BS - 0 . 15575E-01 0.93202E-02 -1.671 0.09469
POVH 0.14015E-01 0.15674E-01 0.894 0.37122
MILESTH -0.42251E-03 0 .55172E-03 -0 .766 0.44380
BIRTH 0 . 10836E-03 0 . 10298E-03 1.052 0.29265
SIXF -0 .1 1087E-01 0.36678E-01 -0 .302 0.76243
CT 0.51205 0.40927E-01 12.511 0.00000
TOBIT E s tim a te s  
Dependent v a r ia b le :  DEA VRS INEFFCIENCY INDEX (Transform ed)
Log l ik e l ih o o d  fu n c t io n  -31.87259 
__________________ V a r ia b le  C o e f f ic ie n t  S tandard E rro r  z = b /s .e . P [|Z |> z )
Constant 0.39476 0.65920 0.599 0.54928
PADMD 1.0341 1.3534 0.764 0.44482
PADCHAR 0.24978 0.85901 0.291 0.77122
PADHMO -0.98248 0.62271 -1 .578 0.11462
DSH -0.69811 1.0467 -0 .667 0.50481
IRB 1.3091 0.35080 3.732 0.00019
HS -0.33464E-02 0.86587E-02 -0 .386 0.69915
BS -0.50892E-02 0.55725E-02 -0 .913 0.36110
POVH -0.12086E-01 0.90754E-02 -1 .332 0.18293
MILESTH -0.25326E-03 0.30851E-03 -0.821 0.41170
BIRTH 0.15940E-03 0.58603E-04 2.720 0.00653
SIXF 0.24480E-02 0.22250E-01 0.110 0.91239
CT 0.28152 0.30678E-01 9.177 0.00000
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7
Conclusions and Implications
The administrative expenditures of hospitals grew faster than any other component of 
hospital costs the last decade (Shulkin et al., 1993) and its share reached an average of 26 
percent ranging between 22.9 and 34 percent in 1994 ( Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 
1997). To address the question of efficiency a comprehensive empirical investigation was 
undertaken. The state of the art techniques on efficiency measurement, both parametric 
and non-parametric, were employed.
Hospital efficiency and administrative efficiency were estimated and evaluated.
The hospital average inefficiency was found to be 4.04 percent, a dollar equivalent of 
$4,293 thousand. The mathematical programming technique yielded comparable results. 
The average potential cost improvement amounted to $4,273.98 for the VRS and 
$7,516.22 for the CRS formulations.
In an integrated framework, an improved Assurance Region/Cone Ratio model was 
estimated using the empirical estimates of the stochastic frontier to construct the weight 
bounds in an attempt to bring the DEA estimates (technical efficiency) closer to an overall 
cost efficiency.
Specifically the marginal rate of output transformation and the marginal rate of input 
substitution formed the “Technologically Consistent Assurance Region.”
The restricted model‘s inefficiency estimates were much higher. The potential cost 
savings for the average hospital amounted to $9,639 and $11,762 thousand for the VRS 
and CRS surfaces, respectively.
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The results indicated that the weight restricted DEA score was correlated more with the 
DEA initial estimates than the overall cost frontier estimates. The weight bounds that 
incorporate additional information into the model (price information) do not necessarily 
yield overall cost efficiency as many recent studies claim (Thompson et al., 1990).
Table 7-1
Hospital Efficiecy
M odel In e f f ic ie n c y E f f ic ie n c y A v.S av ings  ($000)
S to c h a s t ic  F r o n t ie r 0.0404 $4,293
S to c h a s t ic  F r o n t ie r  (CMI a d ]) 0.0339 $3,820
Data Envelopm ent A n a ly s is CRS 0.8619 $7,516
VRS 0.9287 $4,273
W eight R e s t r ic te d  DEA CRS 0.7974 $11,762
VRS 0.8167 $9,639
Cost M in im iz in g  DEA CRS T e c h n ic a l 0.9220
A llo c a t iv e 0.8509
Cost 0.7845
VRS T e c h n ic a l 0.9427
A l lo c a t iv e 0.8836
Cost 0.8333
However, another nonparametric approach, the cost-minimizing DEA, was estimated.
This is a DEA cost minimization approach to efficiency measurement or the nonparametric 
analog o f the stochastic frontier.
Even if the data requirements of this technique are enormous, the results are in line with 
those of the stochastic frontier. The cost-minimizing DEA inefficiency and the stochastic 
cost frontier inefficiency are correlated.
Inefficiency was modeled in a second stage. Administration was found the most important 
determinant o f hospital inefficiency. The results support the hypothesis that hospital 
administration is inefficient and also support the notion of Himmelstein et al., (1996), that 
“more administration waste time and trees.”
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The administrative function of the hospital, also, was specified and estimated using the 
techniques mentioned above. The average administrative inefficiency, (estimated 
parametrically), was found to be 3.34 percent, which translated into dollars yielded an 
average of $470.28 thousand per hospital. The DEA estimates amounted to $2,960 and 
$3,535 thousand for the two surfaces (VRS and CRS respectively).
A weight-restricted model, also, was estimated with bounds obtained from the 
administrative stochastic frontier model, which yielded much higher potential savings for 
producers. Specifically, hospital could save from $5,932 to $6,821 thousand under the 
CRS and VRS formulations, respectively.
Table 7-2
Adninistrative Efficiecy
Model In e f f ic ie n c y E f f ic ie n c y  A v .S av ings  ($000)
S to c h a s tic  F ro n t ie r 0 .0334 $470
Data Envelopment A n a ly s is CRS 0.8297 $3,535
VRS 0.8757 $2,960
W eight R e s tr ic te d  DEA CRS 0.5724 $6,821
VRS 0.6633 $5,932
Cost M in im iz in g  DEA CRS T e c h n ic a l 0 .8050
A llo c a t iv e 0.3547
C ost 0.2879
VRS T e c h n ic a l 0 .8816
A llo c a t iv e 0.4698
Cost 0.4213
The cost-minimizing DEA function, also, was estimated, which indicated a large 
proportion of allocative and cost inefficiencies. However, the construction of input 
variables (prices and quantities) of this type of models involves an additional problem to 
estimation.
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The most significant determinants of hospital inefficiency include the administrative 
hospital function, hospital size, competition in the local market, quality, and case mix. 
Among the determinants of administrative inefficiency are the payer mix, teaching status, 
and hospital area characteristics.
Hospitals, like any other firm, have invested billions o f dollars in computer information 
systems. This paper provides a different approach for assessing the economic contribution 
of information technology based on the foundations o f microeconomic theory of the cost 
and production functions. The results strongly support the wide application of Electronic 
Data Interchange.
There are several limitations regarding the data set employed in this analysis. The number 
of observations does not allow an actual model to be developed and estimated. However, 
the regressions confirm that information technology and specifically Electronic Data 
Interchange could reduce administrative costs and improve efficiency.
Finally, in addition to the limitations of the data set, a number of caveats of this study and 
suggestions for future research should be mentioned.
An Assurance Region, which is based on empirically obtained productive characteristics of 
a cost function, could be proved the best approach o f setting weight bounds, limiting 
weight flexibility and estimating an overall cost efficiency through a production function. 
However, this is at the expense of a rich data set that would allow a cost function to be 
estimated. The cost-minimizing DEA proves to be the nonparametric analog o f the 
stochastic cost frontier, but its data requirements exceed even the requirements of the 
stochastic frontier.
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